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Chapter 1: Introduction
Attempts at health care reform have occurred in the United States since President
Theodore Roosevelt. Since then, presidents have frequently attempted to try and reform the
health care system in the United States; whether one aspect of the system was being reformed or
a health care overhaul was being attempted, it has been tried by presidents throughout history. A
key component of reform efforts and passing legislation through Congress is the activity of
interest groups. Interest groups have their own special interests and when reforms are on the
table, each group likely wants something slightly different out of a reform. This leads to
lobbying efforts by interests at times of reform. Common lobbying efforts include inside and
outside strategies (attempting to influence Members of Congress and the public) and spending.
Through trying to make appeals to the public, interest groups may utilize grassroots campaigns
or may use advertisements to sway public opinion in their favor. Also, in order to try and gain
the provisions that they would like in a reform, interest groups may align themselves with the
president. This includes supporting the president’s plan publically and making deals with the
administration. Finally, an organization that is ideologically aligned with Congress may be better
positioned to gain provisions that they would prefer in a reform.
Looking at interest group behavior and the strategies of interest groups that appear to be
most successful in a reform is useful. Interest groups can use effective strategies to gain as many
provisions that they would like to see in a reform. It is important to be able to identify why some
groups have a high level of success in a reform and some have a low level of success. If success
is not due to chance, the causal mechanism is important to know so it can be used as an effective
strategy. Both interest groups, and those working in Congress and in the White House can look at
interest groups’ roadmaps to success to help bargain, compromise, and create an effective reform
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that satisfies the most players in a reform. Understanding the motivating and successful strategies
of interest groups is important because in order to work with these groups, and in order for these
groups to be successful as an organization, their mechanisms must be known.
The main frameworks for interest group theory involve theories of institutional change,
interest group dynamics, the status quo, collective interests, and citizen groups. Each framework
has a different approach to interest group behavior. Status quo theory focuses on how interest
groups are able to initiate or block change, while collective interests touches on how interest
groups can band together to try and accomplish a goal.
In this study, the strategies interest groups use to influence health care reform in the
United States will be observed and analyzed. The research question being tested is: What
strategies do interest groups choose to use in an attempt to influence health care reform and how
successful are the different direct and indirect strategies? The hypotheses are: 1) With all other
things being equal, interest groups who are more active with the reform movement are more
likely to be successful in their goals than those who are less active, 2) With all other things being
equal, interest groups who are aligned with presidential health care reform initiatives are more
likely to be successful in their goals than those who are not aligned, and 3) With all other things
being equal, interest groups who are aligned with the ideological majority in Congress are more
likely to be successful in their goals than those who are not aligned with the ideological majority
in Congress. These hypotheses will be tested through empirical case studies of President Clinton,
President Bush, and President Obama’s health care reform attempts. Key interest groups will be
observed and their activity level, ideological alignment with Congress, presidential alignment,
and their success level will be observed. Finally, judgments will be made about the model after
each case.
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This study will take the following approach, first a review of the literature and key

theoretical frameworks will be provided, then the theory and methods for this study will be
provided. Following that will be three case studies of presidential attempts of health care reform
in the United States. At the end of each case study will be an analysis of the model for that
individual case. Following the cases, however, will be an overall analysis of the model and a
conclusion to the study.

Chapter 2. Empirical Literature Review
Health care reform attempts by presidential administrations in the United States date back
as far as President Theodore Roosevelt. Since then, health care has been on the political agenda
and interest groups have risen to either favor or oppose proposed legislation. Interest groups have
been active since the creation of health care programs in the United States to either actively
support or to oppose any further reform attempts in Congress. There are many studies and
theories that aim to explain why interest groups have been so active and prevalent in health care
reform in the United States. Many scholars have attempted to address interest group behavior in
the United States. Such scholars include Mark Peterson, Thomas Gais, Jack Walker, Frank
Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, Beth L. Leech, Kay Lehman
Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. There are three different elements to current
interest group research: how the institutional system in the United States has changed, that it is
significant whether or not interest groups are protecting the status quo, and broad collective
interests have developed a newfound importance in American politics.
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I. Institutional Changes
One of the main arguments from Mark Peterson about how interest groups operate in the
United States is that “changes in these organized interests and in Congress have transformed the
health care reform policy community from an ‘iron triangle’ dominated by an antireform alliance
of medicine, insurance, and business to a more loosely bound policy network in which a reform
coalition may now be able to prevail” (Peterson 1993a, 395). Iron triangles are autonomous and
impermeable while issue networks are “made up of technical specialists, journalists,
administrators and public administrators (Gais et al. 1984). Issue networks, however, lack “the
structure and internal homogeneity of subgovernments” (Gais et al. 1984, 162) and therefore
complicate situations, are unpredictable, and strain governmental leadership.
Both iron triangles and issue networks have distinguishable characteristics. Iron triangles
are more sympathetic to the concerns of the large vested interests in society, policy outputs are
more predictable, budget shares are more strongly fixed, and authority would be clear even
though it is decentralized and complicated. Issue networks would have a less stable system of
authority. There would be possible rapid mobilization of new coalitions and legislation that
would be thought to have a low likelihood of passage would be able to pass through Congress.
Stable policy areas could suddenly develop conflict. This system of subgovernments has barriers
against redistribution, but new programs could be added as long as they did not disturb the
existing system. Thus, in this system, redistribution shifts in the budget shares are likely, because
as new programs are added, the budget must change accordingly (Gais et al. 1984).
To test this theory, Peterson looks at three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that
“despite the apparent structural changes the core power relationships will remain the same as in
the past, and the antireform alliance will either continue to block policy change or will push
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through a reform program that protects its constituent interests” (Peterson 1993a, 395).
According to the second hypothesis, “the structural changes produce an atomization of power,
making coalition building in support of reform impossible” (Peterson 1993a, 395). The third, and
what is considered the most plausible hypothesis is, “the structural changes, in combination with
the shift in politics and Clinton’s election, have generated new opportunities for fundamental
reform” (Peterson 1993a, 396). This is the most plausible hypothesis because it is more
optimistic and is the most in line with current political environments (Peterson 1993a).
To explore these changes, Peterson sets forth three possible approaches. The first method
he suggests is to comparatively look across nations and look how other democracies that are
economically advanced have executed comprehensive health care finance reform, especially
those with similar discussions to the United States (Peterson 1993a). The second, like the first, is
a comparative approach. This method would search for the common ground in the policy
domains of American politics. This approach “draws attention to fundamental reforms that have
been both deliberated and executed in this country, such as the creation of the Federal Reserve
and the establishment of Social Security” (Peterson 1993a, 398). The third method, and the
method that Peterson uses in this study, is the approach of focusing on health policy in the
United States and emphasizing the attributes of that policy domain that are subject to variation
and are likely to be of consequence to governmental decisions about comprehensive health care
reform (Peterson 1993a). This approach is preferred and is the one utilized in Peterson’s study
because it is the most favorable. The first approach falls short and is not able to estimate the
probability of enacting reform given the design of the United States’ government and political
system (Peterson 1993a). The second approach is problematic because the policy outcomes that
it compares are “…influenced by the characteristics of the individual policy domains to which
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they belong and the substantive issues involved” (Peterson 1993a, 398). The third framework is
the best because it enables Peterson to look at the way attributes of health policy “derives from
the ways in which they motivate the national policy making process in the U.S., both
individually and in the interaction with one another” (Peterson 1993a, 399). Thus, this method
makes it possible to observe and study how likely it is that the President—President Clinton in
this case—will have more success with comprehensive health care reform that those who
attempted a reform before.
The focus of this theory is that the institutional structures in the United States have
changed and that affects the context in which ideas are promoted, blocked, deliberated, decisions
are made, and cues to other decision makers are formed (Peterson 1993a). A main concern is
with the changes in the policy community. Main players in reform are representational
communities and these communities are either stakeholders or stake-challengers.
Representational communities are composed of “organized interests and members of the
executive and legislative branches of government who turn proposals into policy or orchestrate
vetoes of them” (Peterson 1993a, 400). The members of this community influence and motivate
public opinion and then use the public’s positions to advantage themselves in the eyes of elected
officials to increase and build their credibility. A key role of a representational community is that
“it determines which interests project an effective voice and which do not and affects which
ideas and perspectives get emphasized in public debate and so gain the most currency among
officials” (Peterson 1993a, 400). Ultimately, Peterson thinks that politics and structure were
radically changed by the 1990s because the iron triangle system transformed to a policy network,
which is a diverse and open system that allows coalitions the opportunity to succeed. This
transformation will be further described in how Peterson believes structure is important and how
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the American Medical Association (AMA) has lost power in the United States. The most
significant factor for the prospect of reform success in the 1990s was the transformation of the
health care community from an iron triangle to a policy network (Peterson 1993a).
Based on current research, “the fundamental outlines of American politics have been
altered and we are aware that this transformation has been the result of many influences” (Gais et
al. 1984, 163). It is clear that there are still iron triangles in the United States, but they are less
powerful than they were in the 1940s and 1950s and are no longer a collection of loose
subgovernments (Gais et al. 1984). The American government has changed in size and scope. It
has become decentralized. The fragmentation of Congress has “allowed private interests to
cultivate relationship with relatively small sets of governmental actors who possessed the
authority necessary to resolve most policy issues” (Gais et al. 1984, 164). This is clear in the fact
that there are hundreds of new government programs that have involved the government in many
different areas that were once of only a local concern. This has created an opportunity for the
development of subgovernments that would not change the decentralized structure of policy
making in the United States (Gais et al. 1984).
When looking at how policy is moved, it is evident that “once the President and
congressional leaders become directly involved in debate over an issue, the controversy naturally
attracts the attention of larger number of people” (Gais et al. 1984, 165). This is because the
mass media displays information to the public and then the public becomes more interested and
involved with their elected officials and the debate (Gais et al. 1984). The authors believed that
the American public had become more involved with politics and their representatives because a
study showed that “the proportion of the population reporting that they had written a letter to a
government official increased from 17 to 28 percent between 1964 and 1976” (Gais et al. 1984,
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166). The American middle-class has also changed; they became more involved in politics in the
1960s and 1970s, and thus became a target audience for political entrepreneurs. This is important
because “new constituencies could be reached who were more likely to respond to ideological
appeals, and less likely to care about the maintenance requirements of large private organizations
or their co-opted allies in the public sector” (Gais et al. 1984, 166).
There is “evidence of a transformation of the American system of policy making.
Important new institutions and individuals have recently appeared that are willing to serve as
patrons for political action in pursuit of broad collective goals” (Gais et al. 1984, 177). The
increased presence of citizen groups in American politics (discussed below) who are more likely
to engage in grassroots mobilization and appeal to the public to advance their goals and interests
has changed the institutional dynamic. It is concluded that “the decentralized system of
subgovernments is definitely being threatened” (Gais et al. 1984, 177) because policy
entrepreneurs are being challenged. This has also increased the conflict level in American
politics because commercial interests and citizen groups are competing against one another.
Congress is affected because the change has created more problems for legislators in terms of reelection campaigns. Committees have lost their control in Congress and conflict has increased
and weakened Congress’ control over policy outcomes. This means that many decisions are then
left up to the executive branch of government. Presidents must also bargain and debate what the
subgovernments have established concerning a policy issue. Subgovernments should, however,
protect the presidency from having to handle too many technical issues and debates that could be
handled within the government. Therefore, the Presidency can “shape the agenda of the higher
levels of government, choosing issues that will enhance their reputations and increase their future
influence” (Gais et al. 1984, 181). The President is put in a difficult position because the
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President must ultimately handle the decisions that were too difficult to handle in the lower
levels of government. This turns the President into a conflict manager.
In The United States, “a penetrable, unpredictable competitive system of conflict
resolution will emerge that would frustrate almost all efforts to provide it with national focus and
leadership” (Gais et al. 1984, 184). When Congress’ efforts become stumped, control and power
falls to the president and his or her administration, but often they have difficulty resolving and
focusing conflict as well. It is unlikely that a decentralized system of autonomous
subgovernments could be re-established. A change in the representative institutions in American
national government has been observed. The increased presence of citizen groups has also
changed how policy is created and enacted in the Untied States. The previous system of iron
triangles has moved to a system of issue networks that are fluid and composed of technical
specialists, journalists, administrators, and political entrepreneurs (Gais et al. 1984).
Peterson has always argued that “institutional change can dramatically alter the dynamics
of political relationships” (Peterson 1993b, 782) and that it has “practical consequences for how
health policy reformers of every stripe approach one another, assess the intersection of
substantive policy and political reality, and set the course for restructuring one of the largest
economies in the world: the American health care financing and delivery system” (Peterson
1993b, 783). Peterson believes that others assume that there are “unyielding institutional
characteristics of American government and politics that simultaneously make the reform
enterprise itself extraordinarily precarious and constrict sharply the domain of viable policy
options even if reform in some sense moves forward” (Peterson 1993b, 783). Peterson believes
that this is incorrect and states that the 1990s are not the 1970s. This is because the problems of
diminished access, rising cost, and threatened quality have been aggravated, the general public is
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more ready to promote intervention by the government, and the middle class is suffering from
setbacks in health security (Peterson 1993b).
The 1990s have had an institutional change that has altered the way interests are
mobilized and represented in the policy-making process. Profit-sector interests, like trade
associations, have had a strong advantage with organizing for political purposes (Peterson
1993b). Profit-sector interests have a low number of potential members and they have a rational
basis for a member to subsidize the organizational effort. Groups with large potential
memberships face what Peterson calls the “free rider” problem. This is because all of the
members of their organization will benefit if their political objectives are achieved regardless of
whether or not each organization participates.
The institutional change in America, according to Peterson, is due to five different factors
in Congress. The first factor is that after the 1970s and through the 1980s the House was more
productive at moving legislation out of subcommittees and onto the House floor, and once
legislation was on the floor, the leadership was good at maintaining the agenda. Secondly, there
were a large number of party, committee, and subcommittee leaders who were experienced and
committed to health care reform. Thirdly, Members of Congress had become policy
entrepreneurs and made their own plans to restructure the financing of new medical services.
This means that many Members of Congress were knowledgeable about the problem, interested
in it, and working on a solution. Fourthly, the 1992 elections brought 110 new representatives
and twelve freshmen senators into the 103rd Congress. Many of these representatives campaigned
on ending gridlock and finding an acceptable solution to the health care reform debate. Finally,
Congress is able to do high-level policy analysis and has resources such as the Congressional
Budget Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, the General Accounting Office, the
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Congressional Research Service, the Physician Payment Review Commission, and the
Prospective Payment Assessment Commission. These offices help Congress produce meaningful
data that enable them to make informed decisions (Peterson 1993b).
Peterson notes that policy change “depends on fairly momentary ‘policy windows’
engendered by a confluence of problem awareness, events, public mood, electoral outcomes, and
policy entrepreneurship” (Peterson 1993b, 795). Once these policy windows are open, “major
shifts in policy probably depend on the results of…‘political’ decision making, when ideas and
people with influence are both energetically in contention” (Peterson 1993b, 795). Peterson notes
that this is not static and depends on bargaining and the participant’s relative power and how
resources are utilized. Based on his analysis, it is concluded that “the current institutional setting
affords the best chance in this century for fulfilling the most ambitions reform objectives”
(Peterson 1993b, 796). Reformers learn from past reforms and thus, “reformers are also
cautioned by the 1970s episode to assess carefully the fluctuating politics of medical care reform
and know when to strike a deal—when to fight and when to bargain…” (Peterson 1993b, 796).
A structure-based approach to interest group behavior is important because “conditions
become perceived as problems, problems attract attention, and popular sentiment motivates
adjustments in policy only through mediating institutions, which are, additionally, players in
their own right” (Peterson 1993a, 497). If representation institutions, like interest groups, show
the attitudes of those who have the most to lose from adjusting the policy status quo, and the
government’s structure allows these interests to have primary control, no variation in politics can
create policy innovation except a mandate from the government unified by a strong political
party (Peterson 1993a). The key part of this theory is that as the politics around health reform
changes, the health policy domain has changes as well. It has changed in regards to how interests
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are represented in the United States and how interest groups have access to policymakers. The
end result is a whole new policy community (Peterson 1993a).
The shift from an iron triangle system to an issue network system in the United States
“provides an opportunity, an opening, for reform where perhaps none ever existed before”
(Peterson 1993a, 426). A policy network has been created that is more complex than before and
that the current system now has roles for new ideas and players (Peterson 1993a). After each of
the three hypothesis surrounding the institutional structure of government in the United States is
tested, it is found that the first hypothesis, that structural changes do not have much consequence,
has strong and weak components that leaves it subject to counterarguments and subjects it to
questioning. It forgets to include the impacts of campaign financing and the business community
in the hypothesis. This results in the consequence that “business representatives cannot join in
active support of any particular reform initiative and instead may thwart those presented by other
participants (Peterson 1993a, 424). It also results in the consequence that “major policy change
will continue to be stymied by Members of Congress who are directly or indirectly bought off by
campaign contributions from the insurance industry and the medical community” (Peterson
1993a, 424). The second hypothesis that structural changes reduce the likelihood of reform,
“recognizes the dramatic shifts that have occurred in the representation community and the
rearrangement of power in Congress” (Peterson 1993a, 426). This hypothesis, however, is flawed
because it ignores or misinterprets features of American politics that Peterson deems significant,
such as the rising number of interest groups that lead to fragmentation within the system. The
third hypothesis which Peterson favors, states that structural change has introduced previously
unavailable opportunities for reform. This has the most significant and optimistic outcome
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according to Peterson. It allows for new ideas and players to enter the system and for new
alignments to form.
The most important conclusion made is that “the [organized interests] are more willing to
compromise with him [the President] than with each other” (Peterson 1993a, 429). This relates to
his third hypothesis and he associates it with the structural change of the representational
community. The President is important because if reformists of a majority party have
disagreements while in Congress while the public is open to a reform, they will look to the
President for suggestions.
The change and transformation of the representational community matters because they
“indicate a growing tension in the health domain between nonprofit enterprises…and profit
making providers and other businesses who remain (at least in the mid-1980s) far more
antagonistic to government involvement” (Peterson 1993a, 415). Due to the changes, Congress
has transformed and issue network policy communities have taken over policy domains. This led
to policy networks, issue networks, knowledge communities and advocacy coalitions. These
terms are ones that Peterson borrows from other researchers such as Helco, Walker, McCool,
Sailsbury, and Sabatier. Advocacy coalitions are what Peterson calls “variable factions made up
of both government officials and organized interests that may or may not have a partisan bias to
them” (Peterson 1993a, 419). A finding that Peterson has is that there is “a representational
community of both competitive stakeholders and plentiful stake-challengers, a Congress
decentralized and more open—indicate that in the health care realm the policy community has all
it needs to be a policy network” (Peterson 1993a, 423). This conclusion and theory plays along
well with the hypotheses and research question that will be explored in this study.
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There are three ways that the institutional threshold for health care reform in the United

States could be lowered. The first way is for governing institutions to be substantially
restructured. The second is to wait for a crisis to develop within the health care system. Political
systems, even ones that appear to be slow and less responsive, can rise and respond to a threat or
disaster. The final option is that the politics and government within the United States are not
static. Peterson states that “access, influence, and decision making depend not only on the
constitutional outlines of the political system but also on the evolving details of how private
power and public authority are manifest in each policy domain” (Peterson 1993b, 785).
In the analysis, it is clear that the 1990s had an institutional change altered the way
interests are mobilized and represented in the policy-making process. Profit-sector interests, like
trade associations, have had a strong advantage with organizing for political purposes (Peterson
1993b). Profit-sector interests have a low number of potential members and have a rational basis
for a member to subsidize the organizational effort. Groups with large potential memberships
face the free rider problem.
It is also thought that certain presidents and eras may have more advantages than other
when it comes to reforming health care policy. This is also due to the institutional structure and
the advantages that a president has (Peterson 2011). There are three categories of problems that
are perceived with the U.S. health care system that can influence the policy outcome of health
care reform. These categories are costs, coverage, and consequences. Costs are defined as “a
concern in terms of any or all of the following: U.S. spending as compared to that of other
countries; health care inflation relative to the underlying consumer price index; and evidence of
increasing spending on government budges, businesses’ bottom lines, and individuals…”
(Peterson 2011, 430). Coverage, is defined as, “problematic when a significant or growing
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percentage of the population is uninsured; a large or rising percentage of the insured have
insufficient coverage to provide adequate protection against health care costs…” (Peterson 2011,
431) or if coverage varies based on race, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status. The concept of
consequence is what the actual health care system in place delivers. It is inadequate if the quality
of care is poor and the nation’s expenditures regarding health care are high.
There are four ways that politics has transformed from the 1970s to the 1990s. First, there
was an increasing number of interests in Washington, D.C. Therefore, it was more difficult for
groups to have the influence that they previously had unless an unusually strong coalition is
present. Secondly, money from PACs did not have as large of a political influence on political
issues that were highly-visible to the public. Lastly, organized interests’ impacts depended on the
“nature of the institution they are attempting to manipulate. How public authority itself is
organized affects the pathways of influence” (Peterson 1993b, 791).
While noting how the United States’ institutional structure has typically been arranged, it
is observed that the structure was generally stable and unchanging before the 1970 and through
the early years of President Nixon’s presidency. However, by the mid-1970s Congress changed
because of the implementation of structural reforms (Peterson 1993b). Power in Congress was
institutionally redistributed. This created subcommittees for all of Congress (Peterson 1993b).
Institutional changes are important in how they changed the way of Congress and how
policy is discussed and addressed in the United States. What made the 1990s a unique and good
opportunity for health care reform in the United States was that “providers, insurance companies,
and business have lost much of their organizational advantage, and by 1985, groups of all kinds,
including citizens associations, were reporting equivalent levels of cooperative interactions with
congressional committees and subcommittees (Peterson 1993b, 794).
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Peterson also observes policy making through the presidencies of President Franklin

Roosevelt through President Obama. The policy-problem, institutional, and political factors are
observed for six periods of reform debates—1912, President Franklin Roosevelt, President
Truman, President Nixon and President Ford, President Carter, President Clinton, and President
Obama. This assessment is then used to determine whether or not the presidents’ status at the
time were “conducive to the political success of reform initiatives” (Peterson 2011, 433). This is
done through comparing those eras to costs related to international measures, health care
inflation, government spending, and business spending. These eras are also compared in regards
to coverage according to individual spending, the uninsured, the underinsured, and disparities.
The eras are also compared in regards to consequences according to quality and outcomes,
international rank, and population health. The categories are coded in terms of no evidence of
problem, evidence of problem but condition improving, problem evident and persistent, problem
present and getting worse (Peterson 2011). They are also then coded as contextual factors
influencing the politics of health care reform when it was on the agenda, from inhibiting to
conducive. In this analysis, Peterson categorizes policy problems in relation to cost, coverage,
and consequences and ranks them as very favorable, favorable for reform enactment, neutral, or
challenge for reform enactment. Next, Peterson categorizes institutions in relation to interest
groups, the House, and the Senate in the same way. Finally, Peterson ranks political resources in
respect to the presidential election, the House (solid), the Senate (solid), critical juncture, and the
public on the same scale. This is how information about the unity of collapse of antireform
alliances is established and reform alliances are observed. Finally, whether or not issues were
centralized—or in the majority-party leadership, decentralized—in the committees of
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jurisdiction, or fragmented—shared with rank-and-file members are compared and observed
(Peterson 1993a).
From the analysis and tables, it is concluded that President Franklin Roosevelt had more
advantages than the other presidents working for health care reform because he has no evidence
of problems with international measures, health care inflation, government spending, business
spending, the under-insured, disparities, outcomes, international rank, or the population health.
President Clinton had benefits when they entered the health care debate in the early 1990s, such
as the severity of the perceived problems, the constructive changes in the interest-group
community and Congress, and an increased amount of solid votes among Democrats in Congress
than previously seen under President Truman and President Carter (Peterson 2011). President
Clinton, however, also had disadvantages. A serious disadvantage was that he received a low
amount of the popular vote when he was elected to office. President Obama entered his
presidency and was able to have a health care reform debate and agenda “with more favorable
contextual attributes than any president since FDR, and perhaps including FDR as well”
(Peterson 2011, 435). He had benefits from previous changes in the House that led to increased
influence from the leader and he had the highest first-term popular vote of any Democrat since
FDR. His party, the Democrats, were able to break a Senate filibuster. According to Peterson,
this (2009-2010) was the most favorable to health care reform.
Ultimately, it is determined that leadership still matters in American politics and
especially in health care reform debate and politics. Peterson argues that context is important, but
the advantages only matter if they utilize and exploit them correctly and to their full potential,
otherwise, the advantages will not make much of a difference in reform efforts. Also, despite the
number of advantages given, challenges will still remain, and it takes an effective leader to
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navigate the debate properly and effectively. When observing Obama’s health care reform uses,
he states that Obama understood that pushing reform before opposition was able to inspire fear
and collapse the public support was essential. He also notes, that Obama “chose to go for broke”
(Peterson 2011, 436). Peterson credits actions of the president and how he interacted with
Congress to the success of his health care reform movement.
Certain presidential administrations are more likely to have success with interest groups
and policy reform because of the relationships between interest group liaisons and a presidential
administration. This White House Liaison theory is based on whether or not presidents and their
administration wish to be inclusive or exclusive to all interest groups with differing ideologies
than their own. It also depends on the type of substantive focus an administration would like to
have. The focus could either be programmatic or representational. A programmatic focus “works
with interest groups to secure the passage or implementation of its policy agenda. Particular
organizations attract the solicitations of the White House because of the influence they
potentially wield in the legislative arena” (Peterson 1992, 613). A representational focus
“emphasizes an administration’s desire to reinforce its political standing, either among the
president’s electoral coalition or among group representatives at large” (Peterson 1992, 613). In
this focus, presidents must decide which groups best support and improve the president’s image
to the public and Congress.
To analyze the activity of presidential administrations and interest groups, Peterson
creates a typology of White House liaison with interest groups. This typology includes four
different categories: liaison as governing party, liaison as consensus building, liaison as outreach,
and liaison as legitimization. To set up this analysis, it is stated that there are three choices that
presidents must make about the breadth of relationships and their focus on the institutional,
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political, and economic contexts facing them (Peterson 1992). The first choice is what the
presidents would like to accomplish, the second is how to organize the means for achieving their
ends, and the third is selecting individuals to fill positions in the administration and progress
toward the goals of the administration while rewarding allies, paying political debts, and quelling
defeated factions (Peterson 1992). From here, the four different typologies of White House
liaisons with interest groups emerge. When the substantive focus of interest group interactions is
programmatic and the breadth of group interactions is exclusive, the typology is the liaison is
acting as a governing party. If the substantive focus of interest group interactions is
programmatic and the breadth of group interactions is inclusive, the liaison is consensus
building. Thirdly, if the substantive focus of group interactions is representational, and the
breadth of group interactions is exclusive, the liaison’s typology is labeled as outreach. Finally,
when the substantive focus of group interactions is representational and the breadth of group
interactions is inclusive, the typology of the liaison is legitimization (Peterson 1992).
These typologies are applied to past situations. He states that this “demonstrates how
these approaches derive from the context of a particular president’s tenure in office and reflect
the political and organizational biases of the individual chief executive” (Peterson 1992, 614).
Through Peterson’s research and interviews, he found that even when a president such as
President Carter did not like interest groups, he found it necessary to work with them and even
“lobby the lobbyists…to get a large constituency on an issue” (Peterson 1992, 616) in order to
try and have successful policy movements. Even if an interest group could not be swayed to
favor the president’s interests, the administration would work to at least make the interest groups
neutral on the issue so they would not oppose the president’s efforts (Peterson 1992). The main
case study for this research was President Reagan’s administration. It was found that two-thirds
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of conservative groups reported to have at least occasional interactions with the administration,
while less than a quarter of liberal organizations reported having interactions with the
administration. Being well positioned with Congress also made a difference for interests, because
small interest groups were less likely to be selected for regular attention from the presidential
administration (Peterson 1992).

II. Interest Group Dynamics and Challenging vs. Protecting the Status Quo
There are four different representational communities in the United States based on the
composition of the attributes of stakeholders and stake-challengers (Peterson 1993). Stakeholders
are “interests that benefit by the status quo, or at least are more threatened by revisions in it”
(Peterson 1993a, 408) while stake-challengers are “the interests that want to change the status
quo because they either do not benefit from it or are actually harmed by it” (Peterson 1993a,
408). It is possible for stakeholders to create a strong alliance, if they agree on a public policy, or
they may become competitive and make a competitive environment if they are divided and
disagree. Stake-challengers are able to work against the stakeholders and their interests, or they
can be absent from the picture, or ineffective altogether. The attributes that stakeholders and
stake-challengers can combine to possess are: allied stakeholders with no stake-challengers who
present as block (homogeneous) representational communities, allied stakeholders with stakechallengers who present as dyad (polarized) representational communities, competitive
stakeholders with no stake-challengers who present as amalgam (differentiated) representational
communities, and competitive stakeholders with stake-challengers who present as network
(heterogeneous) representational communities. In regards to these relationships, Peterson
suggests that usually, representational communities “begin as blocks, with allied stakeholders
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unencumbered by stake-challengers” (Peterson 1993a, 409) He also notes that “the interests of
stake-challengers, however, are generally more diffuse and thus less likely to prompt
mobilization. An individual stake-challenger cannot justify unitary action, and organized
representation is achieved only if barriers to collective action are overcome” (Peterson 1993a,
409).
Each type of communities has significance. The block community, composes of allied
stakeholders and stake-challengers who are not effectively present, create a homogenous
community. The amalgam community, where stake-challengers are absent, but stakeholders are
competitive with each other, is complex, less uniform, and less cohesive. When stake-challengers
are organized and challenge stakeholders who are allied, a polarized community that is called a
dyad community of opposed coalitions forms. The final community is the network, this is where
stakeholders are competitive with each other and stake-challengers are vigorous. This
community is loosely structured and heterogeneous (Peterson 1993a). Block communities are
most common in the politics of the United States, but from the 1960s to the 1970s, the
representational community became more dyadic. This is because “new stake-challenger groups
increasingly polarized health care politics while stakeholders maintained their old alliance”
(Peterson 1993a, 413). Now stakeholders are more competitive with each other, there are a larger
number of stake-challengers, and there is a heterogeneous representational network (Peterson
1993a).
Not all interest group activity happens in plain sight of the public and often times, what
interest groups want is to keep attention off of an issue to maintain the status quo. Researchers
interviewed over 300 lobbyists and government officials and created a random sample of over
100 issues and identified specific 98 issues. This research was conducted from 1999-2002—the
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final two years of the Clinton administration and the first two years of the George W. Bush
administration. Data for this research was collected from lobbyists’ quarterly disclosure reports
of what issues they were lobbying and how much money was spent on each issue. Interviews
were conducted asking lobbyists to give information regarding the most current issue on which
they were working on that relates to the federal government. Researchers first looked at
organized interest groups that were the most active. Then, they chose to work with the in-house
lobbying representative. Finally, each representative provided them with an issue (Baumgartner
et al. 2009). This means that they “only talked with so-called in-house lobbyists—those who
work directly for the trade association or corporation that is registered as the lobbying
organization” (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 5). This is the most representative sample that has been
used in the study of lobbying. As previously stated, the aim of most lobbyists is not to inspire
change, but to prevent it from happening. A good predictor of success in lobbying is “not how
much money an organization has on its side, but simply whether it is attempting to protect the
policy that is already in place” (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 6).
The interviews that were conducted identified the major players on both sides of the
policy debate. Out of these interviews both government officials and outside actors were
identified as major players. The study defines a side as “a set of actors who share a policy goal”
(Baumgartner et al. 2009, 6). Policy actors on the same side may not necessarily be working
together, but they all seek the same goal. This study identified 214 sides across the 98 issues that
were observed. After attempting to interview a leading representative from each side on an issue,
it was found that “the most common single goal across our 214 sides is, not surprisingly, to
protect the status quo from a proposed change” (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 7). Major players
determined the number of advocates on each side. Major players were defined as being “an
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advocate mentioned by others (or, occasionally, who was revealed through our subsequent
documentary searches) as playing a prominent and important role in the debate” (Baumgartner et
al. 2009, 7). This number ranged from one to over 50, but usually was in the single-digits. For all
the cases, there was a total of 2,221 advocates, with an average of 23 per case (Baumgartner et
al. 2009). It was observed that 41 percent of the advocates involved were government officials
themselves, which shows that government officials are not, as many have thought, neutral actors.
Thus, 59 percent of major actors were lobbyists involved in various organized interests. Each set
of actors has their own opinions and biases. To collect data regarding the interest group actors,
the researchers looked at their “membership, budget, annual revenues, number of employees,
hired lobbyists, lobbying and PAC expenditures, and more” (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 8). They
also looked at congressional statements, speeches and hearing testimonies along with newspaper
and television searches (Baumgartner et al. 2009). In total, they were able to obtain information
about 2,220 major actors about the 98 selected issues.
Citizen groups are most often mentioned at the major participant in policy debates at 26
percent of mentions, followed by trade and business associations with 21 percent of mentions.
While the press commonly mentions unions, they only make up 6 percent of the mentions by
actors. It is noted that “citizen groups may spend less on lobbying and lobby on fewer issues than
business organizations, but when they do lobby, they are more likely to be considered an
important actor in the policy dispute” (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 11). The study also found that
“individual corporations, trade associations, and professional groups constitute 74 percent of the
issue identifiers in our sample, but they collectively represent only 48 percent of the major
participants. Citizen groups, representing just 15 percent of the issue identifiers, are 26 percent of
the major participants” (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 12).
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Most cases of government participants, two-thirds, include rank-and-file Members of

Congress along with committee and subcommittee leadership from both parties (Baumgartner et
al. 2009). It is clear that policy making is a bottom-up process that is porous for advocates. This
is an alternative to the thought that policy making is a top down process, because the actors do
not frequently mention party leaders or party leadership as central figures in these policy debates
(Baumgartner et al. 2009).
Most interests wish to preserve the status quo, because of this it is possible that few
issues may be in the eyes of the public. It was found that most of the issues did not have
newspaper or TV coverage and, on average, for each issue, nine congressional bills were
introduced and three hearings were held and more than half of the issues had at least one
executive department or agency as a key policy advocate for the issue (Baumgartner et al. 2009).
It is clear that there are four factors that influence interest groups and policy change in
Washington. Lobbying revolves around changing current policies in Washington, it is complex
with multiple and often contradictory constituencies, there are relatively homogeneous sides that
mobilize to protect or to change the status quo and finally, attention in Washington is limited
(Baumgartner et al. 2009, 19).
In the United States, policy change tends to not be incremental because of the status
quo’s strength. When change does occur, it is a large and substantial change rather than a small
one. Contrary to popular belief, interest group resources do not always mean interest group
success. A more indicative factor of interest group success is that interest groups who can reduce
uncertainty are typically favored in times of reform. This is because policy makers do not want
any uncertainly when implementing a policy. Groups that can create doubt or uncertainty toward
their opposition’s position, can weaken their opposition and strengthen their own stance. Just like
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the status quo, stability is favored in policy making. It is hypothesized that money is not
necessary for success because those with money typically compete against other groups with
money. Also, those interests with large amounts of money have likely gotten what they have
wanted in the past, thus the status quo fits their needs and more money would not necessarily
mean that they would have more influence or better outcomes during a current reform. In terms
of framing, it was found that broadly reframing an issue is rare for interest groups to do, but it
does occur on an individual level. An overall bias was found toward professions and groups that
can organize well and provide resources and information (Baumgartner et al. 2009).
The interest groups who tend to get what they desire as a policy outcome in Washington
are usually those who are protecting the status quo. It is thought that this is because these groups
have already gotten the positions that they have wanted in the past. Also, these groups are more
likely to use negative argumentation. It is important to note that status quo protecting groups are
only going to fully-mobilize if there is an obvious countermovement against them because they
do not necessarily need nor want public attention or action. According to Baumgartner, “publicpolicy disputes are almost always related to existing public policies and that efforts to change an
existing policy orientation usually fail” (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 239). The status quo is
powerful in Washington. When looking at the out of the 98 issues observed, 58 did not change,
while 13 had marginal adjustments and 27 had significant changes during the four years they
were observed (Baumgartner et al. 2009). The changes are also more likely to be major than
minor because changes require a lot of time and effort, and for Members of Congress and
agencies to get involved in the process, more has to be at stake than a small change and there has
to be a large constituency affected that will benefit (Baumgartner et al. 2009). This is significant,
because when change does occur, 70 percent of the time it is catastrophic rather than marginal.
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The American policy system is clearly not incremental, but a system of equilibrium.

Attention is scarce in Washington, and obtaining the attention of those in Washington is a
challenge for all lobbyists. Therefore, it is the largest obstacle that advocates face. What makes
the policy system stable is shared information. In policy communities, policy experts are able to
share information and discuss how to justify the policy, what direction to take it in, and develop
common understandings (Baumgartner et al. 2009).
The causes of policy change in the United States, according to this study, are dependent
on context and include having a policy window, social cascades, powerful coalitions, presidential
support, and counter mobilizations (Baumgartner et al. 2009). A policy window, a concept
created by John Kingdon, is when there are moments in the policy making process that allow for
influence over the policy outcome and the policy making process as a whole. Changing pubic
opinion, coalitions with great resources, public support from the Presidential administration and
interests working against other interests can certainly have an influence on the policy outcome.
There is not a single factor that resulted in policy change. Policy change takes a long time to
occur and is a time consuming, effort involved process. Having an issue on the political agenda
does not necessarily mean it will have action, if it is on the agenda, it is more likely to be acted
upon, but being on the agenda is not sufficient for political action. There is little control over the
policy process in the United States’ relatively stable policy process and that those groups that are
protecting the status quo typically win.

III. Collective Interests and Citizen Groups
There are three ways that cause-oriented citizen groups have benefited from new
resources that aim to help reduce the collective action problem. One way that these groups have
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benefited is that the “citizenry has become more educated, attuned to politics, and find greater
personal reward for the actual participation in political and social action, thus diminishing free
rider inclinations” (Peterson 1993b, 789). The second possible way that cause-oriented citizen
groups have benefited is that those who donate to political action groups “have become much
more significant sources of revenue for citizen groups, permitting these organizations to form
without having to depend so extensively on unpredictable membership dues and contributions”
(Peterson 1993b, 790). In 1985, voluntary organizations in the profit-making sector had almost
90% of their revenues from routine membership contributions, unlike citizen group budgets
where less than half of their revenues came from routine membership contributions (Peterson
1993b). Certain changes have occurred in the United States’ institutional structure surrounding
the policy arena such as: organizations such as medical providers, insurance carriers, and
business leaders went from having compatible interests in the 1970s to being in conflict with one
another and prone to internal fissures in the 1990s (Peterson 1993b).
The system of interest groups has changed in that there is a rise of interest groups that
claim to represent “broad collective interest in civil rights, occupational health and safety,
environmental protection and consumer affairs” (Gais et al. 1984, 166). These groups tend to
have liberal tendencies and grew out of the civil rights movement’s success. However,
fundamentalist groups that promote traditional religious values counter their efforts in
Washington (Gais et al. 1984).
There has been an important emergence of new interest groups organized around
ideological causes rather than narrow commercial or professional interests in the American
political system. The different groups are divided into four different types: occupational profit
sector, occupational mixed sector, occupational non-profit sector, and non-occupational citizen

	
  

28

groups. Profit sector occupational groups include trade associations and professional groups
whose members who work mostly in the profit-making sector. Mixed sector occupational groups
are small in number and consist of groups such as the National Association of Broadcasters, the
American Hospital Association, the Society of American Forecasters and the National Society of
Professional Engineers. Non-profit occupational groups consist of associations of universities,
non-profit hospitals, state and local government agencies, and professional societies with
members that work for the government, social welfare, education, or cultural agencies. Finally,
citizen groups that are non-occupational organize around a common cause or an idea and are
inclusive to anyone. Examples of such groups include Common Cause, Citizen for Clean Air,
and Americans for Freedom (Gais et al. 1984). Upon researching these groups through surveys,
it is found that the interest group system in the 1980s was controlled by the occupational sector,
and the occupational non-profit sector in particular. Only 20.7 percent of respondents to the
survey were classified as citizen groups. In terms of funding, “only about 22 per cent of the
citizen groups receive as much as 70 per cent of their budgets from dues” (Gais 1984, 169). The
majority of citizen groups receive funding from grants, contracts, gifts from wealthy individuals,
and gifts from foundations. Citizen groups, importantly, have found a way to maintain their
organizations even without having large memberships. All of these factors and behaviors have
contributed to how citizen groups have grown in the United States.
Profit sector and citizen groups differ because “profit sector occupational groups are
solidly opposed to expansions of either regulations or services and, in fact, show heavy
majorities in favour of the contraction of each” (Gais et al. 1984, 170). On the other hand,
“citizens groups solidly favour an expansion of government activity in both realms, establishing
a clear line of ideological cleavage” (Gais et al. 1984, 170). Profit sector occupational groups and
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citizen groups believed that they experienced the most opposition to their views. This challenges
the subgovernment thesis that “decentralization reduces overt conflict by delegating policymaking authority to virtually independent, segmented communities of like-minded participants”
(Gais et al. 1984, 170). Citizen groups exert specific behavior that makes it so they do not fit into
the system of subgovernments because they appear to be unwilling to co-operate and bargain and
consult about arguments that are made in that sphere. It is determined that citizen groups do not
have good “insider strategies” and that they are twice as likely as occupational groups to “appeal
to the public through the mass media and to engage in various forms of grass-roots lobbying at
the lobbying level. Citizens organizations are also much less likely to engage in lobbying of
administrative agencies than all types of occupational groups…” (Gais et al. 1984, 173). There is
evidence that the environment of interest organizations has changed, especially because since
1961 “28 per cent of the profit sector organizations have since moved heir headquarters to
Washington, while 19 per cent of the associations representing the non-profit sector and only 4
per cent of the citizen groups have made the same move” (Gais et al. 1984, 175-176). In terms of
cooperation between interest groups and federal agencies, 46 percent of citizen groups reported
an increase in cooperation, 68 percent of non-profit groups, 79 percent of mixed groups, and 62
percent of profit groups reported no change in cooperation (Gais et al. 1984).
Individuals’ whose work is unskilled, unless they are members of a union, have no
occupational associations to represent their interests in Washington. Also, even though there “are
a small number of organizations that advocate for the poor, there is not a single organization that
brings together recipients of means-tested government benefits such as Medicaid acting on their
own behalf” (Schlozman et al. 2012, 346). This is yet another way American politics and interest
groups have an “upper class accent” (Schlozman et al. 2012).
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From 1981 to 2006, the number of active political organizations increased in the United

States and this expansion in the pressure system of politics was uneven across the different
categories of organizations that exist. At the same time, there has been a large growth of
subnational governments in the United States, “especially local governments, and institutions,
especially in the health and private sectors. Taken together, the share of organizations in the
pressure system accounted for by subnational governments and the health and educational
sectors rose nearly three times over the twenty-five-year period” (Schlozman et al. 2012, 357).
This pressure system is fluid and constantly changes. Organized interest groups are continually
entering, leaving, and re-entering the political system. From 1981 to 2006, the stake of local
governments in this system increased from 5.8 percent to 13.1 percent. When they look further
they find that, “not only are the well educated and affluent more likely to be affiliated with
political organizations but, even among members, they are also more likely to be active in those
organizations and to serve on the board or as officers” (Schlozman et al. 2012, 380). Thus, the
educated feel that theses organizations speak on their behalf.
Generally, the affluent are overrepresented, but disadvantaged groups are mentioned and
advocated for in Washington. The groups that are likely to mention disadvantaged groups are
“drawn from categories with small numbers of organizations and constituencies with limited
recourses, which suggests that the compensatory effect is very limited. Mainstream economic
associations, especially trade associations, are very unlikely to mention disadvantaged groups”
(on their website) (Schlozman et al. 2012, 392). The authors found that “…the advocacy of the
relatively small number of organizations that do the most to diversify the perspectives brought
into pressure politics not only ameliorates bias but simultaneously exacerbates it” (Schlozman et
al. 2012, 383).
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One of the main questions that lobbying organizations must face is whether or not to

become involved, and if they do, how intensely to become involved. In consideration of this,
they must think about: the availability of appropriate resources, the importance of an issue to an
organization or its members, and the probability of achieving the desired policy objectives. They
must also decide about the locations of their political actions. Thirty percent of the organizations
listed in the Washington Representatives directories had offices in Washington that had in-house
lobbyists. The majority or organizations, 70 percent, “do not have offices in Washington and rely
on outside firms for their Washington representation” (Schlozman et al. 2012, 397). Finally, “just
over one in eight, or 13 percent of all organizations, have both in-house and outside lobbyists”
(Schlozman et al. 2012, 397). When observing the websites of different organizations and how
those websites either present information or a call to action, compared to corporations,
occupational associations, trade and other business associations, organizations advocating for
social welfare or the poor, identity groups, and public interest groups, unions discuss public
policy on their website 87 percent of the time and facilitate political action 72 percent of the
time. This is much higher than the average of discussing public policy issues 37 percent of the
time and facilitating political action 22 percent of the time.
When comparing monetary and congressional resources of the different organizations
through looking at how much organizations spent, PAC spending, and how much the
organizations testified before Congress, it was found that most of the money spent on lobbying is
in amounts of more than $10,000 by organizations. Also, certain organizations, such as elderly
identity groups, and trade and business associations spend a lot more than organizations that
provide services. In regards to PAC spending, they saw “a complicated relationship to equality of
political voice. Campaign giving is the realm of participation in which financial inequalities
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among individuals matter most” (Schlozman et al. 2012, 440). In terms of equality and
representation of the economically disadvantaged, “PAC spending is the only realm in which the
activity of the economically less privileged registers at all significantly: 28 percent of PAC
donations represent unions; occupational associations of those in non-managerial,
nonprofessional jobs or the economically needy” (Schlozman et al. 2012, 440). Surprisingly, “the
less economically privileged account for 15 percent of PAC spending, a far higher share than in
any other domain” (Schlozman et al. 2012, 440). In terms of Congressional testimony, it was
observed that “the balance of congressional testimony by organizations seems not only to favor
those on the scene with Washington offices but also to tilt less obviously in the direction of the
kinds of organizations that are especially numerous in Washington politics” (Schlozman et al.
2012, 415).
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady had seven main findings about political voice. The first
was that most interest organizations in Washington only have one or two in-house lobbyists or
employ a single outside lobbying firm. Secondly, membership organizations are more likely to
use websites to speak about political issues or to inspire political involvement than initiations.
Thirdly, “although the weight of advocacy by organizations representing business interests varies
across domains of organized interest activity, in no case is it outweighed by the activity of either
organizations representing the less privileged or public interest groups” (Schlozman et al. 2012,
442). Fourthly, organizations that provide services to or represent the poor are scarce. Fifthly,
Unions are politically active, but because they are few in number, they only have a significant
share of organized interest group activity when it comes to PAC contributions. Sixthly, identity
groups are a small part of interest group activity. Finally, it is impossible to determine what share
of activity should represent public goods (Schlozman et al. 2012). It is concluded that politics do
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have an upper class accent and that money can be used to buy influence and professional
advocacy in American politics.
Another way interests gain advantages in Washington is through promoting the idea that
they have more specialized knowledge than the average person. Medical professionals in the
health care lobby do this frequently. This is because such professionals claim to have some
responsibility for the public good and reflect this responsibility onto the public. They make the
public think that they are the ones who know how to achieve the public good (Peterson 2001). In
order to have control and influence over the public and policies regarding their profession,
medical professionals must make others believe that they are the only ones who can safely make
decisions about the medical profession and health care in the United States.
There are seven attributes that would be advantageous for interests for interest groups to
possess in the “political market.” These attributes are: information, recurrent interactions with
policy makers, large and dispersed membership, quasi-unanimity, organizational resources,
electoral resources, and policy niche and coalition leadership (Peterson 2001). Information is
important for organizations to possess because government officials need information to
overcome uncertainty of how the policy action will translate into policy outcomes and
uncertainly of how an official’s constituency will interpret the government’s actions and how
that constituency will respond. Recurrent interactions with policy makers give credibly to the
organizations and to the information that they present. Having a large and dispersed membership
gives organizations a stronger political influence and greater ability to speak to a policy maker’s
constituents. If an organization is particularly good at, or well enabled to make, a grassroots
campaign, this will help them even more in being a successful organization. However, interest
groups with a large membership are subject to the free-rider problem and problems of collective
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action where all members do not have to participate to receive the benefits. Quasi-unanimity is
advantageous because “effective organized interests have to possess enough cohesion and focus
on shared core interest to project something representing a unified front on high-priority policy
concerns” (Peterson 2001, 1151). Organizational resources, both economic and status, make it
possible for the organization to consist of “a large, skilled, experienced, and professional staff”
(Peterson 2001, 1151) who know to frame issues and conduct research while communicating
effectively. Electoral resources enable these organizations to receive funds and information so
that effective election and re-election campaigns can be made. Policy niche and coalition
leadership aids an organization’s creditability, unity, and impact because an organization can
claim an advantage in information and resources (Peterson 2001).
When looking at the attributes that previous literature has deemed essential for interest
groups to possess to be successful, it is found that “most interests at the national or state level at
any given time do not possess any of these attributes, at least reliably” (Peterson 2001, 1151).
The only interest group that he finds that possesses all of the attributes is the American Medical
Association (AMA). When these characteristics were deemed essential in 1963 by Arrow, nine
out of ten practicing physicians were a member of the AMA and its state associations (Peterson
2001).
Physicians and the AMA weakened their own authority “when the AMA, starting in the
1950s and the 1960s, shifted the focus of its meetings and other activities from scientific
exploration to more economic and political interests and avoided joining concerted efforts to
measure and improve the quality of medical services” (Peterson 2001, 1158). Now managed care
interests are rising in the United States and they are staking a claim to the policy area. Peterson
finds flaws with managed care professionals’ claim to the debate because he believes that their
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motives are similar to that of physicians. There is not an ideal image where managed care
professionals can eliminate information asymmetries and ensure that patients receive the best
care. This is because managed care professionals, like physicians, are self-motivated and
politically motivated. People would have to build trust in the insurers of the health care system
and that seems unlikely to Peterson because they are for-profit organizations that are seen as
being motivated by economic interests. These groups also had low public approval, in 2000, 29
percent of the public thought that managed care companies were doing a good job (Peterson
2001). It is found that physicians will be called in to be a mediator between managed care
companies’ protocols and the science of medicine when policy is being made. Because of this,
trust is returned to physicians and this is the same situation as before.

Chapter 3. Theory
Current theories of interest group success in American politics have developed over the
past century in political science research. Theories revolve around institutional changes in the
United States, interest group dynamics and the status quo, and collective interests and citizen
groups. These theories work to address my research questions of: What strategies do interest
groups choose to use in an attempt to influence health care reform and how successful are the
different direct and indirect strategies? They also relate to my three hypotheses: 1) With all other
things being equal, interest groups who are more active with the reform movement are more
likely to be successful in their goals than those who are less active, 2) With all other things being
equal, interest groups who are aligned with presidential health care reform movements are more
likely to be successful in their goals than those who are not aligned, and 3) With all other things
being equal, interest groups who are aligned with the ideological majority in Congress are more
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likely to be successful in their goals than those who are not aligned with the ideological majority
in Congress.

I. Institutional Change
It is argued by scholars that there has been an institutional change in the United States
from a system of iron triangles to a system of loose policy networks (Gais et al. 1984 and
Peterson 1993a). Iron triangles, as defined by Gais et al., are autonomous and impermeable.
Issue networks on the other hand are composed of specialists, journalists, and administrators.
These issue networks tend to lack the structure and homogeneity that subgovernments in the
United States posses internally. This results in unpredictably complicated situations that
governmental leadership (Gais et al. 1984). These scholars are asking questions such as: What
makes a good opportunity for change? How has the institutional structure created an opportunity
for health care reform in the United States? and What type of institutional system does the
United States currently have?
Scholars such as Gais and Peterson observed that politics along with the structure of
American politics and government has been changing, especially since the 1990s. This is
because the iron triangle system has transformed into an open and diverse policy network system
(Gais et al. 1984 and Peterson 1993a). Peterson’s theory has always been that institutional
change can have a significant effect on and dramatically alter political relationships (Peterson
1993b). This is because institutional change has “practical consequences for how health policy
reformers of every stripe approach one another, assess the intersection of substantive policy and
political reality, and set the course for restructuring one of the largest economies in the world:
the American health care financing and delivery system” (Peterson 1993b, 783). These changes
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are what, according to scholars, had led to new opportunities for reform and a new structure in
American politics.
Peterson and Gais saw that the institutional change has decentralized the American
government and resulted in a change in both size and scope. As a result of this, Congress is now
fragmented which allows for private interests to form relationships with small sets of
government actors who can influence policy (Gais et al. 1984, Peterson 1993a). This
decentralization has also allowed for many new government programs that involve the federal
government in areas that were once none of its concern, resulting in subgovernments having an
opportunity to develop in the United States (Gais et al. 1984). There are many key components to
policy change according to Peterson. In the United States, Peterson theorizes that policy change
“depends on fairly momentary “policy windows” engendered by a confluence of problem
awareness, events, public mood, electoral outcomes, and policy entrepreneurship” (Peterson
1993b, 795). Once these policy windows are open, “major shifts in policy probably depend on
the results of…‘political’ decision making, when ideas and people with influence are both
energetically in contention” (Peterson 1993b, 795). These key components indicate that when
policy windows are open, there is a confluence of the public and private factors, and political
decision making produces results where people with influence are in contention, major shifts in
policy are possible.
Ultimately, Peterson determines that leadership still matters in American politics and
especially in health care reform debate and politics. This is because he provides a theoretical
framework that suggests that a president with the most institutional advantages in a reform
attempt, who uses them well, will have the most success. He argues that the context of the
president is important, but the advantages only matter if they utilize and exploit them correctly
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and to their full potential, otherwise, the advantages will not make much of a difference in
reform efforts. Also, despite the number of advantages given, challenges will still remain, it takes
an effective leader to navigate the debate properly and effectively (Peterson 2011).

II. Interest Group Dynamics and Challenging vs. Protecting the Status Quo
Other theories suggest that interest groups or representational communities who are
protecting the status quo are more likely to succeed in their efforts. These authors seek to
understand how the policy process in the United States works, who wins in politics, who loses,
and why (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Peterson theorizes that representational communities
typically “begin as blocks, with allied stakeholders unencumbered by stake-challengers”
(Peterson 1993a, 409). Peterson also believes that “the interests of stake-challengers, however,
are generally more diffuse and thus less likely to prompt mobilization. An individual stakechallenger cannot justify unitary action, and organized representation is achieved only if barriers
to collective action are overcome” (Peterson 1993a, 409). A change has taken place in the
representational communities of the United States. While block communities are the most
common, the representational community became more dyadic from the 1960s to the 1970s. This
change resulted when stake-challenger groups polarized health care politics while stakeholders
kept old alliances (Peterson 1993a). As a result, according to Peterson, stakeholders are more
likely to be competitive with one another, when there are more stakeholders, and the
representational network is heterogeneous (Peterson 1993a).
Baumgartner et al. identified four factors that influence interest groups and policy change
in Washington. They are: “first, lobbying is about changing existing public policies. Second,
policies are complex, with multiple and contradictory effects on diverse constituencies. Third,
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following from previous fact, ‘sides’ mobilized to protect or to change the status quo tend to be
quite heterogeneous. And, fourth, attention in Washington is scarce” (Baumgartner et al. 2009,
19). These different factors lead to policy change in the United States, when it does happen,
being significant rather than incremental because of the status quo.
Through the research of Baumgartner et al. 2009 it is theorized that interest groups who
can assist in reducing uncertainty are usually favored in American politics because policy makers
do not want there to be any unpredicted problems or uncertainty when implementing a policy.
Also, if groups can cast doubt or uncertainty on other groups’ positions, hey strengthen their
own stance while the targeted groups’ positions becomes weaker. Just like the status quo,
Baumgartner et al. 2009 theorize that stability is favored which is how they account for the
minimal impact of money and interest group spending on interest group success in American
politics.
They theorize that because money competes against money and because interest have
usually won their preferred position in the previously established status quo, having more money
in the present is not necessary for influence or for better policy outcomes for interest groups. Part
of this theory is that interest groups who get the policy outcomes that they desire in Washington
are those who defend the status quo. This is because those who are protecting the status quo have
already achieved what they have wanted in the past. They are more likely to use negative
argumentation, because they are protecting what is already in place, which has less uncertainty
than new policies. Those who are protecting the status quo are only going to fully-mobilize if
there is a clear and cohesive countermovement against them (Baumgartner et al. 2009). The
causes of policy change in the United States, according to this study, are dependent on context
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and include having a policy window, social cascades, powerful coalitions, presidential support,
and counter mobilizations (Baumgartner et al. 2009).

III. Collective Interests and Citizen Groups
Other scholars theorize that there are different types of interests in the United States.
There are four different types of groups: occupational profit sector, occupational mixed sector,
occupational non-profit sector, and non-occupational citizen groups. This will be explained
further in-depth in the literature review, but briefly stated, profit sector occupational groups
include trade associations and professional groups whose members who work mostly in the
profit-making sector. Mixed sector occupational groups are small in number and consist of
groups such as the National Association of Broadcasters, the American Hospital Association, the
Society of American Forecasters and the National Society of Professional Engineers. Non-profit
occupational groups consist of associations of universities, non-profit hospitals, state and local
government agencies, and professional societies with members that work for the government,
social welfare, education, or cultural agencies. Finally, citizen groups that are non-occupational
organize around a common cause or an idea and are inclusive to anyone (Gais et al. 1984). Each
group has their own dynamics. Citizen groups do not have good insider strategies and because of
this, they are twice as likely as occupational groups to use outsider strategies and to appeal to the
public through the media and grassroots lobbying (Gais et al. 1984). Also, because of their poor
insider strategies, citizen groups are less likely to lobby administrative agencies (Gais et al.
1984).
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IV. Assessment and A New Model
The current theories provide a good starting point for future research. When reading the
past research, it is quite difficult to pull out theories and theoretical frameworks from the
literature. This makes it hard to form a complete analysis of the theoretical frameworks
previously completed because it is not clear what past research was really aiming to discover.
Weakness in past theories include that they do not always provide a clear question or they
try to explain too many things at the same time. These theories also do not always clearly and
directly look at how interest groups interact with congress and a presidential administration. Not
many theories look at how interest groups’ interactions with a presidential administration can be
indicative of interest groups achieving the goals that they want in a policy outcome. Current
interest group behavior theories tend to focus on how the institutional structure of the
government has changed and the strength of the status quo, but they lack any exploration of
interest group strategies to get the policy outcomes they desire in relation to interest group
activity level, alignment with the ideological majority in congress, and alignment with the
current presidential administration. These theories also do not always explore interest group
activities from the beginning. Often, studies look at legislation that is currently in Congress and
determine whether that passed or failed and label that as a failure or a success for an interest
group. Most legislation, however, does not even make it to Congress and some interest groups
consider creating awareness, even through legislation that fails to leave committee, a success for
their organization. Current research can overlook this information and create gaps in data about
interest group success and interests.
These theories raise the empirical questions of: What strategies do interest groups choose
to use in an attempt to influence health care reform and how successful are the different direct
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and indirect strategies? With this research I aim to explore how interest groups, through their
activity level and use of direct and indirect strategies, are able to align with a presidential
administration and the ideological majority in Congress to achieve their policy goals in a time of
policy reform. This research will move from an institutional based approach and toward a
behavior based approach. It will also utilize current behavior theory and apply it along the way,
taking the best of all approaches. Status quo behavior theory is utilized when looking at interest
groups’ activity level and desired policy goals. Through the new theoretical framework, some of
the existing gaps will be closed and new conclusions will be formed.
The framework for this study will take the following form:
Figure 1. Arrow Diagram
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In this framework, Interest Group Preferences is the independent variable, Interest Group
Strategy: Activity Level is an intervening variable, Ideologically Aligned with Congress is a
conditional variable, Presidential Alignment is a conditional variable, and Policy Success is the
dependent variable. Interest Group Preferences are the interest groups’ public policy preferences
for the health care reform change being observed. These preferences can be determined through
the group’s public statements, mission statement, past actions, and website. Interest Group
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Strategy is defined as an interest group’s activity level relating to the group’s direct and indirect
strategies. This is the activity level of how much groups use direct strategies such as meet with
Members of Congress, testify in Congress, frequency of references in newspapers like the New
York times and journals such as the Congressional Quarterly Weekly relating to the legislation,
and how much the groups use indirect strategies such as running political ads, political spending
reports and attempting to affect public opinion. Ideological Alignment with Congress is defined
by comparing the interest group’s values relating to the legislation with the ideological majority
in Congress and determining whether or not the two are similar, or compatible. Presidential
Alignment is reached is if an interest group’s ideological preferences are similar to those of the
president or the president’s administration. All of these factors impact to policy success, which is
defined as an interest group getting some of their policy preferences in a reform attempt.
Based on this model, an interest group that has a high activity level, that has a high
ideological compatibility with Congress, and a high presidential alignment would be the most
successful in a reform attempt. It is important to remember that success does not always mean
that there is policy change. That distinction is how this model incorporates other theories’
notions of protecting the status quo. High interest group activity would logically lead to higher
policy success because it is reasonable to believe that the more an interest group utilizes direct
and indirect strategies, the more likely it would be that they would gain more of their favored
outcomes because the groups have been actively working with the policy makers—Congress—
and their constituents. The ideological alignment of an interest group with Congress would affect
the policy outcome because the closer the ideological goals, the more likely it is that the interest
group’s message will have salience with Congress and that the group will be able to negotiate
and work with Congress. Also, if their ideological preferences are aligned, they already have
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common ground on which to start discussion. Presidential alignment works in a similar way. If
an interest group’s goals are aligned with a presidential administration, there is an increased
likelihood that the interest group could work with or have support from the administration. This
could benefit the group and lead to increased policy success.
This model will look at how interest group preferences, strategies, and activity levels in
particular lead to policy success for interest groups. Ideological alignment with the ideological
majority in Congress and alignment with the president or a presidential administration can also
affect an interest group’s likelihood at policy success. Looking at interest group activity and
success this way will allow for the observation of status quo protection activity, how interest
groups work with both the president and Congress, how activity works when Congress and a
presidential administration are not aligned, which activities interest groups utilize the most, and
if activity level has an affect on policy success.
The current theories provide a good starting point for future research. When reading the
past research, it is quite difficult to pull out theories and theoretical frameworks from the
literature. This makes it hard to form a complete analysis of the theoretical frameworks
previously completed because it is not clear what past research was really aiming to discover.
Weakness in past theories include that they do not always provide a clear question or they
try to explain too many things at the same time. These theories also do not always clearly and
directly look at how interest groups interact with congress and a presidential administration. Not
many theories look at how interest groups’ interactions with a presidential administration can be
indicative of interest groups achieving the goals that they want in a policy outcome. Current
interest group behavior theories tend to focus on how the institutional structure of the
government has changed and the strength of the status quo, but they lack any exploration of
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interest group strategies to get the policy outcomes they desire in relation to interest group
activity level, alignment with the ideological majority in congress, and alignment with the
current presidential administration. These theories also do not always explore interest group
activities from the beginning. Often, studies look at legislation that is currently in Congress and
determine whether that passed or failed and label that as a failure or a success for an interest
group. Most legislation, however, does not even make it to Congress and some interest groups
consider creating awareness, even through legislation that fails to leave committee, a success for
their organization. Current research can overlook this information and create gaps in data about
interest group success and interests.
These theories raise the empirical questions of: What strategies do interest groups choose
to use in an attempt to influence health care reform and how successful are the different direct
and indirect strategies? With my research I aim to explore how interest groups, through their
activity level and use of direct and indirect strategies, are able to align with a presidential
administration and the ideological majority in Congress to achieve their policy goals in a time of
policy reform. This research will move from an institutional based approach and toward a
behavior based approach. It will also utilize current behavior theory and apply it along the way,
taking the best of all approaches. Status quo behavior theory is utilized when looking at interest
groups’ activity level and desired policy goals. Through the new theoretical framework, some of
the existing gaps will be closed and new conclusions will be formed.
In the framework mentioned above for this study, Interest Group Preferences is the
independent variable, Interest Group Strategy: Activity Level is an intervening variable,
Ideologically Aligned with Congress is a conditional variable, Presidential Alignment is a
conditional variable, and Policy Success is the dependent variable. Interest Group Preferences
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are the interest groups’ public policy preferences for the health care reform change being
observed. These preferences can be determined through the group’s public statements, mission
statement, past actions, and website. Interest Group Strategy is defined as an interest group’s
activity level relating to the group’s direct and indirect strategies. This is the activity level of
how much groups use direct strategies such as meet with Members of Congress, testify in
Congress, frequency of references in newspapers like the New York times and journals such as
the Congressional Quarterly Weekly relating to the legislation, and how much the groups use
indirect strategies such as running political ads, political spending reports and attempting to
affect public opinion. Ideological Alignment with Congress is defined by comparing the interest
group’s values relating to the legislation with the ideological majority in Congress and
determining whether or not the two are similar, or compatible. Presidential Alignment is reached
is if an interest group’s ideological preferences are similar to those of the president or the
president’s administration. All of these factors impact to policy success, which is defined as an
interest group getting some of their policy preferences in a reform attempt.
Based on this model, an interest group that has a high activity level, that has a high
ideological compatibility with Congress, and a high presidential alignment would be the most
successful in a reform attempt. It is important to remember that success does not always mean
that there is policy change. That distinction is how this model incorporates other theories’
notions of protecting the status quo. High interest group activity would logically lead to higher
policy success because it is reasonable to believe that the more an interest group utilizes direct
and indirect strategies, the more likely it would be that they would gain more of their favored
outcomes because the groups have been actively working with the policy makers—Congress—
and their constituents. The ideological alignment of an interest group with Congress would affect

	
  

47

the policy outcome because the closer the ideological goals, the more likely it is that the interest
group’s message will have salience with Congress and that the group will be able to negotiate
and work with Congress. Also, if their ideological preferences are aligned, they already have
common ground on which to start discussion. Presidential alignment works in a similar way. If
an interest group’s goals are aligned with a presidential administration, there is an increased
likelihood that the interest group could work with or have support from the administration. This
could benefit the group and lead to increased policy success.
This model will look at how interest group preferences, strategies, and activity levels in
particular lead to policy success for interest groups. Ideological alignment with the ideological
majority in Congress and alignment with the president or a presidential administration can also
affect an interest group’s likelihood at policy success. Looking at interest group activity and
success this way will allow for the observation of status quo protection activity, how interest
groups work with both the president and Congress, how activity works when Congress and a
presidential administration are not aligned, which activities interest groups utilize the most, and
if activity level has an affect on policy success.

Chapter 4. Research Design and Methodology
I. Research Question, Arrow Diagram, and Variables
For this research design, a comparative case study approach will be utilized to answer the
research questions of: What strategies do interest groups choose to use in an attempt to influence
health care reform and how successful are the different direct and indirect strategies? The
hypotheses are: 1) With all other things being equal, interest groups who are more active with the
reform movement are more likely to be successful in their goals than those who are less active,
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2) With all other things being equal, interest groups who are aligned with presidential health care
reform initiatives are more likely to be successful in their goals than those who are not aligned,
and 3) With all other things being equal, interest groups who are aligned with the ideological
majority in Congress are more likely to be successful in their goals than those who are not
aligned with the ideological majority in Congress. For this design the theoretical framework is:

Figure 1. Arrow Diagram
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As stated in the theory section, Interest Group Preferences is the independent variable, Interest
Group Strategy: Activity Level is an intervening variable, Ideological Alignment with Congress
is a conditional variable, Presidential Alignment is a conditional variable, and Policy Success is
the dependent variable.

II. Comparative Case Study Approach and Case Selection
A comparative case study approach will be utilized to approach these research questions
and hypotheses. A comparative case study is the best approach for these research questions
because the questions being asked are process questions, which are best addressed by case
studies. A comparative case study has explanatory power and provides the opportunity for
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replication. According to Yin, “case studies can be done by using either qualitative or
quantitative evidence. The evidence may come from fieldwork, archival records, verbal reports,
observations, or any combination of these” (Yin 1981, 58). It is useful for causal analysis
(Johnson and Reynolds 2012). A comparative case study is useful when one is trying to explore
the utility of a theory and test a hypothesis. That is why it makes the most sense to use for this
research. A weakness of the case study approach is that one is limited to the cases available. The
method can only answer questions such as why things happen or what is the process that leads to
the outcome (Johnson and Reynolds 2012). With a comparative case study approach more
control can be utilized in the research and selective and careful variation can be chosen. This
method can be informative and helpful in providing understanding of causal processes and
general explanations of theories (Johnson and Reynolds 2012).
This research is aiming to understand certain factors about interest groups and how the
process of interest group behavior and activity works to produce interest group influence or a
lack of influence in American politics. Comparative case studies are designed to understand the
causal relations in a process. The cases that will be utilized in this study are: President Bill
Clinton’s Health Security Act, President George W. Bush’s Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement and Modernization Act, and President Barack Obama’s Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. These cases have been chosen through the method of difference. These
cases will allow the study to look at health care reform through three different eras that include
three different health care attempts. Comparing Obama’s and Clinton’s health care attempts will
be beneficial because the ideological composition of Congress and the presidencies are similar,
but the overall policy outcomes are different, so finding a potential explanation for this outcome
is beneficial. Also, Bush’s health care reform has a much different ideological composition than
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the other two attempts and there was a policy change. Finding a causal explanation for how
certain interests won in different cases will be beneficial for future research and health care
reform attempts in the United States.

III. Operationalization and Measurement
The variables will be measured ordinally on a high, medium, low, scale. Interest group
preferences are the interest groups’ public policy preferences for the health care reform change
being observed. These preferences can be determined through the group’s public statements,
mission statement, past actions, and website. Interest group strategy is defined as an interest
group’s activity level relating to the group’s direct and indirect strategies. This is the activity
level of how much groups use direct strategies such as meeting with Members of Congress,
testifying in Congress, are mentioned in newspapers and journals such as the Congressional
Quarterly Weekly relating to the legislation, and how much the groups use indirect strategies
such as political spending reports. To find the mentions of interest groups in newspapers, the
LexisNexis will be used. To search for interest group mentions the formula (“healthcare” OR
“health care”) AND (“reform” OR “proposal” OR “plan”) AND (“President Name”) AND
(“Interest Group Name” OR “Interest Group Abbreviation”). The search will be done in specific
years for the cases. Interest groups will be chosen from www.opensecrets.org in the health care
spending category. For health care there are five categories of industries for the health sector.
These categories are: Pharmaceuticals/Health Products, Health Professionals, Hospitals/Nursing
Homes, Health Services/HMOs, and Misc Health. Well-known interest groups that may have
been left out were then added to the list of interest groups. For CQ Weekly and The National
Journal in the 1990s, the research will be done outside of the database. CQ Weekly’s articles will
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be searched through their website for the appropriate years and then subcategorized by health.
Then the totals for each interest group will be counted. This is because their information is not
available on LexisNexis. For The National Journal in the 1990s, the print copies will be utilized
to collect data. The top spending interest groups for the year the legislation was active will be
chosen. Duplicate mentions will be eliminated. The data on Opensecrets.org is not available for
the years of Clinton’s reform. Thus, interest groups who are frequently mentioned in The
National Journal and well-known interests will be used. The years searched will be 1992, 1993,
1994 for the 1990’s health care reform plan with President Clinton. The year searched for the
early 2000’s Medicare reform with President Bush will be 2003. Finally, the years for late 2000s
health care reform with President Obama will be 2008, 2009, and 2010. The more newspaper
mentions an interest group has, the higher an activity level an interest group would have.
Ideological alignment with Congress is defined by looking at the interest group’s political
spending on Opensercrets.org. This is done by making a ratio of the organization’s political
spending for Democrats and political spending for Republicans. Then this ratio is compared to
the composition of Congress. If Congress is ideologically liberal and the group has a 2:1
spending ratio in favor of Democrats, the organization would be in line with Congress
ideologically and vice versa. A 2:1 spending ratio in favor of the ideology of Congress would
give an interest group a high alignment with Congress. A 2:1 ratio against the ideology of
Congress would be a low alignment and approximately even values would be a moderate
alignment. Congress’ ideology is measured through DW-Nominate scores. Presidential
alignment is when an interest group’s goals are similar to those of a presidential administration.
If an interest group’s preferences are similar to those of the president there is alignment with the
president. To measure this, presidential statements and objectives will be observed. If the
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president has made any proposals or recommendations to Congress, these will be considered the
president’s preferences. Based on how similar an interest group’s preferences are to a
presidential administration’s that interest group will have a high, medium, or low alignment with
the presidential administration. Policy success is defined as an interest group getting some of
their policy outcome goals in a reform attempt. Policy outcome goals could be specific changes
or no changes at all. Based on the interest groups public goals and the end policy result, it will be
determined whether there is high, medium, or low policy success for an interest group.
It will be determined that there is high interest group activity if an interest group is in the
top third of interest group mentions in, The New York Times, The National Journal, CQ Roll
Call, USA Today, The Washington Post, and CQ Weekly. There will be low interest group
activity if the group is in the bottom third. Moderate activity is when the group is in the middle
third.
High alignment with the ideological majority in Congress will be when an interest group
has the same ideological standing as Congress. This is determined through political spending. If
an interest group and Congress have completely different ideological standings, it will be
determined that there is a low ideological alignment. If either group has a mixed ideological
stance, it will be determined that there is a medium ideological alignment.
Interest groups who have the same policy preferences as the president and publically
endorse and support the president’s plan will have high presidential alignment. Medium
presidential alignment is when an interest group and a presidential administration share some
policy preferences. Low presidential alignment is when a presidential administration and an
interest group share few or no policy preferences.
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Policy success is when an interest group gains most or all of their policy goals. Medium

policy success is when an interest group gains some of their policy goals, but not many. Low
policy success is when an interest group gains little to none of their policy goals. This can be
observed by the following contingency table:
Table 1. Contingency Table of Variables
Low Policy Success
(non-significant)
Interest Group
Strategy: Activity
Level
Ideological Alignment
with Congress
Presidential
Alignment

High Policy Success
(Very Significant)

-

Moderate Policy
Success
(Significant)
+

-

+

++

-

+

++

++

Interest group preferences and the actual legislation for each reform attempt/case study
will be observed to collect this data.

IV. Empirical Requirements
Once the data is collected and it is determined whether or not an interest group has high,
medium, or low levels on each variable, the data will be applied to the original hypotheses. First,
looking at reform activity, this study will seek to see what relationship, if any there is between
interest group activity and preferred policy outcomes. Second, this study will look and see if
there is a relationship between interest groups who are aligned with a presidential administration
and preferred policy outcomes. Finally, the ideological compatibility of interest groups with the
ideological majority in Congress will be observed in relation to preferred policy outcomes for
interest groups. As a result, one will be able to see if interest groups with low, medium, or high
levels of activity, ideological alignment with Congress, and presidential alignment are able to be
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“winners” or gain more of their preferred policy outcomes and have policy success. This would
allow one to determine whether or not these interest group strategies are successful or not in
cases of health care reform in the United States.
In order for an interest group to be counted in the research, it must have clear policy
preferences and available data. These are criteria set in order for the model to work and for
variables to have a value. Due to limitations in data requirement, five interest groups were
removed from the data after initial selection. In Bush’s case study these groups were the Senior’s
Coalition and the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans. Additionally, in Bush’s case
study, because in late 2003 America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) merged with the
Association of Health Plans (AAHP) and the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA)
these groups were merged into one in the data. AHIP represents all three organizations in that
case. In Obama’s case study, these groups were Aetna Inc., Alliance for Quality Nursing Home
Care, and the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans. Clear policy preferences are
needed to determine a group’s Success Level. Also, spending data for Congressional Alignment
is necessary. If a group was lacking too many criteria and cannot be associated with other likeminded groups, they were not suitable for this case study.
My overall prediction is that high interest group activity, high ideological compatibility
with the ideological majority in Congress, and high Presidential alignment will lead to high
policy success. If an interest group does not have high values in some variables and has a mixed
model or has all medium/moderate values, they will have moderate success. If all variables are
low, there will be low success. The more high values an interest group has, the more policy
success they will have.
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Chapter 5: Case Studies
Case Study 1: President Clinton’s Health Care Reform Attempt
I. Background:
Health care reform has been a topic of discussion in the United States throughout many
decades. This study will focus on reform attempts throughout the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. To
begin the case studies, President Bill Clinton’s health reform plan of the 1990s will be observed.
This plan began before Clinton’s presidency. Comprehensive health care reform was a topic on
which he campaigned on in 1992 and, Americans knew if he was elected president, it would be a
topic on which he would take action. In November 1992, Clinton was elected to office. Plans for
a comprehensive health care reform began as soon as he took office in January 1993.

II. Why Health Care Reform Was An Issue:
Health care reform was put on the agenda by the Clinton presidency. As soon as he took
office, Clinton stated at the end of January 1992 that he would have a health care proposal for
Congress within 90 days. He also stated that he hoped Congress would be able to complete the
work on this bill by the end of the year (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994). It was clear to
the American public and the federal government that there were evidential gaps between the
reality of the health care system and what Americans wanted (Clymer et al. 1994). This health
care reform overhaul aimed to “…fix a health care system that is badly broken…giving every
American health security-health care” (Skocpol 1995, 1). The Clinton Administration was able to
frame the issue, but they ended up lacking one “…single, easily understood objective” (Helco
1995, 4).
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In order to help progress his health care plan and identify what goals he would like to see

accomplished, Clinton organized a task force to draft a health care reform proposal for Congress.
The task force was headed by the First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton, and included Cabinet
members and White House staffers. A key player in the health care task force from the White
House was Ira Magaziner. Ira Magaziner was a part of the Clinton administration. Before he
worked on the task force, he also served as the Senior Advisor to the President for Policy
Development and Chief Healthcare Policy Advisor. Magaziner and Clinton had met during their
time at Oxford and were friends before the health care debate of the 1990s.
The task force consisted of 511 individuals. 412 of these individuals were full time
government employees, 82 were temporary employees or specialists, and 17 were consultants.
Over 130 of these members worked for members of Congress (Pear 1993). These 511 individuals
composed different working groups on health care topics. Members of these groups included the
congressional staffers who handled health care politics, federal health care experts, and experts
from the private and public sectors. According to the Center for Public Integrity (1995), although
it is stated that 511 people were part of these working groups, “court documents show that more
than 1,000 people actually worked with these groups in some capacity, even though they had no
official status” (The Center for Public Integrity 1995). Of those 1,000 individuals, 300 of them
“worked the in private sector, including the representatives of managed care companies, the
insurance industry, and small business groups” (The Center for Public Integrity 1995). Members
of these groups included individuals from the “D.C. Chartered Health Plan, The National
Governors’ Association of Counties, the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB),
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Healthcare, Aetna, Coopers and Lybrand, and Telesis,
Magaziner’s former consulting firm” (The Center for Public Integrity 1995).

	
  

57

III. How the United States Health Care System Worked:
At the time of the Clinton health care debate, health care in the United States was
delivered through several different means. One could gain health care coverage either through
their employer—the private sector, the government, or an individual. Insurance coverage was
paid for through payroll taxes from working adults, other taxes, and payments to health care
providers and health care suppliers (Iglehart 1999).
As it stood, the private sector, or employers and employees purchased health care through
insurance premiums. Employers take a percentage of an employees’ paycheck, either weekly or
monthly, to cover the premiums that fund health insurance coverage. Employers and not the
employees’ pay cover the remaining amount, about 80 percent of the premium. The income that
employees pay toward health insurance premiums is exempt from federal and state taxes and the
employer’ costs for health insurance coverage for their employees are a tax-deductible business
expense (Iglehart 1999). In 1990, 73.2 percent of Americans had health insurance coverage
through the private sector (US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2007).
Individuals who are not covered in employee-sponsored insurance can purchase nongroup insurance on the individual market. In this system, private insurance companies administer
plans and determine coverage levels. Insurance companies are able to deny people coverage
based on pre-existing conditions. Individuals assume full responsibility for premiums as an outof-pocket expense and the premium depends on the assessed health risk of the individual. Nongroup insurance that is purchased by an individual tends to cost more than group plans.
The government, through Medicare, Medicaid, and other government assistance
programs provides health care coverage to individuals as well. In this area, the government
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collects revenue for the coverage through taxes and then pays the physicians and employees of
publically operated health care facilities that accept Medicare and Medicaid. States, on an
individual basis, can also collect and distribute funds for health care services. Medicaid is for
low-income or disabled individuals, however, many elderly individuals are on Medicaid. This is
because Medicare does not cover nursing home care, and many elderly individuals become lowincome because they run through their savings paying for nursing home care, which Medicare
covers. It is required by federal law that states cover poor pregnant women, children, the elderly,
disabled individuals, and parents. States do have control of how they implement Medicaid and
whether or not they expand coverage because states administer the program. Medicare is the
largest government-controlled health care program. In 1990 there were 34,251 Americans
enrolled in Medicare (2013 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital
Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds). In 1990, 13 percent of
the population had health insurance through Medicare, 9.7 percent had insurance through
Medicaid, and 4 percent of the population had insurance through other government programs
(US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2007).
Medicare is a single-payer system that is funded through 1) contributions from employers
and employees that are required by law, 2) tax revenues, 3) beneficiaries’ premiums, and 3)
deductibles and copayments paid by patients/supplemental health insurance (Iglehart 1999).
Individuals who qualify for Medicare are the disabled, those with end-stage renal disease, and
individuals over the age of 65. Medicare Part A—the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund—has
workers make required payments into the fund during the working years with the promise that
they will receive benefits when they retire. The payroll tax that was paid was 1.45 percent of
earned income both by employees and employers. The self-employed paid 2.9 percent
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themselves (Tax Foundation). Part B, or the Supplementary Medical Insurance Program, of
Medicare pays for physicians, outpatient services, home health services, and other services. The
government only worked with approved doctors and hospitals that agreed to their prices. Funds
for this program are generated through tax revenues. Participants of Part B pay monthly
premiums and the enrollment is voluntary (Iglehart 1999).
Citizens of the United States themselves have out-of-pocket expenses. These expenses
are “generally defined as including expenditures for coinsurance and deductibles required by
insurers, as well as direct payments for services not covered for a third party. Premium amounts
contributed by employees are generally not considered as out-of-pocket expenditures” (Iglehart
1999, 72).
In the health care system of the 1990s, coverage, benefits, and costs depend widely by an
individual’s plan. The main ways an individual could gain health care were through their
employer, on an individual level, or through the government. In total, according to the U.S.
Census Bureau, 13.9 percent of the population was uninsured in 1990 (US Census Bureau,
Current Population Survey, 2007).

IV. Creating A Health Care Reform Proposal:
The mission of the Task Force on National Health Care Reform was to expand health
care to all Americans and reduce the increasing rate of health care spending. At the time, 38
million Americans were uninsured. Every month, 100,000 more people lost their health
insurance coverage. Spending on health care in the United States in 1992 had reached $832
billion. That was one-seventh of the United States’ economy at the time. This spending was
estimated to increase to $1.6 trillion by 2000 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994). At the
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time, many players in the health care system such as insurance companies, doctors, consumers,
and unions agreed about how serious the problems of the health care system in the United States
were. Americans also agreed that health care reform was necessary. According to a Wall Street
Journal/NBC news poll published on March 12, 1993, 74 percent of Americans believed that
reform was needed. However, the reform that the public envisioned was not always in line with
the reform the government was pursuing. This is because most Americans, 85 percent,
Americans were already insured, and typically, they were happy with their health insurance
coverage (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994). To finance a reform, 66 percent of
Americans agreed to pay higher taxes to cover the cost of a health care overhaul.
During the time of the movement around health care reform in 1993, over 500 different
interest groups met with the White House staff that handles health care issues to discuss their
particular concerns with the proposal (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994). For the past 60
years, health care providers had resisted changes and other sectors of the health care industry
such as doctors, hospitals, and pharmaceuticals were hesitant to support change because
annually, their income grew as a result of the rising costs of health care. However, some doctors
were in favor of reform because of the amount of paperwork and regulations caused by the
private insurance industry and the government (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994). A
main cause for concern and driving factor for health care reform was that Medicaid and
Medicare, part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society program, were comprising
almost 30 percent of the United States’ health care spending. Through these programs, the
government gives health care coverage to the elderly, disabled, and the poor (Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 1994). The system that existed in 1993 had funding from ten different
sources: Medicare, Medicaid, Indian Health Service, Veterans, Department of Defense, other
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federal spending state and local government health spending, private insurance and other
consumer spending, workers’ compensation, and auto insurance (Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 1994).
Clinton’s 245-page draft health care reform proposal was finally turned into Congress on
September 22, 1993. This draft came after Congress had already negotiated a $55.8 billion
deficit reduction bill, which included large cuts to Medicare. The health care reform proposal had
six key goals. The first goal relies on “aspects of a health policy known as managed
competition—in which doctors, insurers and hospitals competed for patients. Clinton added to
that a regulatory structure to control costs and quality” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994
338). Secondly, an economic analysis produced the concept of “gathering consumers into larger
groups, known as healthcare alliances” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994, 338) so that
consumers can bargain with health insurers and get a better price and services for health
insurance, essentially maximizing individuals market power with insurers. The third goal
involved funding the plan. This would be done through both the private and public sectors. For
the private sector, “employers would be required to pay for about 80 percent of their employees’
health-care costs. Employees would pay the balance” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994,
338). There would be subsidies available for both the employers of low-wage workers and the
employees themselves. An opt-out would be available for companies with more than 5,000
employees who did not want to provide health care coverage for their employees. If employers
opted out of the government purchasing system, they would have to pay an additional one
percent tax on payrolls in order to cover the cost of the uninsured and underinsured. A tax on
tobacco would also be added to the existing tobacco tax that would amount to about $0.75 a
pack. The fourth goal of Clinton was to “reduce the rate of growth in health-care spending
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nationwide by capping the rate of increase in health insurance premiums and by making cuts
totaling $238 million over six years in Medicare and Medicaid” (Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 1994, 338). The fifth goal emphasized that the health care alliances would change
health care delivery because states would have control of the system and be able to buy insurance
on behalf of individuals (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994). Clinton’s sixth goal is that
“the alliance would play the role that health insurers played under the existing system: It would
negotiate with health plans (groups of doctors and hospitals) for the best insurance price for the
people in the alliance and then offer the plans to everyone in the region” (Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 1994, 338).

V. Congressional Debate and Action:
At first it seemed like Congress was open to the possibility of health care reform,
although it was clear that bipartisan support would be needed because the Democrats did not
have enough members to avoid filibuster and the Democrats were not as united as they could
have been. At the start of the 103rd Congress in 1993, the Senate was composed of 57 Democrats,
and 43 Republicans. The House of Representatives was composed of 258 Democrats, 175
Republicans and, one Independent. On October 27, 1993, Clinton formally submitted his health
care reform bill to congressional leaders. Hillary Clinton led the charge to get health care reform
passed and testified in Congress, often answering many questions and catering her answers to
congressmen’s specific districts and concerns. The hot-button issues of the debate and the reform
were: health alliances, the premium caps, the employer mandate, and the subsidy cap. However,
both sides tended to agree on a need for insurance reform, malpractice reform, purchasing
cooperatives, and streamlining (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994).
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Other Members of Congress introduced their own health care reform proposals as it

became obvious that Clinton would introduce a bill and debate would occur. These bills are:
Cooper-Grandy (HR 3222), McDermott (HR 1200), Michel (HR 3080), Chafee (S 1770),
Wellstone (S 491), and Nickles (S 1743) (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994). The Clinton
Administration had tried to set the health care reform agenda themselves, but controlling the
debate around health care reform proved to be difficult.
The Cooper-Grandy proposal was a bi-partisan proposal created by Representatives Jim
Cooper, D-Tennessee and Fred Grandy, R-Iowa. This proposal, HR-3222 was the main
alternative to Clinton’s health care reform proposal. It was centered around managedcompetition. In this system, health care providers would create networks and compete for
patients. People would be encouraged to join managed-care plans, but not required to do so.
Another difference from Clinton’s proposal was that tax deductions would be limited for health
care and employer participation would be completely optional. This bill had 56 cosponsors in the
House of Representatives (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1993). The introduction of the bill
reads that it aims to “to contain health care costs and improve access to health care through
accountable health plans and managed competition, and for other purposes (HR 3222) The main
difference between the Cooper-Grandy proposal and Clinton’s proposal is that there were no
mandates regarding health care coverage.
Representative Jim McDermott, D-Washington, offered a single-payer proposal that was
similar to the system that exists in Canada. His proposal gathered over 90 cosponsors
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1993). The goal of McDermott’s plan was to “provide for
health care for every American and to control the cost of the health care system” (HR 1200). The
plan would be administered at a state-level by the terms the plan set and every citizen of the
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United States, or lawful alien, would be eligible for the universal coverage.
House Republican Leader, Robert Michel, proposed a plan with large Republican support
that would make expand coverage for the poor.
John Chafee, R-Rhode Island, had a proposal that was similar to Clinton’s proposal on
many aspects but eliminated cost controls and employer mandates. While Chafee’s plan did
include purchasing plans, they were voluntary (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1993). The
Chafee plan also included purchasing pools, a ban on coverage denial based on pre-existing
conditions, vouchers for the poor to buy insurance, an individual mandate, insurance companies
are prohibited from cancelling coverage, there is long term care insurance, Medicaid malpractice
reform, insurers cannot set lifetime spending caps, coverage is not extended to dependents, and
the self-employed are given more equal tax treatment. The goal of this plan was to have 92-94
percent of Americans covered by 2005 (Kaiser Health News 2010).
Democrat Paul Wellstone from Minnesota proposed a single-payer plan, along with other
Democratic senators, that resembled Representative McDermott’s plan to mimic Canada’s health
care system (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1993).
Finally, Republican Senator Don Nickels introduced a plan that was drafted by the
Heritage Foundation. This bill had 24 cosponsors and avoided government controls.
On November 20, 1993, the health care reform bill was officially introduced in the House
of Representatives. It was then referred to the Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and
Education and Labor committees. Smaller portions of the bill were referred to the Veterans’
Committee, the Judiciary Committee, the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, and the
Armed Service Committee. Additionally, the bill went to the Government Operations and
Natural Resources Committee in the House. In the Senate, one committee needed to have

	
  

65

jurisdiction, and it would be difficult to give sole power to one committee regarding this bill, the
bill was left on the calendar as originally written by the task force. It was taken to the floor in
1994 for both committees, the Labor and Human Resources Committee and the Finance
Committee, to amend it along with any other senators who wished to make changes
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994).
Action on health care reform was halted due to the government’s efforts to pass the North
America Free Trade Agreement. Due to the efforts involved with NAFTA, it was clear that
health care reform would not occur in 1993. Other distractions such as the economy, Whitewater,
and foreign crises, deferred attention from health care reform. Thus, health care reform was put
on the backburner for both Clinton and Congress, which caused the problem recognition of
health care to fade from the spotlight and made it clear that no action on health care reform
would occur in 1993 (Clymer et al. 1994; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1994).
On September 26, 1994, Clinton’s health care reform bill was declared dead by Senate
Majority Leader George H. Mitchell, D-Maine. Lawmakers had originally thought that they
could still act on health care reform after their summer recess, but it became clear that there was
not enough time or willingness to complete the work that was needed to get a comprehensive
health care reform bill passed. Issues that created the most problems and debate were the
Democrats’ hesitancy to accept the notion that employers would cover most of the costs and the
government would have a large hands-on approach to the institution of the system. Republicans
were wary of the whole reform because they felt it had too many taxes and regulations
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995).
Debates surrounding Clinton’s plan focused on the ideas of health alliances, premium
caps, employer mandates, and subsidy caps. Health alliances were debated because some thought
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the formation and regulation of health alliances would be too much government intervention and
would not be the appropriate role of the government. Acting in such a way would be “big
government” according to those who opposed the alliances. Premium caps were heavily
contested by the health care industry because it limits the amount insurance premium could
increase annually. There was concern that the caps would allow the price to rise considerably
once they expired and would not allow room for the health care industry to respond to the cost of
a crisis. An employer mandate was heavily opposed by small businesses this is because the
mandate would force employers to pay for employees’ health insurance. Small businesses and
their supporters, such as Republicans, worried that it would cause small businesses to close or to
fire employees because of the burden of the cost. Large companies who already paid for
insurance favored the mandate, however, because they believed that the mandate might help
limit the cost-shifting that doctors and hospitals institute because of the costs of the underinsured
and uninsured. Finally, the subsidy cap was contested by Liberal Democrats because it ran the
risk that programs for the poor and the small business subsidies fund could run out of money in
order to help the federal government avoid debt from Medicare and Medicaid (Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 1993).
Overall, it was clear that Clinton’s plan was becoming hard to sell to the public. Initially,
when Clinton’s proposal was introduced, 57 percent of Americans approved of the proposal and
31 percent disapproved according to a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll, but six months later only 39
percent of Americans approved of the proposal and 46 percent disapproved (The Center for
Public Integrity 1995). With increasing use of outside strategies by lobbyists and with Clinton’s
decreasing poll numbers, it was not surprising that public support was decreasing as well. It
became clear that not only was health care reform a policy issue, but it was also a political issue.
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Clinton would need all the Democratic support he could gather in order to pass the bill. On
December 2, 1993, William Kristol sent a memorandum titled “Defeating President Clinton’s
Health Care Proposal.” It was clear that Republicans did not want to compromise on the issue,
but to offer an alternative and dismiss Clinton’s. The unwillingness to compromise is clearly
stated: “On grounds of national policy alone, the plan should not be amended; it should be
erased” (Talking Points Memo 2013). In his memorandum he says he would like to “assess the
current political climate surrounding the health care debate and to provide a winning Republican
strategy that will serve the best interests of the country” (Talking Points Memo 2013). Defeating
the plan became political. Kristol acknowledged that the Clinton plan lost public support and the
Republicans hoped to use that to their advantage and to win support with their own plan. The
health care debate became a forum to advance general Republican interests and ideals.
From when Clinton took office in 1993, health care reform had been on the agenda. He
formally proposed his plan to Congress on September 22, 1993, while the bill was introduced in
the House and Senate (HR 3600, S 1757) on November 20, 1993. By July 21, 1994, it was clear
to the Democratic leaders that the plan would need to be scaled back if there was any chance of
passing it through Congress. The bill was not scaled back because it was clear that the window of
opportunity had closed and the momentum behind health care reform was dying. Finally, on
September 26, 1994, health care reform was declared dead for the year, the window of
opportunity for health care reform was gone for the year.

VI. Interest Group Activity:
While Congress was working on a health care reform, interest groups were also involved
in their own efforts. Some interest groups stayed on the sidelines, while others were prominently
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opposed or for health care reform. Interest groups also had different desires of what they wanted
to come from a reform, so some supported alternative plans. Groups such as the American
Association of Retired Persons (AARP) worked with the task force and submitted testimonies to
Congress (Congressional Record Database). Groups such as the American Medical Association
(AMA), AARP, Aetna, Prudential, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), the American Federation of Teachers, AFSCME, and others met with the White
House Office of Public Liaison and the task force to express their positions of health care from.
According to The Center for Public Integrity (1995), “Magaziner and other members of the task
force had met with representatives of more that 1,100 groups, each voicing their opinions and
concerns regarding health care reform” (The Center for Public Integrity 1995). It was clear that
“the White House knew exactly what the most powerful special interest were concerned about,
and elaborate efforts were made to mollify them before the President’s formal plan was written
or released” (The Center for Public Integrity 1995). While it is not unusual for the White House
to interact with specific interests, it is notable that this many interests were meeting with the
White House on a specific interest and topic in order to try and incorporate organizations’
interests into the legislation proactively.
Another group that was active at the time of Clinton’s proposal was the Jackson Hole
group. The Jackson Hole Group consisted of members that were a part of academia, insurance
companies, hospitals, H.M.O.s, doctors, businesses, government, and other organization with
interests across the United States (Toner 1993). The Jackson Hole Group had been meeting and
discussing health policy solutions for over 20 years and had slowly introduced managed care into
the discussion and the solution in order to make health care more efficient. Through the Jackson
Hole Group, business interests were presented. The Jackson Hole Group was unique in this

	
  

69

situation because it was part think tank and part interest group. It developed potential policy
solutions while it also promoted the positions of its members. The business community in this
situation was split. Big businesses were generally in favor of Clinton’s proposal because they
hoped that a larger pool of insured individuals could lower the cost of their insurance. This is
because they generally already provide some sort of health care coverage for their employees and
are disadvantaged when doctors charge more because of the high costs of providing care for the
underinsured and uninsured. However, small businesses were currently not required to provide
insurance for their employees, and if a mandate were instituted, they would be economically
disadvantaged. They claimed that they would be at risk of closing or firing employees because
they would not be able to afford to provide everyone with health insurance.
However, other organizations lobbied both members of Congress and the public such as
the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA). HIAA launched a public ad campaign
with what are known as the “Harry and Louise” advertisements. These advertisements depict a
couple sitting at their kitchen table discussing how Clinton’s proposal would affect them,
negatively. This grassroots effort was a multimillion-dollar campaign (The Center for Public
Integrity 1995). Lobbying the public is a common framing technique that interest groups and
organizations use in an attempt to sway public opinion in their favor. This is what interest group
theory refers to as an indirect outside strategy because the interest groups are trying to influence
individuals outside of the government in order to advance their objectives.
Many lobbyists also turned to grassroots efforts to try and appeal to the public. Lobbyists
efforts were extensive, members of Congress said that they did not have time to schedule all the
face-to-face meetings requested from “dance therapists, masseurs, chiropractors and podiatrists,
armed with scripted palm cards from one trade association or another” (Krauss 1993). These
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efforts are referred to as AstroTurf grassroots efforts, because it is not a pure grassroots
campaign, but rather an artificially stimulated grassroots response. These campaigns involve the
use of mass calls, mailings, and meetings to and with Members of Congress about their issue, but
without the script from the organization, those speaking with Members likely would not know
exactly what to say.
As reported by the New York Times, interest groups like the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (PMA) and the American Academy of Family Physicians spent large
amounts of money to hire lobbyists. Other groups such as AMA the National Association of Life
Underwriters, and the American Dental Association (ADA) “increased their campaign
contributions to lawmakers of both parties with the intention of increasing their access and
influence” (Krauss 1993). The AARP made appeals to their members to contact their own
Members of Congress with their stance on the issue. They utilized this tactic instead of taking an
official position on health care reform. These interest groups, however, were not all trying to
spread the same message. Some organizations were against the idea of reform altogether, while
others wanted specific goals from a health care reform. There seemed to be a balance of forces
among interest groups. They each were employing different strategies and advocating for
different goals. This is an important component of interest group theory. For most issues, there is
a balance of forces that attempts to help preserve the interest group balance. Details about what
interest groups were trying to achieve will be outlined later on in this paper.
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VII. Analysis of Interest Group Success:
VIIa. Methodological Approach:
In order to analyze interest group behavior and activity during the time of Clinton’s
health care reform, different interest groups were observed and compared. The following twelve
interest groups were observed, American Academy of Family Physicians, American Association
of Retired Persons (AARP), American Hospital Association (AHA), American Medical
Association (AMA), Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, Blue Cross Blue Shield,
Chamber of Commerce, Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), National Association
of Manufacturers, National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of America (PMA), and the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). As mentioned earlier in the methods section, interest
groups for this case study were chosen based on which groups were mentioned most in The
National Journal and the groups that were listed on www.opensecrets.org as spending the most
money in the health care interest group category. For health care there are five categories of
industries for the health sector. Well-known interest groups that may not have been listed by
OpenSecrets were added to the list. They were compared in terms of their mentions in the New
York Times, CQ Roll Call, The Washington Post, USA Today, CQ Weekly, and The National
Journal in 1992, 1993, and 1994. Their political spending in 1992 in terms of whether or not
they spent more on donations to Republicans or Democrats and how that aligns with the
ideological composition of Congress was compared. Finally, the organizations’ stances were
compared to Clinton’s objectives for the proposal to determine how much alignment there was
with the President’s objectives. All three aspects are rated on a low, moderate, high scale.

	
  

72
Interest groups were determined to have low, moderate, or high levels of newspaper

mentions by being broken up into the top third, middle third, and bottom third of mentions.
While Blue Cross Blue Shield, was not in the top third, it was included with the high category
because it was closer to the top third than the middle third of mentions. From this data, there is
evidence that, in general, those groups who have moderate and high levels of Congressional
Alignment have a better success level. The only exception to this is the American Academy of
Family Physicians.
Congressional alignment is determined by interest groups’ donations to political parties
because while partisanship is not technically equivalent to ideology, with how partisan and
divided Congress has become, one can observe ideology through partisanship. Congress’ DWnominate score for 1992 was -0.046. The Democrats’ DW-nominate score was -0.33 and the
Republicans’ score was 0.329 (Vital Statistics on Congress). Thus, Congress was more liberal
and an interest group was more ideologically in line with Congress if it donated more money to
liberal Members of Congress, or Democrats, rather than donating the majority of its money to
conservative, or Republican Members of Congress. If there was over a 2:1 ratio in favor of
Democrats, a high alignment was determined. Congressional Alignment was moderate if its
spending was relatively equal, and it was low if it favored Republicans.

VIIb. Was It Alignment Or An Opposition Movement?
When looking at Table 3 below, it is clear that there are many groups that have low
Presidential alignment and a high success level. This is because these groups were not in favor of
the plan and advocated for protecting the status quo—a common goal in interest group theory.
President Clinton’s goal was to change the status quo, therefore groups who wanted to keep
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things the same would not align with him. When the reform attempt failed, they achieved a high
level of policy success because things remained the same. Looking at Table 2 below, it is clear
that there is a strong opposition to Clinton’s plan. Out of the twelve groups observed, only one
group, the Chamber of Commerce, fully endorsed and supported Clinton’s health care reform.

VIIc. How Interest Groups Were Categorized:
The American Academy of Family Physicians endorsed a single-payer option, which is
not what the Clinton plan provided. During the time of the health care reform debate they
engaged in discussions with the administration and agreed on a need for reform, but not on the
type of reform that was being proposed. The American Academy of Family Physicians has a low
level of success in this reform attempt because they received none of the gains that they wanted
and the single-payer system was never seriously considered in Clinton’s proposal. The singlepayer system was not implemented and it was never a significant alternative policy alternative to
proposals being offered. Their preferred option was not an option of major consideration;
therefore, they had a low level of success.
The American Association of Retired Persons did not endorse the Clinton plan and called
on their individual members to make an assessment and voice their individual opinions to
Congress. Generally, they are in favor of comprehensive reform, but they did not publically
endorse it at the time, and they were wary of the cuts in Medicare and Medicaid to fund the
proposal. Therefore, the AARP was a moderate winner, because they really were advocating for
change and the status quo at the same time. They wanted some change, which did not occur, but
they were happy with preserving the status quo and ensuring that Medicare and Medicaid cuts
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would not happen, which did occur. This balance led them to come out as having a moderate
success level.
The American Hospital Association has a moderate success level because they are against
any reductions in Medicare payments, but they are for health care coverage for everyone. They
are determined to have a moderate success level because reductions in Medicare payments do not
happen because the status quo is protected, yet health care coverage is not gained for everyone.
The American Medical Association had a high level of success because they were quite
outspoken against Clinton’s proposal and were intent on maintaining the status quo. They
utilized the strategy of alliances and used that to try and get a beneficial outcome. They were
worried about the effects of Clinton’s plan and what the implications of the plan would be for
doctors. In the end, the status quo was preserved, so they were successful.
The Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans had a high level of success. This is
because they were against the plan and were part of a greater group of interests against the plan
because of the impact on employers. They thought the plan would increase health care costs for
employers, which would cause employers to drop health care coverage. Their success level is
high because employer-mandated coverage did not occur and that was their main goal.
Blue Cross Blue Shield had a high level of success because they were against the Clinton
proposal. Primarily, they were against health alliances. Ultimately, health alliances did not form,
and the status quo was preserved. Therefore, they had a high level of success.
The Chamber of Commerce, while they had previously not supported any initiative by
President Clinton, unanimously backed universal health care coverage through employer
mandates as stated by Clinton’s proposal. Due to the failing of the legislation, the Chamber of
Commerce had a low level of success.
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Health Insurance Association of America was very against Clinton’s health care proposal.

They spent a lot of money ($14 million dollars on advertisements) and efforts to protect the
status quo in this case. They ended up having a high level of success because the legislation
failed and the status quo remained the same.
The National Association of Manufacturers had a high level of success because they were
against the proposal and wanted to protect the status quo. They represent large and small
manufacturers in the United States and were concerned about the employer costs and mandates.
When the legislation failed and the status quo remained the same, they won.
The National Federation of Independent Business also wanted to preserve the status quo.
For small businesses, the employer mandate was a serious issue. Small businesses were not
previously required to provided health insurance to their employees and it was feared that a new
mandate could cause small businesses to fire employees or to close. The NFIB strategically
targeted swing-vote members of Congress to gain around 55 to 60 votes against the employer
mandate in the Senate (Jacobs 1999). The NFIB had a high level of success when the status quo
remained the same.
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of America (PMA) or Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)—the two organizations joined together at the
end of the health care debate in the 1990s—had a moderate level of success. They supported
many aspects of Clinton’s plan, but they did not like that companies would have to pay rebates
on Medicare patients’ prescription drugs and that there would be investigations into excessive
drug prices. They were also against a single price mandate for prescription drugs. The fact that
they were against rebates on Medicare prescriptions and investigations, but were generally
supportive of comprehensive health care is what gives PhRMA and PMA a moderate success
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level. So, they were a moderate winner with the health care reform debate. When the status quo
was preserved, and the monitoring of the cost of Medicare patients’ prescription drugs remained
the same, yet universal health care was not achieved, PhRMA and PMA had a moderate success.
They did not receive what they truly wanted; yet what they did not want to occur did not happen.

VIII. Success of the Model:
In the case of the Clinton administration’s attempt at health care reform in the 1990s, the
model utilized in this case study does not work well. In this case study, the status quo was
preserved. Therefore, groups who wanted to preserve the status quo to had high levels of success,
and were likely not highly aligned with the President. Most of the active interest groups were
opposed to Clinton’s reform plan. This can be observed in Table 3 below. There was only one
interest group observed, the Chamber of Commerce, who was fully supportive of Clinton’s
health care reform plan. A strong opposition to the President’s plan resulted in low Presidential
Alignment. As a whole, it seems that this could have affected the outcome of the plan as a whole.
Interest groups were determined to be in favor of Clinton’s plan if they publically supported
Clinton’s health care reform plan and the Chamber of Commerce is the only group that fits this
description. Other groups were hesitant and against the plan as a whole.
For this case, my model does not work well; this is likely due to the strong opposition
alliance that appeared to have formed during the 1990s health care debate. Out of the twelve
interest groups observed, the model appears to work for five of the interest groups. These groups
are the AARP, AHA, HIAA, PHA, and PhRMA. The model appears to work for these groups
because they each have a high level of significance that leads to their success level.
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The model works when an organization has two or more significant variables that lead to

a significant outcome. The model also works when an organization as two or more low
significance variables that lead to a non-significant outcome. A high variable can be thought of
as being very significant, a moderate variable can be thought of as significant, and a low variable
can be thought of as not significant. If an interest group has a combination of high and moderate
variables and has a high or moderate Success Level the model is successful. This is because the
average of the two would be significant—either high or moderate. Therefore, the expected
outcome of success would be significant, or moderate. If the expected outcome is produced, then
the outcome worked. The model works if it follows this pattern:
Table 2. Instances of Model Success
Variable 1
Significant (Moderate or
High)

Variable 2
Significant (Moderate or
High)

Not Significant (Low)

Not Significant (Low)

Variable 3
Significant or Not
Significant (Low or
Moderate or High)
Significant or Not
Significant (Low or
Moderate or High)

Success Level
Significant (Moderate or
High)
Not Significant (Low)

It is important to note that Variable 1, 2, and 3 are not assigned to any particular variable.
Any variable can have the assigned significance value that would meet the criteria for the model
to be successful. For instance, Variable 1 is not restricted to Newspaper Mentions. Any two
variables out of Newspaper Mentions, Ideological Alignment with Congress, and Presidential
Alignment can fulfill the two out of three minimum requirement for matching significance or
non-significance for the model to be successful in that case.
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Below is a table of the interest group analysis and of the opposition movement.

Table 3: 1992, 1993, and 1994 Interest Group Analysis
Interest Group Name
American Academy of Family Physicians
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
American Hospital Association (AHA)
American Medical Association (AMA)
Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans
Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS)
Chamber of Commerce
Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA)
National Association of Manufacturers
National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB)
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of America
(PMA)
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA)

Newspaper
Mentions
Low
High
Moderate
High
Low
High
High
High
Moderate
Moderate

Congressional
Alignment
High
High
High
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Low
High
Low
Low

Presidential
Alignment
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
Low
Low

Success
Level
Low
Moderate
Moderate
High
High
High
Low
High
High
High

Low

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Low

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Table 4: Whether Interest Groups Wanted President Clinton’s Health Care Reform vs.
Newspaper Mentions in 1992, 1993, and 1994
Interest Group Name
American Academy of Family Physicians
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
American Hospital Association (AHA)
American Medical Association (AMA)
Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans
Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS)
Chamber of Commerce
Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA)
National Association of Manufacturers
National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB)
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of America (PMA)
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)

Want Clinton’s
Reform?
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No

Newspaper
Mentions
Low
High
Moderate
High
Low
High
High
High
Moderate
Moderate
Low
Low

When comparing interest groups who are in favor of health care reform in the 1990s to
their activity level (number of newspaper mentions) in 1992, 1993, and 1994, some observations
can be made. As stated in Table 4 above, there are clearly more interest groups in opposition of
reform than in favor of the health care reform being proposed at the time. Interest groups may
have a mixed activity level, but those who support a reform attempt are severely outnumbered to
those who wish to protect the status quo. While some of the groups labeled as “no” are typically
reform-friendly, those groups were not publically friendly to the reform being proposed by

	
  

79

President Clinton in the 1990s, thus they were labeled as being against the Clinton plan. Without
a public endorsement, interest groups were not considered to be fully in favor of the health care
reform plan at the time. For example, the AARP is labeled as not being in favor of Clinton’s
reform plan because, at the time, the AARP did not give public support for the plan. While they
were not adamantly opposed to reform, they did not give the support of their organization.
Instead they encouraged their members to contact their Members of Congress and let them know
their personal opinions. There was not a formal stance of the organization in favor of the reform.
If there is not a clear stance of the organization in favor of this plan, they cannot be labeled as in
favor of Clinton’s reform.
From this observation, it is clear that unbalanced interest group activity could lead to the
policy outcome. With having eleven key interest groups opposed to the Clinton plan and only
one group publically supportive, it is reasonable to believe that the unbalanced activity was able
to protect the status quo and lead to the bill’s failure.
Groups who were not very successful in this reform were groups who supported a
President Clinton’s reform, such as the Chamber of Commerce. This could be because of the
strong opposition. There was a strong presence of groups who were interested in preserving the
status quo. The opposition clearly outnumbered those who were in favor of reform in this case.
With a strong opposition, there was low presidential alignment. With a large amount of interest
groups opposed to the reform movement, presidential alignment did not seem to be a significant
burden for interest groups to overcome. The opposition by the interests was strong enough to
allow the interest groups to succeed and the presidential reform movement to fail in this case.
Groups who supported a specific aspect of reform ended up being moderately successful.
This is because they benefited from preserving the status quo, but they would have benefited if
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parts of the proposed health care plan were implemented. Theses groups typically had certain
aspects of the reform that they were against, but were able to reconcile the idea of
comprehensive health care reform as a whole.
When applying the model specifically to these interest groups, certain conclusions may
be drawn. In the case of AARP, all of the AARP’s variables have a moderate-to-high level of
significance, which leads to a moderate success level. In this case, the model helped predict the
group’s success level. The AHA has a similar presentation of variables that shows a moderate-tohigh level of significance which helps lead to the AHA’s moderate success level. For HIAA,
having two variables with a high level of significance, helps lead to the group’s high level of
success. Finally, for both PMA and PhRMA, having two moderate-level variables helps lead to
the groups’ moderate level of success.
However, for the majority of the interest groups, the American Academy of Family
Physicians, AMA, the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, Blue Cross Blue
Shield, Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufacturers, the model does
not work.
My criteria here is that the modes is said to work when an interest group has at least two
out of three of the intervening variables are moderate or high as well as the success level. This
means that the intervening variables would then accurately align with the success level of the
interest group.
The only groups whose success level was low, were the American Academy of Family
Physicians and the Chamber of Commerce, however, the model was unable to explain why these
success levels were low. The levels of success that the model was best able to explain were
moderate success levels. It was only able to successfully predict one high level of success. The
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reason why there were so few low success levels for the model to be able to explain is because of
the strong opposition movement. The model had a difficult time explaining the effects of interest
groups bandwagoning and the results of larger interest groups paving the way for smaller groups
to achieve success. For instance, smaller groups are able to spend less money, be less active, and
potentially have a lower alignment with the president, but have a higher level of success because
larger interest groups with the same interests and desired outcomes are being active and spending
money on their behalves. It is possible to see the clear-cut activity of the larger interests in this
model, but the smaller interests who are benefiting from the bandwagon have a path that is
harder to observe through my chart and model.
In general, with the exception of the Chamber of Commerce, the only observed group in
favor of the reform, if a group has a high amount of newspaper mentions, it will have a high or
moderate level of policy success. Out of the five groups with high newspaper mentions, three
had a high level of policy success (AMA, Blue Cross Blue Shield, and HIAA)—which is half of
the groups with high policy success, one had moderate success AARP), and one had low success
(Chamber of Commerce). Those who were moderately active in newspapers generally had a high
policy success level. The National Association of Manufactures and the NFIB both had high
success levels and moderate newspaper mentions, while the AHA also had moderate newspaper
mentions but had moderate policy success. Those groups who had low levels of newspaper
mentions had mixed policy success. Both PMA and PhRMA had moderate levels of policy
success, while the Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans had a high level of policy
success, and the American Academy of Family Physicians had a low level of policy success.
The clearest explanation for the difference between those with high and low success in
this case is that those who were more active and who were opposed to the Clinton health care
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reform had higher levels of success. A bandwagon effect occurred. Groups with less resources
and power were able to benefit from being aligned with interest groups who were more active
and had more influence against the reform.
Due to the large number of interest groups who do not support any reform effort—eleven
out of twelve—it is very difficult for this model to be successful in this case. While the model
did help explain the success outcome for some groups, the strong opposition effort is hard for the
chart and theory to explain. When a few interest groups are in favor of the reform it is difficult to
see how Newspaper Mentions, Ideological Alignment with Congress and Presidential Alignment
will align to influence an interest group’s success level. The strong opposition against the reform
makes it so that Presidential Alignment and Congressional Alignment was not necessary for a
group to have success.
Ideological Alignment with Congress was not a main requirement for success.
Congressional Alignment did not have a large impact in this case. Looking at Congressional
Alignment alone does not help to explain a significant Success Level outcome. It also does not
help to explain a Success Level outcome that is non-significant. This could be because of the
strong opposition movement against the reform. It is generally easier to protect the status quo
than to initiate change, and based on this case, it is clearly easier to obstruct change than to win.
Presidential alignment is needed to create change and win a reform, but it is not essential to
obstruct a policy change. When specifically looking at the impact of Newspaper Mentions and
Congressional Alignment in this case, both have four instances where an interests group’s
Newspaper Mention or Congressional Alignment is opposite of its Success Level. For
Newspaper Mentions, there are three instances of one level deviations from the Success Level
and for Congressional alignment there are four instances of this. Congressional Alignment is the
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same as an interest group’s Success Level four times and Newspaper Mentions is the same of
Success Level five times. These numbers are so close that it is hard to distinguish the distinct
impact of each. Thus, for this case, Presidential Alignment and Congressional Alignment were
not essential variables for success. Simply being aligned against the movement is what allowed
interest groups to have a high Success Level. This is because when Clinton lost, the strong
opposition movement won.

Case Study 2: President Bush’s Medicare Reform Attempt
I. Background:
In 2003, Medicare Modernization became an issue of debate as President George W.
Bush pushed for the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA)
which was the biggest Medicare overhaul to date. Drug coverage in Medicare was debated long
before Bush became the 43rd President of the United States in January 2001. When Clinton’s
Health Security Act failed in the 1990s, the issue of Medicare drug coverage was left
unaddressed. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 created the Medicare+Choice program,
Medicare Part C, and allowed Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in the traditional Medicare
program, HMOs, or preferred provider organizations. After Clinton left office, the next
opportunity for reform was during Bush’s Presidency. With the midterm elections in 2002, the
Republicans had a majority in Congress. With this newfound majority and because the Bush
Administration was pushing for a modernization of Medicare, the Republican majority wanted to
take this opportunity to expand the prescription drug benefit for Medicare in a way that they
could control and claim credit. Previously all attempts to reform Medicare were part of a larger
health bill, but with the new Republican majority, there was a window of opportunity to pass a
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Medicare reform that would include prescription coverage but would not address any other
aspect of health care. This would be a single-issue reform. Bush campaigned on the issue, and
quickly made it a priority within his administration. In the development of the MMA, the Senate
and the House developed different plans from that proposed initially by the Bush administration.
While the administration tried to delegate legislative responsibility for the plan to Congress,
Bush clearly had his own preferences for the plan.

II. Why Medicare Reform Was An Issue:
Medicare reform was discussed in the campaign platforms of all the candidates in the
2000 presidential election. Both major candidates, George W. Bush and Al Gore had plans for
reforming Medicare to include prescription drug coverage. Gore’s plan would have a voluntary
benefit in Medicare to assist low-income beneficiaries and the chronically ill against catastrophic
prescription drug expenses. As a candidate Bush’s plan proposed a federal subsidy for lowincome beneficiaries so that they could purchase private prescription drug coverage through
private insurers (Oliver et al. 2004, 307). After Medicare Part C was implemented, “the growing
availability in managed care plans, coupled with the projected budget surpluses, made it more
necessary to answer why the government could not help cover prescription coverage for all
beneficiaries” (Oliver et al. 2004, 305). By 1999, private insurers wanted to withdraw from
Medicare Part C because of the growth of HMOs. This growth made the market less favorable
for their interests and resulted in millions of beneficiaries being left to shop elsewhere for
prescription drug coverage (Oliver et al. 2004, 305). This lack of coverage for millions of
beneficiaries added to the pressure on the federal government to add prescription drug coverage
and benefits to the Medicare program. Another reason why reform was as issue was because of
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the rising cost of prescription drug coverage to beneficiaries. Experts were realizing that
“between 1998 and 2000 alone, overall prescription spending rose 40 percent” (Campbell et al.
205, 9) for Medicare beneficiaries. However, as the economy changed so did Bush’s plan.
Eventually Bush supported a plan that would incorporate prescription drug coverage into
Medicare while also increasing Medicare’s dependence on private insurance plans (Oliver et al.
2004, 309). Instead of giving a draft proposal to Congress, Bush made his preferences known on
July 10, 2001 when he announced his two requirements for a plan. His requirements were that 1)
All seniors would have the option of a subsided prescription drug benefit as part of Medicare,
and 2) Medicare should provide improved health insurance options similar to those available to
Federal employees (Blumenthal and Morone 2009, 395). The message from the administration
was that they would support a plan that modernized Medicare along conservative lines. The
reformed plan should “resemble the Federal employees Health Benefit Program, in which the
federal government solicited bids from insurance companies, made the resulting options
available to employees (in this case the elderly) and let the employees (Medicare eligibles) pick a
plan, for which the government covered part of the premium” (Blumenthal and Morone 2009,
396). The Bush plan would not guarantee prescription drug coverage, but Medicare enrollees
could purchase drug coverage though choosing a plan that covered it. Plans that covered
prescription drugs would cost more money and would cost even more for the elderly. The poor
would get subsidies and assistance to help pay for prescription drug coverage with this type of
plan (Blumenthal and Morone 2009, 396). By during the fall and winter of 2002 and 2003, the
administration’s position had changed slightly. They increased funding for prescription drug
coverage from $190 billion to $400 billion over 10 years (Blumenthal and Morone 2009, 399).
Bush’s administration also “took a less direct route and tried to get Medicare beneficiaries to
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choose private health plans by dangling the prescription drug carrot before them. Medicare
would offer drug benefits only under private plans; beneficiaries would choose whether to stay in
the traditional program or switch for the new benefit” (Blumenthal and Morone 2009, 400).
After Bush announced his prescriptions for a plan, the House and the Senate created their
own separate drafts and work out the legislative details. At the time, most legislators agreed that
“the benefit should be designed to serve all Medicare beneficiaries, while providing assistance to
those most in need, specifically low-income beneficiaries and those who incur very high
prescription drug expenses” (Blum 2006, 1).

III. How the United States Health Care System Worked in 2003:
Prior to the attempt to reform Medicare in the early 2000s, the health care worked
similarly to how it did during Clinton’s attempt at health care reform. Major changes included
the implementation of the Medicare+Choice program. This program, as stated above, had
Medicare beneficiaries choose between the traditional Medicare program, HMOs, and preferredprovider organizations. Medicare Part C also created medical savings accounts for Medicare,
strengthened fraud prevention and prosecution, and changed payment polices and formulas for
providers and health plans (Oliver et al. 2004, 303). As a part of this change, the National
Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare was created. In the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 the State Children’s Health Insurance Program was created (Key Milestones in CMS
Programs).
In 2003, 85.4 percent of the population was covered by private or government health
insurance according to the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau). Most Americans, 70.1
percent, were covered by private health insurance. 61.5 percent of Americans had employment-
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based health insurance and 10 percent had private health insurance that they purchased
themselves (U.S. Census Bureau). The government provided insurance for 26.4 percent of
Americans—11.9 percent of which were enrolled in Medicaid and 13.6 percent were enrolled in
Medicare (U.S. Census Bureau). Finally, 3.5 percent of Americans were enrolled in Military
sponsored health care and 14.6 percent of Americans were uninsured (U.S. Census Bureau).

IV. Creating A Health Care Reform Proposal:
Instead of generating a proposal, the Bush administration delegated the issue to Congress.
Both the House and the Senate offered their own proposals for a Medicare reform to include a
prescription drug benefit. The mostly Republican controlled Congress was committed to giving
the Bush Administration a win and making reform a success (Congressional Quarterly Almanac
2004). The Senate bill, S 1 was introduced by Senators Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa and Max
Baucus, D-Montana. The initial House bill HR 2473 was introduced by Representative William
M. Thomas, R-California and the overall House bill, HR 1, was introduced by the Speaker of the
House Dennis J. Hastert, R-Illinois. The Bush administration’s plan, as mentioned above, was
not a formal plan, but was one he discussed in public and he did make his preferences known. In
Bush’s remarks on Medicare reform, he stated that he saw five goals for reform. First, senior
should have choice and should have the option of keeping their current Medicare plan. Second,
there will be a new range of choices of plans for all seniors. This would include a new
government-run plan and other non-governmental plans. All plans would have to, at a minimum,
offer as much coverage as the Government plan and offer prescription drug coverage. The
Federal Government would regulate the plans. Third, the plans would compete with one another
for beneficiaries’ choice. This would create better plans, better benefits, service and lower
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premiums. Fourth, Medicare would respond better to seniors by putting a stop-loss limit on the
amount any senior would pay in a year. Finally, Medicare would be put on a path to ensure it
would be maintained for the future (Bush 2001). A comparison of the plans can be observed in
the charts below from pages 286-288 of Oliver et al. 2004.
286

A B L E 1 in Major Medicare Reform Proposals*
Table 5. Comparison of Prescription Drug TBenefits

Comparison of Prescription Drug Benefits in Major Medicare Reform Proposals, 1988–2003

Participation
Drug benefit
added to
Medicare
Part B

Drug benefit
added to
Medicare
Part B
Voluntary
enrollment in
new Medicare
Part D

House
Republican
Bill (passed in
2002)

Drug
Discount
Card

Deductible
$600

Coinsurance
Beneficiary pays 20%
over $600,
maximum tied to
general
catastrophic
coverage limit

$11

$250

$24 in 2002,
increasing to
$44 in 2008

None

Beneficiary pays 20%
over $250,
maximum of
$1,000
Beneficiary pays 50%,
maximum of
$2,500

Voluntary
enrollment in
new Medicare
Part D

$35 to $40

$250

Beneficiary pays 25%
between $250 and
$1,000, 50%
between $1,000
and $2,000,
$100% between
$2,000 and
$5,000, nothing
over $5,000

House
Democratic
proposal
(2002)

Voluntary
enrollment in
new Medicare
Part D

$25

$100

Beneficiary pays 20%
over $100,
maximum of
$2,000

Bush
administration
proposal
(2003)

Drug benefits
included for
enrollees in
restructured
Part C
managed care
plans
Voluntary
enrollment in
new Medicare
Part D

Unspecified

Unspecified

Stop-loss protection
for all beneficiaries
(estimated at
$5,500 or higher)

Yes

Estimated
$250 in
$35.50 in
2006
2006 (indexed,
(indexed)
estimated at
$56 in 2013)

Beneficiary pays 20%
between $250 and
$2,000, maximum
of $3,500

Yes

H.R. 1 (passed
House in June
2003)

Voluntary
enrollment in
new Medicare
Part D

Estimated $34 in $275 in
2006 (indexed,
2006
estimated at
(indexed)
$62 in 2013)

Beneficiary pays 50%
between $275 and
$4,500, 10% over
$4,500, maximum
of $3,700

Administration
Federal Medicare
program and
Part B carriers

Estimated
Cost of Drug
Benefits

Federal Medicare
program and
Part B carriers
Full premiums,
deductibles, and
coinsurance below
135% of poverty
Subsidies for 135% to
150% of poverty

Private regional
pharmacy benefit
manager selected
through
competitive
bidding

$118 billion over
ten years for
drug benefits

$350 billion over
ten years,
including drug
benefits

Stop-loss higher for
income above
$60,000 for
individuals and
$120,000 for
couples

S. 1 (passed
Senate in June
2003)

Low-Income
Assistance

Yes

Full premiums,
deductibles, and
coinsurance below
150% of poverty
Subsidies for 150% to
175% of poverty
Credit of $600 for
low-income
beneficiaries in
discount card
program

Private pharmacy
benefit managers
(with federal
assistance in price
negotiation)

$415 billion over
ten years for
drug benefits

$422 billion over
ten years for
drug benefits

287

Interim credit for
Part C managed care
low-income
plans or private
beneficiaries in
drug plans
discount card
Private fallback plan
program
with federal
financial risk if no
Full premiums,
qualified coverage
deductibles, and
available in region
coinsurance below
135% of poverty
and meeting asset
test
Sliding scale
premiums between
135% and 150% of
poverty
Interim credit for
Part C managed care
low-income
plans or private
beneficiaries in
drug plans with
discount card
governmentprogram
administered
fallback plan if no
qualified coverage
available in region

$400 billion over
ten years,
including drug
benefits

T.R. Oliver, P.R. Lee, and H.L. Lipton
Medicare and Prescription Drug Coverage

Proposal
Medicare
Catastrophic
Coverage Act
(enacted as
P.L. 100–360
in 1988,
repealed in
1989)
Health Security
Act (proposed
1993, defeated
1994)
Clinton proposal
(1999)

Monthly
Premium
$4 per month
added to Part
B premium
Supplemental
premium for
high-income
beneficiaries

89
T A B L E 1–Continued
Proposal

Participation

Deductible

Estimated $35 in $250 in
2006
2006 (indexed,
(indexed,
estimated at
estimated
$58 in 2013)
Could vary based
at $445 in
on enrollee’s
2013)
choice of plan

Coinsurance

Beneficiary pays 25%
between $251 and
$2,250, 100%
between $2,250
and $5,100, 5%
over $5,100, no
maximum

Drug
Discount
Card

Yes

Low-Income
Assistance
Administration
Full premiums,
deductibles, and
coinsurance below
135% of poverty
Sliding scale
premiums between
135% and 160% of
poverty
Part C managed care
Full premiums,
plans or private
deductibles, and
drug plans
coinsurance below
Private fallback plan
135% of poverty
with federal
and meeting asset
financial risk if no
test
qualified coverage
Sliding scale
available in region
premiums and
reduced deductible
and coinsurance
between 135% and
150% of poverty
and meeting asset
test
Beneficiaries must
make small
copayments for
each prescription

Estimated
Cost of Drug
Benefits

$409 billion over
ten years for
drug benefits
(OMB
estimates $534
billion over ten
years)

Sources: CBO 2004a and b; Health Policy Alternatives 2003b and c; Health Security 1993; Himelfarb 1995; National Economic Council 1999; Pear 2002.

*From Oliver et al. 2004 pages 286-288
V. Congressional Debate and Action:
As demonstrated above, both the House and the Senate passed their own bills. Both were
passed on June 27, 2003. The House bill passed 216-215 and the Senate bill passed 76-21. The
Senate also passed HR 1 after substituting in the text of S 1, the House adopted the conference
report on HR 1, H Rept 108-391, with a margin on 220-215 on November 22, 2003. The Senate
cleared the final bill on November 25, 2003 54-44 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004).
Democratic support for the bill dwindled after conference because they felt that the bill would
help insurance and drug companies more than Medicare beneficiaries. Democrats wanted there
to be more provisions to help seniors. They also were not in favor of the law’s lack of provisions
to cap the growing costs of pharmaceuticals or to address public support for importing drugs
from Canada. Democrats were wary of the plan’s cost as well, the cost estimates kept rising
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, 11-8).
Committee actions did take place on the legislation. In the Senate, the Senate Finance
Committee approved S 1, 16-5 on June 12. This was the first time that the Finance Committee
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had approved a Medicare bill in five years and bipartisan support at this level was encouraging.
However, Democrats were critical on the gap in prescription drug coverage for beneficiaries
enrolled in private plans. This gap is commonly known as the “doughnut hole.” The doughnut
hole is where the enrollee pays for prescription drugs themselves, but pays the price negotiated
between the insurance company and the pharmaceutical company. An individual reaches the
doughnut hole because their prescription drug costs have exceeded a certain amount. The price is
less than the prescription drug without insurance, but it is not as inexpensive as before they
reached their coverage limit. An individual is in the doughnut hole until the minimum spending
requirement for catastrophic coverage to start is reached. Once the minimum-spending
requirement is reached, Medicare would once again cover the pre-set amount of prescription
drug costs. Conservatives wanted to encourage competition between plans offered to seniors in
order to help stimulate more choices and contain costs for seniors (Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 2004, 11-5). They believed that through having more plans for seniors and allowing
seniors to choose their own plan, insurance coverage would improve, premiums would decrease,
and seniors would get better service because all of the plans would be competing for the same
customer base. The Senate floor passed the bill on June 27 only after adopting an amendment
that used $12 billion in unallocated funding between the priorities of Democrats and Republicans
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, 11-5). Part of the $12 billion would go to giving
subsidies to assist private insurance companies in attracting seniors and the other half would be
used to provide better preventative and chronic care treatments and benefits for seniors who
remained enrolled in traditional Medicare (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, 11-5).
The House took up Medicare Reform in the Ways and Means Committee and the Energy
and Commerce Committee. In both committees Republicans were able to dominate the debate
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and defeat the Democrat’s efforts to shape the plan (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004).
The Ways and Means committee passed HR 2473—H Rept. 108-178, Part 2 on June 17 by a
vote of 25-15. During the committee’s debate, Democrats were concerned that the bill would
change traditional Medicare too much and force beneficiaries to enroll in private health plans.
The Energy and Commerce Committee passed HR 2473 on June 19 by a vote of 29-20 after a
three-day markup. The debate of the bill in this committee tended to get personal, rather than
purely political (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, 11-6).
The House floor passed HR 1 216-215 at 2:33 a.m. on June 27. HR 1 is a combination of
the both the Ways and Means and the Energy and Commerce Committee bills. Each committee
amended the legislation according to their jurisdiction and produced reports—H. Rept. 108-178
Part I and II. During this time GOP leaders desperately tried to assemble a majority and tried to
target individuals to change their votes from a “no” to a “yes” (Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 2004). Both Jo Ann Emerson, R-Montana and C.L. “Butch” Otter, R-Idaho were
convinced to change their votes at the last minute. In return for switching her vote, Emerson was
promised a vote on HR 2427.1 In order to convince Representatives to switch their votes, Vice
President Dick Cheney himself lobbied the Capitol. The GOP leadership in the House also tried
to change the language in the bill to try and make it more favorable for Democrats and for those
who represented rural areas of the country. Such changed included provisions that would allow
limited drug importation from Canada, speeding up the process for approving generic drugs, and
approving $28 billion in spending for hospitals, physicians and providers in rural areas
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, 11-7). How the House passed their bill was
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1
HR 2427 is the Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003. It was introduced by
Representative Gil Gutknecht, R-Minnesota, and passed the House 243-186 on July 25, 2003.
This bill would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to direct the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to allow qualified individuals to import certain products (HR 2427).
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controversial, but nevertheless, the bill passed and a conference was to follow to negotiate what a
final bill would look like.
The conference occurred between Republican leaders—the only Democrats brought to
the table were Senators John B. Breaux, D-Louisiana and Max Baucus, D-Montana. Senator
Breaux was a centrist in the Democratic Party and he was seen as a key figure in swinging
compromise votes from each party. He was a major player in the Democratic Party, in 1993 he
was elected the Deputy Majority Whip and held that position until his retirement in 2005.
Senator Baucus was the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. The conference report was
filed on November 21, 2003 in the House of Representatives. After the conference report was
filed, the House adopted it by a vote of 220-214 early on November 22 and the Senate passed it
by 55-44 on November 25. Democrats were fairly unified against the bill, which forced the
Republicans to pass the bill without bipartisan support. Democrat’s support for the bill dwindled
because they felt that it gave less assistance to seniors and more help to the insurance and
pharmaceutical companies. Also, as debate about the reform continued, it became obvious that
the plan would cost more and more money (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, 11-8). In
the House, Republicans did not start balloting until 3 a.m., and after an hour the Republicans
were losing 216-218. In order to try and win, Speaker of the House, Dennis J. Hastert, R-Illinois,
and Majority Leader Tom DeLay, R-Texas, started lobbying on the floor, targeting the
individuals who had voted “no.” Republicans took drastic action and held the vote open for two
hours and 53 minutes which was the longest recorded tally since electronic voting started in 1973
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, 11-8). While lobbying was happening on the floor,
party leaders such as Bush were calling Representatives and lobbying that way. The vote
concluded at 5:51 a.m. with Otter and Trent Franks, R-AZ, switching their votes from “no” to
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“yes” and giving the victory to the Republicans. After voting was complete, 16 Democrats in the
House supported the final bill while 25 Republicans opposed the legislation.
Senator Kennedy attempted to filibuster the Senate bill on November 24, but the Senate
voted 70-29 to invoke cloture and end debate. Senator Daschle also attempted to delay the voting
by trying to get a point of order against the bill regarding the health savings accounts and the
fiscal 2004 budget, but the Senate voted 61-39 to waive points of order regarding the budget
against the bill. The Senate passed the final bill 54-44 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004,
11-8).
The amount of coverage that Congress agreed to was not determined by research, but it
was the level that Congress estimated that approximately 5 percent of beneficiaries would have
prescription drug costs above the catastrophic drug coverage threshold and members of Congress
believed that this was a reasonable amount (Blum 2006, 2). This means that approximately 5
percent of Medicare beneficiaries would exceed the catastrophic drug coverage limit once they
have exited the doughnut hole. Some Members of Congress believed that beneficiaries should
pay an amount above the catastrophic coverage threshold to control federal costs. This is over
fears of unnecessary or overconsumption of prescription drugs (Blum 2006, 2). To try and
remedy this, beneficiaries would have to pay 5 percent of the drug cost even after they reach the
catastrophic drug cost maximum (Blum 2006, 2). Congress wanted a cost-sharing mechanism
during catastrophic coverage.
VI. Interest Group Activity:
During this time of Medicare reform, interest groups were active in different ways.
Below is a description of the main groups at the time and what the public was mostly seeing and
hearing. The main actors were the pharmaceutical industry, the insurance industry, and the
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American Association of Retired Persons. At this time the pharmaceutical industry supported
shifting individual who were dual eligible for Medicare and Medicaid into the new Medicare
program (Blum 2006, 2). This is because on the state-level many states were implementing
efforts to contain costs that restricted access to drugs through quantity limits, higher co-pays, and
preferred drug lists (Blum 2006, 2). As a whole, the pharmaceutical industry believed that the
new Medicare program would allow them better access to beneficiaries than the state-run
Medicaid programs that were implementing further restrictions. They held this belief despite the
fact that the new Medicare Part D would also be allowed to implement restrictions (Blum 2006,
3). In this attempt at a health care reform, PhRMA was notably not unyieldingly opposed to
prescription drug benefits. Instead PhRMA endorsed a new prescription drug benefit that would
be a “part of a Medicare program that is modernized to allow beneficiaries to choose among
qualified private-sector health plans” (Oliver et al. 2004, 306; Homer 1999, 24).
Organizations such as the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) or
American’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), which merged in 2003, opposed Medicare reform
because they believed that a stand-alone drug insurance plan would not work and did not think
that an insurance company would be willing to offer insurance for only prescription drug
coverage. The president of the former HIAA said that it was “analogous to offering insurance for
a haircut” (Blum 2006, 4).
The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) endorsed the plan to reform and
Modernize Medicare on November 17, 2003 (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, 11-7).
The AARP felt that the public supported expanding Medicare to include prescription drug
coverage (Oliver et al. 2004, 305). The AARP’s support weakened the Democrat’s opposition to
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reform and attracted some Democratic support for the reform (Congressional Quarterly Almanac
2004, 11-7).
VII. Analysis of Interest Group Success:
VIIa. Methodological Approach:
In order to analyze interest group success, a similar approach was used as previously. The
same interest groups in Clinton’s health care reform were observed as well as additional interest
groups identified through OpenSecrets.org. The groups from OpenSecrets.org were groups who
were top spenders during 2003—the year of Bush’s reform. A total of 21 groups were initially
observed for this case, but due to selection methods and data collection a total of 18 groups were
analyzed fully. It is important to note that the American Association of Health Plans (AAHP)
merged with the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) and formed America’s Health
Insurance Plans (AHIP). Thus, they do have different Newspaper Mentions and Congressional
Alignment, but their goals and Presidential Alignment will be the same. So, AAHP will
reference HIAA, AHIP, and AAHP as a whole.
As before, groups’ mentions in the New York Times, CQ Roll Call, The Washington Post,
USA Today, CQ Weekly, and The National Journal were observed and counted. For this case,
mentions were only observed for the year 2003. The groups’ presidential alignment and
ideological alignment with Congress were also observed. Ideological Alignment with Congress
was observed through looking at political spending data on OpenSercrets.org and seeing how
much money an organization gave to Republicans and how much was given to Democrats. The
data was observed and if the organization’s spending was in line with the composition and
ideological position of Congress, the organization would have a higher alignment. Finally,
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Presidential Alignment was calculated by comparing the organization’s stances about the reform
to Bush’s objectives for reform. All three variables are measured on a low, moderate, high scale.
An interest group was determined to have a high level of Newspaper Mentions if it was in
the top third of groups with Newspaper Mentions. The middle third had a moderate level of
newspaper mentions and the bottom third had a low level of newspaper mentions.
Ideological Alignment with Congress, as stated above, was determined by looking at
political contributions by the organizations. The DW-nominate score of the 108th Congress was
0.03, with Democrats’ score at -0.342 and the Republicans’ total score at 0.382 (Vital Statistics
on Congress). Congress, at this time, was more conservative and thus a group was more
ideologically aligned with Congress if it donated more money to the conservatives, or
Republican Members of Congress, rather than the Democrats, or the liberal Members of
Congress. If there was over a 2:1 ratio in favor of Republicans, an organization was highly
aligned with Congress. If spending was relatively equal, a moderate alignment was determined,
and if the spending favored Democrats, alignment was low.
Finally, Presidential alignment was assessed by determining whether or not an interest
group endorsed Bush’s plan and components of the plan. A low level of alignment was given if
an organization did not endorse the plan or was against the plan. A moderate level of alignment
was given if an organization supported some significant aspects of the plan, but not all of the
plan. Lastly, a high level of alignment was given to groups who supported most of the plan or
endorsed Bush’s major program components.
VIb. How the Interest Groups Were Categorized:
Aetna is a managed health care organization that sells consumer-directed health insurance
as well as traditional health insurance. Aetna is determined to have a high-level of Presidential
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alignment because they made public statements saying that they would be willing to participate
in a reform attempt and that they would be eager to do so (Abelson 2003; Pear 2003b). They
were concerned about making sure the program was adequately funded, so that the program was
workable and sufficient coverage could be provided to beneficiaries (Abelson 2003). Their
general attitude was supportive. Aetna wanted to work with Congress and the administration to
provide a drug benefit to Medicare. They wanted this because they could gain more customers
when this became law. They saw potential in this legislation and wanted to work with it. They
also got some provisions they wanted in the legislation, the bill included provision for insurers
such as the government would cover 74 percent of the insurance plans’ cost for basic drug
coverage. Beneficiaries who had drug costs that exceeded $3,600 would get an 80 percent
“reinsurance” of allowable costs by the government (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004,
11-4). Reinsurance is when a third party, in this case, the government, assumes responsibility for
paying part of an insurance company’s claims once they hit a certain amount. This stabilizes the
insurance market and makes coverage more affordable and available (Healthcare.gov.a). In the
insurers’ case, a government-run reinsurance program would protect them in the instance of too
many high-cost beneficiaries enrolled in the plans. This helps the companies avoid huge losses
and bankruptcy and offer lower premiums.
Aetna was also concerned about the providers, and the revised bill included provisions to
gain support from doctors and hospitals like Aetna was fighting for in order to make sure doctors
were getting adequate payments for Medicare (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, 11-4).
Therefore, when the MMA became law, they had a high level of success because they got what
they wanted, the plan became law and their company had more potential for growth and they
were able to get important provisions in the law.
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America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), which includes the American Association of

Health Plans (AAHP) and the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), has a high level
of success. Ultimately, AAHP supported the legislation (Pear and Toner 2003; Oliver et al.
2004). They were willing to work with the government to create a workable plan for reforming
Medicare. They were supportive of competition, incentives for generic drugs, and they wanted to
ensure that small insurance providers would be protected (Allen 2003; Pear et al. 2003) Mainly,
they wanted to implement a safety valve (Allen 2003). These organizations as a whole were
initially hesitant to support change, but ultimately supported the reform plan. When MMA
passed, theses organizations gained what they wanted and AHIP, HIAA, and AAHP had a high
level of success. They were supportive of reform and reform occurred.
The American Academy of Family Physicians, the American College of Emergency
Physicians and the American College of Physicians all had a high level of success because, while
doctors were expressing concern that Medicare payments were not keeping up with their costs,
they won provisions in the bill that blocked a scheduled 4.5 percent cut in Medicare payments to
doctors that would begin in 2004 and an additional cut in 2005 was also blocked. Doctors were
given a 1.5 increase in 2004 and 2005 in Medicare payments. Doctors, hospitals, and ambulance
services in rural areas could get additional payments (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004,
11-4). They had a high level of success because of gaining these provisions and avoiding cuts in
Medicare. Instead of losing more payments, they avoided cuts and gained increases in Medicare
payments.
The AARP had a high level of success because it publically endorsed the bill and wanted
to change the status quo. The AARP’s Chief Executive Director at the time, William D. Novelli,
said, “We strongly support the legislation and will work hard for its passage. This is not a perfect
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bill, but America cannot wait for perfect. The bill provides a lot of help for low-income people
and people with high drug costs, and it has strong incentives to prevent employers from dropping
coverage for retirees” (Pear et al. 2003). The AARP publically and strongly endorsed the plan,
therefore when the MMA was signed into law, the AARP had a high level of success.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) had a high level of success with the reform of
Medicare. This is because the AHA did lobby hard for the reform and they were part of a list of
supporters sent to the Ways and Means Committee in the House (Pear 2003a; List of
Supporters). When the reform passed, they had a high level of success because they wanted the
reform to pass.
The American Medical Association (AMA) also had a high level of success. The AMA
formed a strong lobbing alliance and lobbied hard for the legislation. It was strongly in favor of
the legislation and publically endorsed it (Pear 2003a; List of Supporters). The AMA did not
want to protect the status quo and wanted the reform to pass, thus when the MMA became law
they had a high level of success because they got what they wanted.
Blue Cross Blue Shield had a low level of success because they were overwhelmingly
opposed to the reform. The Senior Vice President for Blue Cross Blue Shield said that “Small
employers will be giving millions of dollars to insurance companies that are virtually
unregulated” which means “It’s a recipe for fraud” (Pear 2003a). However, they could have been
opposed to the plan because they did not want competition from association health plans (Pear
2003a). When the plan became law and the status quo was changed, Blue Cross Blue Shield had
a low level of success.
The California Healthcare Institute, Federation of American Hospitals, and Healthcare
Leadership Council all publically supported the reform attempt (List of Supporters). They
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endorsed a reform, thus when the MMA became law, they had a high level of success. The
Federation of American Hospitals, especially, had a high level of success because hospitals won
incentives in the final bill (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2004, 11-4).
The Chamber of Commerce had a high level of success with the MMA. The Chamber of
Commerce spent a lot of money in support of the reform and lobbied hard for it’s success (Pear
2003a). The Chamber of Commerce was in support of the legislation and clearly wanted it to
pass, therefore when the legislation did pass through Congress and was signed into law, they had
a high level of success.
Merck & Co. was in moderately in support of the reform, the Vice President for Public
Policy at Merck & Co, Ian D. Spatz, stated that, “There is great risk for the pharmaceutical
industry, but there is great opportunity" (Abelson 2003). They felt like pharmaceutical
companies that serve the elderly had a great opportunity to grow and benefit from this change.
The organization was in support of reform, but there was risk to the change. They have a
moderate level of success because as a pharmaceutical company, they won great gains by not
having all drugs imported from Canada and their market increased, but there is also risk by more
regulations. Merck & Co. clearly liked the provisions in the legislation. Pharmaceutical
manufacturers would have a higher demand for prescription drugs and there would be 1) no
direct administration of benefits by the government, 2) no explicit cost-control measures, and 3)
no drug importation legislation (Oliver et al. 2004, 318). Therefore, they have a moderate level
of success because they are able to be regulated more through the expansion of Medicare and
they do have to negotiate drug prices with consumers who enter the doughnut hole, but they are
not strictly regulated and there are not hard cost control measures or drug importation. They
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wanted to have an increased customer base, but in order for that to occur, pharmaceutical
companies had to accept some regulations.
The National Association of Manufacturers has a high of success because, they support
the $70 billion subsidy that business who currently provide prescription drug benefits to their
retirees will receive. The Vice President of Health Policy for the organization said that “We are
finally ready to move forward with the Medicare reforms that we and so many others have
sought for so long” (Brostoff 2003). The National Association of Manufacturers clearly wanted
the reform to pass and to have their members benefit from the subsidy. When the reform passed,
they had a high level of success.
The National Federation of Independent Businesses strongly supported the Medicare
reform. The NFIB lobbied for the reform (Pear 2003b). They supported the change and the
provisions that would benefit the business community. Therefore, when reform passed they had a
high level of success.
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America certainly had a high level of
success with the MMA reform. PhRMA spent $150 million to help pass the MMA this is
because they felt that “Unless we achieve enactment this year of market-based Medicare drug
coverage for seniors, the industry's vulnerability will increase in the remainder of 2003 and in the
2004 election year” (Pear 2003c). Passing Medicare reform was one of their top priorities (Pear
2003d). The pharmaceutical industry also “won a critical provision from Republicans that
prohibits the government from negotiating prices or discounts. That will be left to private
insurance companies and drug middlemen, known as pharmacy benefit management companies”
(Welch and Appleby 2003). When the MMA became law, PhRMA had a high level of success
because they wanted the bill to pass and they won key provisions.
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VIII. Success of the Model:
Table 6. 2003 Interest Group Analysis
Interest Group Name
Aetna
America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP)
American Academy of Family Physicians
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
American College of Emergency Physicians
American College of Physicians
American Hospital Association (AHA)
American Medical Association (AMA)
Blue Cross Blue Shield
California Healthcare Institute
Chamber of Commerce
Federation of American Hospitals
Healthcare Leadership Council
Merck & Co
National Association of Manufacturers
National Federation of Independent Businesses
(NFIB)
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA)

Newspaper
Level
Moderate
High
Low
High
Low
Low
Moderate
High
High
Not
Available
High
Moderate
Low
Low
Moderate

Congressional
Alignment
High
High
High
Low
Moderate
Not Available
Moderate
High
High

Presidential
Alignment
High
Moderate
High
High
High
High
High
High
Low

Success
Level
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
Low

High
High
High
High
High
High

High
High
High
High
Moderate
High

High
High
High
High
Moderate
High

Moderate

High

High

High

High

High

High

High

Looking at Table 6 above it is clear that groups that had a high level of success, were also
aligned with President Bush. However, there is one exception—Blue Cross Blue Shield. These
groups also tended to have a high level of alignment with Congress. In order for groups to
succeed in this reform, they were also aligned with the President’s preferences. When looking at
the exception Blue Cross Blue Shield, who had a high alignment with Congress and a high level
of Newspaper Mentions, yet had a low level of success, one can deduce that this is because of
presidential influence. Blue Cross Blue Shield had low level of Presidential Alignment and was
against the reform. They clearly worked hard in opposition to the movement, which is reflected
in the first two variables, but they would not be aligned with the President. This results in a low
level of success when the status quo is changed.
It appears that in this case that Newspaper Mentions are not determinative of an interest
group’s level of success. Groups who have a high level of success all appear to have varying

	
  

103

levels of mentions, but generally all the groups have high levels of Congressional and
Presidential Alignment. However, this varying level of Newspaper Mentions could be attributed
to smaller groups utilizing coalitions, networking, and bandwagoning. When looking at the chart,
it is clear that smaller groups with high success level, such as: the American Academy of Family
Physicians, the American College of Emergency Physicians, the American College of
Physicians, the Healthcare Leadership Council, and the Seniors Coalition who all have high
Success Levels, but have low Newspaper Mentions. This means that they do not need to be as
active or spend as much money as larger groups who want they same things that they do.
Because they are in support of the reform, they are able to get the benefits of other groups who
are also endorsing and active in favor of the reform. It is a group activity. The actions of larger
groups benefit smaller groups who want similar provisions in the bill, or the bill as a whole.
In this case there are 17 total interest groups observed. Of these 17, the model works to
explain the Success Level outcome for the majority of the interest groups—13. These groups are:
Aetna, American Academy of Family Physicians, AARP, American College of Emergency
Physicians, American College of Physicians, AHA, AMA, California Healthcare Institute,
Chamber of Commerce, Healthcare Leadership Council, National Association of Manufacturers,
NFIB, and PhRMA. The model does not work for AHIP, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Federation of
American Hospitals, and Merck & Co.
As before, the model works when an interest group has two variables that have a
moderate-to-high level of significance (moderate or high), which leads to a moderate or high
Level of Success.
The case of Presidential Alignment interfering with the Success Level is not as much of a
problem in this case as it was in Obama’s case study. This is because of the nature of Bush’s
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plan. The Bush administration proposed a plan that was separate from the plan of Congress. This
makes it possible for a group to be in favor of a reform plan and aligned with the President, or
against the President. Also, a group could be against the reform and have a different Presidential
Alignment as well. Presidential Alignment was not automatically tied to a group’s success level
in this case. However, many groups did have the same level of Presidential Alignment as it did
Success Level. 16 out of the 17 groups had the same Presidential Alignment as they did Success
Level, however, it was possible for the levels to be different.
Many of interest groups who had similar Presidential Alignment Levels as they did
Success Levels also had similar Congressional Alignment Levels. 10 out of the 17 interest
groups had identical Congressional Alignment, Presidential Alignment and Success Levels. This
would suggest that Congressional Alignment had some importance in this case. Newspaper
Mention levels, however, are more variable across groups and the model does not explain them
very well. Newspaper Mentions do not align as well as the other variables. This could be because
of bandwagoning where the activity of larger groups benefits smaller groups with less resources.
In sum, the model shows that Presidential Alignment and Success Level are not wholly
independent, but for this reform, most interest groups had a high level of success because most
groups were in favor of reform and not because of their Presidential Alignment. There was a
small opposition movement and groups who would normally be opposed, such as the
pharmaceutical industry, won key provisions early on in order to avoid opposition.
When looking at this case, Congressional Alignment appears to have a slight impact on
an interest group’s Success Level. Out of the 17 groups observed, 11 had a matching
Congressional Alignment and Success Level. Newspaper Mentions, however, proved to be less
impactful. Only five groups had matching Success Levels and Newspaper Mentions.
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In this case the model worked. It provided an explanation for why an interest group

would have a high level of success for the majority of interest groups in an attempt of health care
reform. In Bush’s case, Presidential Alignment and Success Level were less of a tautology.
Interest groups who had a significant (moderate or high) level in two or more variables were
likely to have a significant Success Level (moderate or high).

Case Study 3: President Obama’s Health Care Reform Attempt
I. Background:
President Obama’s notions of a health care reform began on his campaign trail in 2008.
During the campaign, both then Senator Obama and Senator John McCain offered competing
health care plans for the United States. It was clear to the nation that whoever was elected in
November of 2008 would attempt to bring health care changes to the United States. Just as other
presidents before him, Obama began making plans for health care reform as soon as he took
office in January 2009. However, after watching Clinton’s failed Health Security Act in the
1990s fail to provide comprehensive health care coverage to Americans, Obama was determined
to not make the same mistakes. Obama also had the advantage of seeing the success of Bush’s
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act. He had knowledge of how
past presidents had won, and lost, with health care reform. With the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Obama and his administration took a different approach and gave Congress
more freedom to decide what they wanted to see in a reform while also making “sweetheart”
deals with key interest groups and industries before the reform was initiated in Congress.
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Why Health Care Reform Was An Issue:
In 2009 health care reform was an issue and on the agenda because the costs of services
were increasing and there was still a significant population of uninsured and underinsured
individuals in the United States. According to scholar Jacob Hacker, the economy was different
in 2009 than previously and “America’s job-based insurance tightly couples work and coverage
for all but the poorest and oldest of insured citizens, heightening public anxiety about losing
coverage or paying for care when the economy sours” (Hacker 2010, 864). In 2008, 14.9 percent
of the population was not covered by health insurance (U.S. Census Bureau). Also, in 2008,
according to the Kaiser Family Foundation, health care spending was about $2.4 trillion, which
was an average of $7,868 per person (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008). The amount of the Gross
Domestic Product being spent on health care in the United States increased from 7.2 percent in
1970 to 16.6 percent in 2008 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008). In addition to more money being
spent on health care, it was becoming less affordable for some individuals, according to Kaiser,
“eighteen percent of the nonelderly were in families that spent over 10% of their disposable
[income] on out-of-pocket health care premiums and cost sharing in 2004” (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2008, Key Facts on Health Care Costs). This is a 97 percent increase in premiums for
employer-sponsored health coverage. Individuals and families also reported having problems
paying for heath care and health insurance. September 2008, 30 percent of respondents in a
Kaiser Health Tracking Poll stated that paying for health care and health insurance was a serious
problem (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008, Key Facts on Health Care Costs). According to
Gallup Polls, in 2008, 64 percent of respondents felt that it was the federal government’s
responsibility to make sure all Americans have health care coverage. 47 percent of people were
dissatisfied with the availability of affordable health care in America. When asked about the cost
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of health care in America, 79 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with the cost of health care
in the United States (Gallup Healthcare System Poll).
It was clear to Congress that in 2008, the growth in health expenditures was regularly
outpacing the growth in income. This was making health insurance less affordable for Americans
and making the problem of extending coverage to the 45 million Americans without health
insurance in the United States even more difficult as time passed (Kaiser Family Foundation
2008). Another increase in health care costs was the increase in the cost of annual premiums for
family coverage. In 2000, the average annual premium for family coverage was $6,438, but by
2008 this number nearly doubled to $12,680 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008).
Due to the high costs of health care in the United States, Medicare and Medicaid
expending had been increasing as well. Since 2000, Medicare expending had increased 96
percent. This increase is partly attributed to the Medicare drug benefit (Medicare Part D) that
was enacted in 2005 under President George W. Bush (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008).
Medicaid, on the other hand, has a relatively low cost increase due to prescription drugs because
enrollees are typically eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid and when Medicare Part D
became law, those individuals were transferred to Medicare (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008).
Since 2000, there has been a 107 percent increase in families’ out-of-pocket expenses for
their contribution to a health insurance policy. The average worker’s contribution for a family
policy was $1,619 in 2000 and rose to $3,354 in 2008 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008). The
out-of-pocket costs for services also rose, the amount of individuals with deductibles of at least
$1,000 rose from 10 percent in 2006 to 18 percent in 2008, for workers in small businesses, that
percent rose even more, from 16 percent in 2006 to 35 percent in 2008 (Kaiser Family
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Foundation 2008). Note, dollar amounts have not been adjusted for changes in the Gross
Domestic Product.
In sum, health care reform was on the agenda because it was a campaign issue and
because the costs of health care and health insurance to both the government and the American
individual were rising in the United States.
II. How the United States Health Care System Worked:
As stated earlier in the Clinton case study, health insurance in the United States could be
obtained through the private sector, the government, or an individual. In 2008, 67.2 percent of
Americans had health insurance through the private-sector. Of these individuals, 58.9 had the
health insurance through their employer, while 9.5 purchased the plans individually (U.S. Census
Bureau). The government provided insurance for 29.1 percent of Americans. Those who were
enrolled in Medicaid were 14.2 percent of those individuals, while 14.3 percent were enrolled in
Medicare. The remaining individuals were enrolled in other government-sponsored programs
such as Military Health Care or the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) (U.S. Census
Bureau).
Since President Bush’s Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act became law in 2003, enrollees of Medicare now had coverage of prescription drugs through
federal subsidies and tax breaks. Medicare Part D made it so that Medicare enrollees paid a
monthly premium that was a minimum of $24.80. They also paid a deductible that ranged from
$180 to $265 and 25 percent of all prescription drug costs up to $2,400. Once an enrollee met the
coverage limit of $2,400, they hit what is commonly referred to as the “doughnut hole.” This
means that the enrollee has to pay for the prescription drug cost themselves, but pays the price
negotiated between the insurance company and the pharmaceutical company. The price is less
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than the prescription drug without insurance, but it is not as inexpensive as before they reached
their coverage limit. This price is paid until the individual reaches minimum spending
requirement for catastrophic coverage to start. In 2009, this amount was when an individual paid
$4,350.25 of true out-of-pocket expenses and total drug spending was over $6,154. Then
Medicare would once again cover 95 percent of prescription drug costs and 5 percent of costs
were paid out-of-pocket.
III. Creating A Health Care Reform Proposal:
As stated earlier, when Obama went to create a health care reform proposal, he did not
want to repeat the same mistakes as Clinton did with his health care reform plan in the 1990s.
Therefore, Obama set out to make clear that he would let Congress negotiate the details in a
health care reform proposal and he would act as an overarching voice of approval of disapproval.
He made it clear what he wanted out of a reform and he helped to manage interest groups, but he
did not get involved in the particulars of the plan. Due to this management style centered around
overseeing a Congress-centered process, both the House and the Senate developed and passed
differing reform plans. There was more debate on the subject, and compromises were made. For
the Obama administration the main goal was “winning over key interest groups and pivotal
Democrats” (Hacker 2011, 440) this is because “the interest group environment was more
favorable for a reform push by a unified Democratic government” (Hacker 2011, 440) and “the
Democrats had converged around a reform strategy that had backing from powerful organized
forces within the party” (Hacker 2011, 440). This will be discussed in detail below.
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IV. Congressional Debate and Action:
Plans for a comprehensive health care reform were taken up in both the House and the
Senate. In January of 2009 at the start of the health care debate the Senate was composed of 55
Democrats, 41 Republicans, and two Independents who caucused with the Democrats. Towards
the end of 2009, due to transitions of members, the Democrats had a supermajority in the Senate
controlling 60 or more votes. The House of Representatives was composed of 256 Democrats,
and 178 Republicans, with one vacant seat. A key change in this congress is that there was a
“loss of more seats in conservative Southern regions and the strengthening of the Democratic
position in the more liberal regions, a more homogeneous, though far from unified, caucus
greeted [President Obama]” (Hacker 2010, 863).
The main debate in the House and the Senate was between Democrats and Republicans
(and more liberal Democrats) on how to provide a public option to Americans, or if to provide a
public option at all. A public option is “a public insurance plan modeled after Medicare that
would compete with private plans to enroll those without coverage” (Hacker 2010, 862). In
Congress, “middle-of-the road Democrats were touting the virtues of a ‘play-or-pay’ approach in
which employers would be required to provide insurance or pay into a public program for with
without employment based coverage (Hacker 2010, 866). Conservative Democrats, on the other
hand, were calling for “more limited measures to bring down the cost of insurance and modestly
expand coverage” (Hacker 2010, 866). It was clear, however, that a single-payer option was no
longer just a strong demand from left of center forces. Other organizations endorsed the
Democratic favored single-payer option such as major unions, liber think tanks, health care and
advocacy organizations (Hacker 2010, 866).
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As a whole, Congress attempted to follow the Presidents two goals, 1) to lead the way for

universal health care coverage in the United States, and 2) to lower the costs of health care
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2010). The Senate had bills come out of two committees, the
Senate Finance committee, S 1796, and the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP)
committee, S 1679. The Senate Finance bill was approved on October 13, 2009, while the Senate
HELP bill was approved on July 15, 2009. The table below adapted from Congressional
Quarterly Almanac (2010) shows the differences in the Committee bills in the House and the
Senate.
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Table 7. Provisions of Committee Overhaul Bills Compared*
SENATE VERSIONS
Finance
S 1796. approved Oct 13

Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
S 1679. approved July 15

Insurance Exchange
Marketplace where
Yes. Create separate state-based exchanges
uninsured individuals and for individuals and small business
some employers could
choose among insurance
plans, with subsidies for
eligible enrollees

Yes. Create state-based exchanges, or
“Affordable Health Benefit Gateways,” for
individuals and small businesses.

‘Public option’
Government-sponsored
health insurance financed
by premiums and offered
as an alternative in the
exchanges

No. Consumer-owned, nonprofit
cooperatives would offer plans that would
compete with private insurance plans in the
exchanges.

Yes. Health and Human Services (HHS)
would create a public option and negotiate
payment rates with health care providers.

Yes. Tax credits for individuals and
families within comes up to 400% of the
poverty level.

Yes. Tax credits for individuals and
families with incomes up to 400 percent of
the poverty level.

Yes. Enforced with tax penalty rising two
$750 per individual, up to $1500 per
household, in 2017. Exemptions if income
is below 133 percent of the poverty level or
if the cost of basic insurance exceeds 8
percent of income.

Yes. Enforced with minimum tax penalty
of $750 per individual, up to $3000 per
household. Exemptions if income is below
150 percent of the poverty line or if cost of
basic insurance exceeds 8 percent of
income.

No. No legal requirement, but employers
with more than 50 workers that do not offer
insurance must pay a fee for each employee
who receives text credit for coverage in an
exchange.

Yes. Employers with more than 25 workers
must offer coverage and pay 60% of
premium costs or pay a fine of $750 per
uninsured employee ($375 for part-time
workers).

Yes. Tax credit for employers to provide
healthcare benefits and have 50 or fewer
workers.

Yes. Tax credit for employers to provide
health care benefits and have 50 or fewer
workers.

Subsidies
Tax credits to help pay
for premiums and out-ofpocket costs as policies
purchased through an
exchange
Individual Mandate
Most Americans required
to obtain at least a basic
insurance policy

Employer Mandate
Penalty for employers
who do not offer
insurance benefits

Small-business Tax Credit
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Abortion
Ban on federal funding

Federal subsidies could not be used to
No discrimination against providers based
cover elective abortion (i.e. abortions in
on whether or not they provide abortion
cases other than rape, incest or danger to
services.
the woman's life). Exchange is required to
have one plan but does not cover elective
abortion and one that does. Enrollees
getting tax credits required to pay separate
premiums to get elective abortion coverage.
Plans must keep those premiums and
separate accounts. No discrimination
against providers based on whether or not
they provide abortion services.

Medicaid
Expansion of eligibility

Yes. Eligibility expanded to all individuals
with incomes up to 133% of the poverty
level. Those that want to do percent to
300% could choose between Medicaid and
subsidize coverage in the exchange. Extra
federal payment to states for new enrollees,
rising to 32.3 percent of costs by 2019.

Outside committee’s jurisdiction. Those
eligible for Medicaid excluded from
subsidize coverage in the exchange.

Revenue
40 percent excise tax paid by insurers for Outside committee's jurisdiction.
portion of employer–sponsored plans that
exceed $1,000 for individuals, $21,000 for
families, indexed for inflation.
$2,500 limit on flexible health care
spending accounts.
Annual fees of $2.3 billion for drug
industry, $4 billion for medical device
industry, $6.7 billion for health insurance
industry, all allocated according to market
share.

	
  

114

HOUSE VERSIONS
Ways and Means
HR 3200, approved July 17

Education and Labor
HR 3200, approved July 17

Energy and Commerce
HR 3200, approved July 31

Insurance Exchange
Yes. Create a national health
Yes. Same as Ways and Means.
insurance exchange under a new
federal agency for uninsured
individuals and employers, with
eligibility expanding each year.
States could operate state-based
exchanges if they meet requirements.

Yes. Same, but those covered by
Tricare or VA health benefits would
also be eligible for exchange.

‘Public option’
Yes. Provide $2 billion in startup
funds but require the public plan to
be funded solely through premiums.
Pay providers Medicare rates plus 5
percent for the first three years;
government to set rates after that.

Yes. Same.

Yes. Same, except rates would be
negotiated with providers at levels
no lower than Medicare rates and no
higher than the average rates paid by
private plans in the exchange.

Yes. Same.

Yes. Same, but credits would be
larger than in the other House
versions.

Subsidies
Yes. Tax credits for individuals and
families with incomes up to 400
percent of the poverty level.
Individual Mandate
Yes. Enforced through tax penalty of Yes. Same.
2.5 percent, capped at the average
cost of a basic plan in the exchange,
with hardship exemptions.

Yes. Same.

Employer Mandate
Yes. Employers with annual payroll
above $400,000 must offer coverage
and pay 60 percent of premium costs
or pay a fine of 8 percent of payroll.
Small businesses pay reduced or no
fines.

Yes. Same.

Small-business Tax Credit
Yes. Tax credit for employers that
Yes. Same.
provide health care benefits and have
25 or fewer workers

Yes. Same.
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Abortion
No provision.

No provision.

Private plans in the exchange would
not be required to cover abortion.
The public plan would have to cover
abortions in cases of rape, incest, or
danger to the woman’s life and
would not be prohibited from
covering elective abortions. The act
would not affect state or federal
abortion laws. No discrimination
against providers based on whether
or not they provide abortion services.

Outside committee’s jurisdiction.

Yes. Federal payments would cover
100 percent of new enrollees,
dropping to 90 percent in 2015.

Outside committee’s jurisdiction.

Outside committee's jurisdiction.

Medicaid
Yes. Eligibility expanded to all
individuals with incomes up to 133
percent of the poverty level. Those
eligible for Medicaid could choose
between Medicaid and obtaining a
plan in the exchange.
Revenue
Graduated surtax on income above
$280,000 per individual, $350,000
per family. Top rate of 5.4 percent
on income above $800,000 per
individual, $1 million per family.
Prohibition on use of taxadvantaged flexible spending
accounts for over-the-counter
drugs.

* Adapted from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2010. Page 13-7 and 13-7.

Once the bills were out of committee, the House and the Senate each passed their own
overall bills for Medicare reform. Below is a chart representing the major provisions of both the
House (HR 3962) and Senate (HR90) bills. The Senate was working on a House bill because it
was legislation that the House had initially passed on October 8, 2009. They were working to
pass the previously passed House bill so it could become law. All of the bills regarding Medicare
Modernization originated in the House, so the Senate was working on amending House
legislation.
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Table 8. Health Care Overhaul: House vs. Senate*

Provision

Passed by the House (HR 3962)
Passed November 7, 2009

Passed by the Senate (HR 3590)
Passed December 24, 2009

Insurance Exchange
Marketplace where
uninsured individuals and
some small businesses
could choose among
insurance plans, with
subsidies for eligible
enrollees

National exchange, created and run by a
new federal agency. Uninsured individual
and small businesses could purchase
insurance from participating providers.
Sates could create state-based exchanges
if approved by Health and Human
Services (HHS).

Created a system of state-run health
insurance exchanges. If a state has not
created an exchange by 2014, HHS will
establish and run one in that state.
Separate exchanges for small business.
Groups of states could create regional
exchanges if approved by HHS.

Public option administered by HHS,
financed through premiums. HHS would
negotiate rates with providers that were no
lower than Medicare rates and no higher
than the average cost of private plans
offered in the exchange. A new program
would facilitate the creation of nonprofit,
member-run co-ops to offer policies in the
exchange.

No public option. Instead, the Office of
Personnel Management would administer
a system of national health insurance
plans. OPM would have to contract with at
least two plans for each exchange,
including one run by a nonprofit. A new
program would foster the development of
nonprofit insurers to offer policies in the
exchanges.

Premium and cost-sharing credits, on a
sliding scale, for uninsured individuals
and families with income up to 400
percent of the federal poverty level, or
whose employer-sponsored plan costs
more than 12 percent of their income. Outof-pocket spending capped at $500 per
individual and $10,000 per family for
those with incomes between 133 percent
and 150 percent of the poverty level.

Refundable premium credits for
individuals and families with income of
100 percent to 400 percent of the poverty
level, or whose employer-sponsored plan
costs more than 9.8 percent of their
income. Cost-sharing credits for those
with incomes of 100 percent to 200
percent of the poverty level. Caps on outof-pocket costs tied to income.

Enforced through 2.5 percent tax penalty
on income above the level needed to file
tax returns, up to the average cost of a
policy on the exchange. Exemptions for
those with too little income to file tax
returns.

Enforced with tax penalty rising up to
$750 per person in 2016, up to a
maximum of $2,250 per family or 2
percent of household income. Penalty
indexed for inflation beginning in 2017.
Exemptions for those with incomes below
100 percent of poverty level.

All plans in the exchange must offer an
“essential benefits” package as defined by
the government. They could offer four
types: Basic, Enhanced, Premium and

All plans in the exchange must offer an
“essential benefits” package as defined by
the government. They could offer four
types: Bronze, Silver, Gold and Platinum.

‘Public option’
Government-sponsored
health insurance financed
by premiums and offered
as an alternative in the
exchanges

Individual Subsidies
Tax credits to help pay
premiums and out-ofpocket costs for policies
purchases through an
exchange

Individual Mandate
Most Americans required
to obtain insurance
coverage through
employer plans, Medicare
or Medicaid, or the new
exchanges
Benefits Package
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Premium Plus. Coverage would range
from 70 percent (Basic) to 95 percent
(Premium) of benefit costs. No cost
sharing for preventive services under the
Basic plan.

Coverage would range from 60 percent
(Bronze) to 90 percent (Platinum) of
benefit costs. No cost sharing for
preventative services. Separate
catastrophic plan allowed.

Tax credits for employers with fewer than
25 employees and average wages of less
than $40,000.

Tax credits for employers with fewer than
25 employees and average wages of less
than $50,000.

Penalty for employers who Employers with annual payrolls above
do not offer insurance
$500,000 required to offer coverage and
benefits
pay 72.5 percent of individual premium or
pay penalty of up to 8 percent of payroll.

No general penalty, but employers with
more than 50 full-time workers that do not
offer insurance and have at least one
worker getting subsidized coverage on an
exchange required to pay $750 penalty for
each full-time employee.

Small-business subsidies
Help for small businesses
that provide health
benefits
Employer Mandate

Medicaid
Expanded eligibility

All individuals with income up to 150
percent of the federal poverty level
eligible. HHS to pay 100 percent of costs
for the added enrollees in 2014, and 91
percent of states’ costs after that.

All individuals with income up to 133
percent of the federal poverty level
eligible. HHS to pay 100 percent of costs
for the added enrollees in 2014-2016, then
share costs with states.

Insurance Requirements
Regulations

No denial of coverage based on preexisting conditions. Temporary high-risk
pool created for citizens and legal
immigrants who have been subject to
such denials.
No lifetime dollar limits on benefits.
Insurers prohibited from rescinding
policies, except in cases of fraud.
Effective July 1, 2010.

Same.

Antitrust exemption

Elimination of most of the health
insurance industry’s exemption from
federal antitrust law.

No provision.

Dependent coverage

Plans that cover dependents must allow
parents to continue coverage for children
up to age 27.

Plans that cover dependents must allow
parents to continue coverage for children
up to age 26.

Medical loss ratio

Insurers required to spend 85 percent of
premium revenue on medical claims or
rebates.

Insurers required to spend 85 percent of
premium revenue on medical claims or
rebates in large-group market and 80
percent in small group and individual
markets.
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Prescription Drug Coverage
Closing the gap, or
“doughnut hole,” in
Medicare Part D
prescription drug coverage

Gap reduced by $500 in 2010 and phased
out by 2019, paid for by drug
manufacturer rebates. Until 2019, drug
manufacturers required to give a 50
percent discount on prescription drugs to
enrollees while they are in the grasp.

One-time $500 reduction in gap in 2010.
Drug manufacturers required to give a 50
percent discount on prescription drugs
while enrollee is in the coverage gap.

No use of funds under the act to purchase
a plan on the exchange that covers
elective abortion (i.e. abortion in cases
other than rape, incest or danger to the
woman’s life). Individuals who receive
federal subsides would be required to buy
separate policies with their own money to
get coverage for elective abortions. No
discrimination against providers based on
whether they provide abortion services.
No effect on federal or state abortion
laws.

No use of federal funds to pay for elective
abortion coverage. Each exchange
required to offer one plan that does not
cover elective abortion. Plans that offer
such coverage must collect a separate
payment from each enrollee, regardless of
age or sex, for the portion of the plan cost
attributable to the abortion coverage. No
discrimination against providers based on
whether they provide abortion services.
No effect on federal state abortion laws.

Incentive payments to states that enact
laws to provide alternatives to traditional
medical malpractice litigation, if the laws
do not limit attorneys’ fees or impose
caps on damages.

Demonstration grants to develop
alternatives to existing litigation laws.
The alternatives must enhance patient
safety and improve access to liability
insurance.

No further funding for CHIP after fiscal
2013: shift children to the expanded
Medicaid program of the exchange.

Increase in federal share of funding for
CHIP. States required to maintain
existing eligibility rules for 2019.

Income tax surcharge

5.4 percent tax on income over $500,000
for individuals, $1 million for families.

None.

Excise tax on high-cost
health insurance

None.

40 percent excise tax on insurers for costs
of employer-sponsored plans in excess of
$8,500 for individuals, $23,000 for
families, indexed for inflation.

Medicare hospital
insurance payroll tax

No change

0.9 percent in crease in Medicare part A
payroll tax rate for individuals earning
more than $200,000, $250,000 for
families.

Health industry fees, taxes

2.5 percent excise tax on sales of medical
devices.

Annual fees on pharmaceutical, medical
device and insurance industries.

Abortion
Ban on federal funding

Medical Malpractice

Coverage of Children
Children’s Health
Insurance Program (CHIP)
Revenue

* Adapted from Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2010. Page 13-10 and 13-11.
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Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, D-California, was able to secure the passage of

House the bill 220-215 on November 7, 2009. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nevada,
after a 25 day Senate session secured all 60 votes he needed to overcome a filibuster and invoke
cloture. The vote to invoke cloture was 60-39 and the bill passed 60-39 on December 24, 2009.
The Senate bill above is the final bill that both houses passed. In the Senate the bill
passed without a single Republican vote. On March 21, in a 219-212 vote House passed the
Senate health care overhaul without any changes. The House then passed the reconciliation bill
220-211, HR 4872. The Senate, much to the relief of nervous Democrats, passed the
reconciliation bill that had important House amendments to the Senate bill on March 25 by a
vote of 56-43. All Republican Senators opposed the bill, along with three Democrats
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2011). This law required most Americans to have health
insurance coverage by 2014 and states created American Health Benefit Exchanges, or
marketplaces (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 2011, 9-3). On March 23, 2010, before the
reconciliation bill had passed, President Obama signed the Affordable Care and Patient
Protection Act into law.
The way that the Democratic leaders were able to get the House and the Senate to pass
the same bill in this instance was to have the House pass the Senate bill and the pass a bill of
corrections that was sent to the Senate. This corrections bill made the following changes: 1)
OPM contracts with insurers to offer a minimum of two multistate plans in each exchange with
one being offered by a non-profit, 2) subsidies were more generous, 3) the fee for noncompliance with the individual mandate was $695 per person up to a maximum of 2.5 percent of
a household’s income, 3) the employer mandate fee was larger, 4) the doughnut hole was to be
closed like in the House bill over 10 years, 5) revenues were changed by increasing the Medicare
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payroll tax for hospital insurance by 0.9 percent for higher income individuals and adding a 3.8
percent excise hospital insurance tax on investments that exceeded that level. The Joint Tax
Committee estimated that the 10-year revenue would be $210.2 billion, which was an increase
from $86.8 billion in the original Senate bill (Congressional Quarter Almanac 2011).
In this case, it is clear that there was a strong Democratic coalition behind the reform
effort. Alternative plans were not seriously considered in the House or the Senate. The only
major options were the bills that came out of committees. Strong leadership was able to help
craft the debate and get to the core of arguments so that compromises could be made between
interests and politicians themselves so reform had a fighting chance.

V. Interest Group Activity:
The American Medical Association (AMA) was “worried about scheduled steep
reductions in Medicare payments for physicians under the terms of a 1997 law” (Hacker 2011,
438). The Democratic leaders in 2009 knew this, and so they offered a solution to the AMA’s
worries. Due to the Democratic leaders’ offer, “the AMA endorsed not just the Senate health bill,
but also the more sweeping House bill” (Hacker 2011, 439). The insurance, pharmaceutical, and
hospital industries were mainly concerned with ensuring that they would have a steady revenue
and patient source from the private sector. They wanted the government to create an insurance
mandate that required individuals to get health care insurance (Hacker 2011). America’s Health
Insurance Plans, formerly Health Insurance Association of America, lobbied for this cause and
“played a double game through the debate, at some points holding its fire or endorsing the
reform, at others directing or funding attacks. But it was far more favorable toward action than in
the past” (Hacker 2011, 439). The pharmaceutical and hospital industries, in particular, were
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quite favorable to reform. They “cut sweetheart deals with President Barack Obama’s team early
on—deals that the White House fiercely protected from congressional attempts to undo them”
(Hacker 2011, 439). The deals included “a White House commitment that neither drug
companies nor hospitals would be required to give up more than a modes amount of expected
revenues” (Hacker 2011, 439). These concessions to the hospital and interest group industries
did have a real impact on policy. This is because they “limited the law’s ability to deliver
tangible benefits to the middle class and largely took off that table tools of cost control used in
other nations” (Hacker 2011, 439).
The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) publically supported Obama’s
reform initiative and the President said so in an op-ed piece he wrote for the New York Times.
(Obama 2009). As a whole, it seemed like interest groups were more favorable to reform during
this time. Organizations such as Pfizer and PhRMA were making deals with the White House in
anticipation of the bills in Congress becoming law (Haberkorn 2012). Major industries knew that
reform was on the horizon and was willing to make compromises rather than to push back
relentlessly.
VI. Analysis of Interest Group Success:
VIa. Methodological Approach:
In order to analyze the success of interest groups, a similar methodological approach was
taken as previously. The same interest groups as in Clinton’s health care reform were observed
as well as additional interest groups identified through the list on OpenSecrets.org of top
lobbying spending during the years of the health care reform. The top two organizations for each
of the five health care industries were added to the list of interest groups and duplicates were
removed. A total of 21 interest groups were observed for this case. Important differences to note
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are that the American Association of Health Plans merged with the Health Insurance Association
of America, and together became America’s Health Insurance Plans. Also, in 1994 the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of America (PMA) merged with the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). Again groups’ mentions in the New York
Times, CQ Roll Call, The Washington Post, USA Today, CQ Weekly, and The National Journal
in 2008, 2009, and 2010 were compared. Their presidential alignment and their ideological
alignment with Congress were also compared. Ideological alignment with Congress was
determined through an organization’s political contributions in 2009 and whether or not that
aligned with the leanings of Congress. Finally, the organizations’ stances were compared to
President Obama’s objectives for the proposal to determine how much alignment there was with
the President’s objectives. All three aspects are rated on a low, moderate, high scale.
An interest group was determined to have a high level of newspaper mentions if it was in
the top third of groups with the highest interest group mentions, a group had a moderate level of
mentions if it was in the middle third, and finally, a group had a low level of newspaper mentions
if it fell in the bottom third
Interest groups alignment with Congress was determined by looking at their political
contributions. While partisanship is not ideology, with how politics has become more partisan
today, it can help measure how a group is aligned. The DW-nominate score of the 111th
Congress was -0.028 indicating that it, as a whole, was more liberal leaning. The Democrats’
DW-nominate score was -0.361 and the Republicans’ was 0.463 (Vital Statistics on Congress).
As in the previous case, an interest group was more ideologically in line with Congress if it
donated more money to liberal Members of Congress, or Democrats, rather than donating the
majority of its money to conservative, or Republican Members of Congress. If there was over a
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2:1 ratio in favor of Democrats, a high alignment was determined. Congressional Alignment was
moderate if its spending was relatively equal, and it was low if it favored Republicans.
Presidential Alignment was determined on a low, moderate, high scale, by assessing
whether or not an interest group or organization endorsed the president’s plan and components of
the plan. A low level of alignment was given if the group did not endorse or support the plan
and/or they were publically against the plan. A moderate level of alignment was determined if a
group supported some significant aspects of the plan, but not all. A high level of alignment was
determined if a group supported most of the plan and/or endorsed the president’s objectives.

VIb. How the Interest Groups Were Categorized:
America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) was deemed to have a moderate level of
success in this instance of health care reform. AHIP attempted to both work with the White
House and seemingly endorse Obama’s efforts to reform health care and a health care reform in
general. However, they also were funneling large amounts of money to the Chamber of
Commerce in order to purchase ads to try and block the reform. A main concern of AHIP was
the Medical Loss Ratio (Ungar 2012). The ratio would require health insurance companies to
spend 80 percent of dollars that come from premiums on health care expenditures. Any money
that was not spent would have to be refunded to the consumer. For 2011, it was estimated that
the amount refunded to customers would be $1.1 billion (Ungar 2012). As the insurance lobby,
AHIP was also concerned about provisions that would increase the cost of coverage such as the
health insurance tax, guaranteed coverage for pre-existing conditions, no varying premiums
because of age or sex, and minimum essential benefits (AHIP.org). They thought that these
provisions could risk individuals not getting insured until they were ill. However, there are
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provisions in the legislation that mandate that people get coverage to remedy the worry of a lack
of healthy population to share the costs of the sicker population. A mandate of coverage is deal
that the insurance industry would benefit from greatly and would likely not have gotten without
this legislation. Because AHIP was working both sides, but they were able to make initial deals
with the White House to get an insurance mandate, they were determined to have a moderate
success level. While they may not have wanted a reform to pass, by having talks with the White
House, they were able to get gains, although they were not fully supportive of reform.
The American Academy of Family Physicians has a low level of success because they did
not get the type of health care reform that they favored. They favored an approach with a patientcentered medical home that has a universal mandate (AAFP.org). This option was not even a
major option in the bills proposed in the committees; therefore they have a low level of success.
The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) has a high level of success
because they publically endorsed the health plans that were going through Congress and
President Obama even stated that he had their endorsement himself (Obama 2009). The AARP
endorsed both the House and the Senate bills and believed that they aligned with their goals to
increase Medicare benefits and eligibility. The AARP endorsed many provisions of the new
health care legislation such as provisions that would specifically benefit its members. Such
provisions were ones that met their goals of making coverage affordable to younger members of
AARP and protecting Medicare (AARP.org). They also supported provisions in the law that
provided annual wellness exams, improved preventative services, the closing of the Medicare
Part D doughnut hole, and better care coordination efforts (The Medicare Newsgroup). Due to
the AARP publically supporting the bill and the bill having the provisions that the AARP
approved of, they had a high level of success.
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The American College of Radiology had a high level of success in this reform effort

because their main concern was to reform medical malpractice (Brice 2009). Both the bills
passed by the House and the Senate included provisions to include incentives to states who
reform medical malpractice and find alternatives to the traditional process. Due to their limited
goal and the presence of it in the final legislation, the American College of Radiology had a high
level of success.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) had a moderate level of success because
while they supported expanding health insurance coverage to more individuals, they were not in
favor of the House bills’ levels of Medicaid eligibility (Eaton 2010). They felt it was too high
and could hurt the revenues of hospitals. The AHA had split goals on this bill, and because of
that they had a moderate level of success. Medicaid was not expanded as much as proposed in
the House bills, but it was still expanded, but so was health insurance coverage.
The American Medical Association (AMA) had a high level of success because the AMA
publically endorsed the health care reform that was occurring and while they felt it was not a
perfect match for their views, they felt it was good enough to endorse and support. They worked
with the House leadership to pass their bills through Congress and to help the reform to progress.
The reform ultimately passed, as the AMA wanted; therefore, they had a high level of success.
Blue Cross Blue Shield has a moderate level of success because they were supportive of
legislation to reform health care, but they wanted a strong mandate to have people enroll in the
new system so that young and healthy people can help balance the costs of older and sicker
people (Zimmerman and Young 2009). Also, they were worried that without a mandate, people
would wait until they were very ill to get health care coverage. Blue Cross Blue Shield sponsored
a study stating that premiums would rise up to 50 percent for individual plans and 19 percent for
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small group plans if the new reform were to pass Congress (Zimmerman and Young 2009). They
attribute the rise to a lack of a strong enough mandate and they fear that too many unhealthy
people will join in the insurance policies, but enough healthy people will not. They were quite
against the requirement that insurers would have to provide insurance coverage to individuals
whether or not they had a preexisting condition and felt that this, combined with a lack of a
strong mandate would cause premiums to rise (Zimmerman and Young 2009). When the
legislation was enacted, there was a mandate in the form of a tax penalty of $750 per individual.
While this might not be seen as the strongest mandate possible, it is a mandate. In 2014 if an
individual did not have health insurance, they were required to pay 1 percent of their yearly
household income above the tax filing threshold, or $95 per adult, per year and $47.50 per child
under 18, per year—whichever amount is higher. In 2015 this amount increased to 2 percent of
an individual’s yearly household income above the tax filing threshold or $325 per adult and
$162.50 per child under 18—whichever amount is higher. In 2016 this amount will be 2.5
percent of yearly household income or $695 per person and $347.50 per child under 18
(Healthcare.gov.b). Since there was a fairly strong mandate instituted in the legislation—the
mandate is generally the cost of a Bronze plan—but the insurance companies do have to provide
coverage to individuals regardless of preexisting conditions, Blue Cross Blue Shield has a
moderate level of success (Healthcare.gov.b).
The United States Chamber of Commerce has a low level of success because the
Chamber was opposed to any legislation reforming the health care system. They served as a
platform for organizations to donate money to in order to purchase advertisements opposing the
reform. When the status quo was not preserved and reform occurred, the Chamber of Commerce
had a low level of success.
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DaVita Inc., along with Fresenius Medical Care also have a low level of success.

Together they are the leaders of dialysis care and control a majority of the market. They were
worried that with a health care reform they would risk having to close dialysis centers because of
having to provide treatment to more patients at rates equal to or close to Medicare rates. They
promoted an integrated care model for health care reform (Williams 2009). The private insurance
market and private insurance patients are how they get most of their income, so if that income
decreases, so does their profits and their productivity. When health care reform passed, Medicaid
was expanded and health care prices were controlled more, DaVita Inc. and Fresenius Medical
Care had a low level of success—the status quo was not preserved for them.
Eli Lilly & Co. had a low level of success because they do not support government
intervention in the health care system. They believe that the free market has solutions that could
help cover more Americans and single-payer along with other government run systems have
proven to not be ideal (Lilly.com). When health care reform was pass and the federal
government’s role was more than just of a safety net, Eli Lilly & Co. had a low level of success.
A free market solution was not seriously considered in any of the committee’s plans and the
government will now intervene in the delivery of health care in the United States.
The Federation of American Hospitals had a moderate level of success because they
wanted a mixed system of health care delivery as well as an expansion of health care coverage to
more Americans (Ways and Means 2009). The model that they favored would be a nongovernment run plan that would heavily rely on non-profits or co-ops to deliver health insurance
to the uninsured. Their fear with the government intervening was that the government would set
prices for services, and that would be harmful for the hospitals (Ways and Means 2009). The
Federation of American Hospitals wanted a system based on private negotiation where the
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government does not intervene (Ways and Means 2009). They wanted to ensure that a health
care reform would not hinder the revenues of hospitals and would improve health care
efficiency. The Federation of American Hospitals had a moderate level of success because while
the ultimate plan was not purely mixed, it did include provisions that non-profit plans must be
available in each exchange, however, the bill does allow the Secretary of Health and Human
Services the ability to negotiate some premium rates with insurers. This is not the government
setting up payment rates, but it is the government setting some standards, and the Federation of
American Hospitals would rather have the public option regulated by the private insurance
market (Ways and Means 2009). Because there are aspects of a mixed plan such as the
availability of non-profit plans in each exchange, but there is government intervention.
The Healthcare Leadership Council had a high level of success because while they
opposed the purely public plan that Democrats had advocated for in the past, they favored a
compromise that would expand health care coverage, incentivize positive outcomes and quality,
reform medical liability, eliminate exclusions for individuals with preexisting conditions, change
payment methods, and create better preventative care (HLC.org). The actual legislation out of
Congress expanded health care coverage, eliminated exclusions for preexisting conditions, and
created better standards for preventative care. This may not have been the system the Healthcare
Leadership Council had in mind, but it included many of their goals, which means they had a
high level of success.
The National Association of Manufacturers had a low level of success because they
wanted to protect the status quo (Eaton 2010). They feared that reform would cause small and
medium sized businesses to drop their health care coverage, which would result in larger
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companies paying more money for health insurance. When the status quo changed the National
Association of Manufactures had a low level of success.
The National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) also had a low level of
success. The NFIB worried that the reform would increase costs for small businesses
(NFIB.com). They were opposed to an employer mandate. When the legislation became law, the
NFIB had a low level of success because there was an employer mandate. Small businesses
would receive tax credits and would not be penalized unless they had more than 50 employees
and an employee received subsidized coverage.
Pfizer and PhRMA both had high levels of success. The pharmaceutical industry was
quick to cut deals with the White House to make it so that prescription drugs could not be
imported from Canada (Hacker 2011). They paid for advertisements in support of the reform and
had a public campaign in support of the reform (Armstrong 2012). The pharmaceutical industry
like Pfizer and PhRMA were primarily concerned about price controls on prescription drugs
from Medicare. Both groups endorsed the plan and the plan passed, making them both have a
high level of success.
UnitedHealth Group had a low level of success. The group was against the reform and
public insurance in general (Eggen 2009). They encouraged their employees to e-mail their
representatives expressing disapproval of the legislation. UnitedHealth Group wanted higher
penalties for those who did not buy health insurance and was against any cuts to Medicare
(Eggen 2009). Their ultimate preference was the status quo and they did not want reform to
occur. Eventually the status quo changed and the UnitedHealth Group did not have much
success. Therefore, UnitedHealth Group had a low level of success.
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VII. Success of the Model:
Table 9 shows the results of the interest group analysis. The results can be seen in Table 4 below.
Table 9. 2008, 2009, and 2010 Interest Group Analysis
Interest Group Name
America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP)
American Academy of Family Physicians
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
American College of Radiology
American Hospital Association (AHA)
American Medical Association (AMA)
Blue Cross Blue Shield
Chamber of Commerce
DaVita Inc.
Eli Lilly & Co
Federation of American Hospitals
Fresenius Medical Care
Healthcare Leadership Council
National Association of Manufacturers
National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB)
Pfizer Inc.
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA)
United Health Group

Newspaper
Mentions
High
Low
High
Low
Moderate
High
Moderate
High
Low
Low
Moderate
Low
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate

Congressional
Alignment
Low
High
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
High
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
High
High
Low
Low
Moderate

Presidential
Alignment
Low
Moderate
High
Moderate
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Low
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Low
High

Success
Level
Moderate
Low
High
High
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Low
Low
Moderate
Low
High
Low
Low
High

Moderate
Moderate

Low
Moderate

High
Low

High
Low

Looking at Table 9 above, some patterns do emerge in the data. The clearest relationships
emerge when looking at Presidential Alignment and Success Level. More often than not, a
group’s Presidential Alignment level is the same as their Success Level. This only occurs when
the President’s reform plan wins. This would indicate that there is a relationship between
Presidential Alignment and an interest group’s Success Level. When a President’s plan wins, a
group’s Presidential Alignment and Success Level are not exclusive variables and they overlap
in content. This could be problematic, but corresponds with the literature about interest group
behavior. The literature suggests that an administration is part of the institution of the
government that handles interest group activity. 2 The President, ultimately, must decide how to
shape the agenda, who to bargain with, and he or she must be a decision maker. Interest groups
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2
See Section I of the Literature Review—Institutional Changes. This section explains further
how a presidential administration interacts with interest groups in order to accomplish goals.
This theory is developed thoroughly by Mark Peterson and Thomas Gais et al. (1984).
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are more willing to compromise with the President than with one another, making the President
crucial in times of debate, but also making it so interest group opinions and positions will likely
align with the President before Congress in a time of successful reform (Peterson 1993a, 429).
The Presidency can shape the agenda at times of reform and choose issues that will enhance his
or her reputation and increasing their influence (Gais et al. 1984, 181). This is because if
reformists of a majority party have disagreements in Congress while the public is open to a
reform, they will look to the President for suggestions. This is what makes is so that an interest
group’s Success Level is not independent of its Presidential Alignment in situations when the
President’s reform movement is successful. In this case, Obama’s policy is successful. While he
did delegate to Congress, Obama gained most of the provisions he wanted (detailed in the
narrative above). The only major provision that Obama did not get was a public option.
However, the absence of the public option is not significant enough to say that Obama failed to
succeed. Presidential Alignment, in this case, was connected to the interest group’s Success
Level.
For the reasons mentioned above it is important to note that over half of the groups
observed have matching Presidential Alignment and Success Level variables. The variables
match in 14 out of the 18 groups observed. The exceptions are AHIP and AARP.
Using the criteria noted in the Clinton analysis above, out of the 18 interest groups
observed, the model worked for 14 of the groups and did not work for four of the groups. The
groups that it did work for were: the AARP, American College of Radiology, AHA, AMA, Blue
Cross Blue Shield, DaVita Inc., Eli Lilly & Co., Federation of American Hospitals, Fresenius
Medical Care Healthcare Leadership Council, National Association of Manufacturers, NFIB,
Pfizer, and PhRMA. The groups that the model does not help explain successes or failures for
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are: AHIP, American Academy of Family Physicians, Chamber of Commerce, and UnitedHealth
Group.
Out of the groups where the model worked, of particular interest are the American
College of Radiology, the Healthcare Leadership Council, Pfizer, and PhRMA. As in the
previous case study, the model works when an interest group has two variables that have a
moderate-to-high level of significance (moderate or high), which leads to a moderate or high
Level of Success.
On first glance, the American College of Radiology may look like it does not have
success. This is because its Newspaper Mentions are low, its Congressional Alignment is
Moderate, and its Presidential Alignment is Moderate. However, for the model to work, the
interest group’s variables must show some level of significance to explain a significant Success
Level outcome. In the case of the American College of Radiology, there is a significant Success
Level outcome, and this is explained by the model and the group’s variables. Even though the
group had moderate and low level variables, the moderate level variables outnumber the low
level. Also, the moderate level variables are still significant. It makes sense that significance
leads to significance. Therefore, it is not unreasonable that two moderate level variables can lead
to a high level of success.
Another group worth explaining is the Healthcare Leadership Council. The Healthcare
Leadership Council may look like its level of success is not explained by the model. However,
although the group has a low, high, and moderate level for different variables, the high and
moderate variables are both significant. A high variable can be thought of as very significant and
a moderate variable can be thought of as significant. The average of the two would be
significant—either high or moderate. Therefore, the expected outcome of success would be
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significant, or moderate. The Healthcare Leadership Council did have a moderate Success Level,
so in this case, the model did work.
Pfizer’s high Success Level is explained by the model because all its variables do have
significance. Two moderate variables and a high variable can reasonably lead to a high Success
Level. All of the variables have significant levels, so a working model would have Pfizer’s
Success Level also be significant, which it is in this case.
PhRMA’s high success level can also be explained by the model. Although it has one low
variable, because the other two variables are significant (moderate and high) a significant level
of success would be expected. Thus, PhRMA’s high level of success is expected and explained
by the model.
Out of the four groups that the model does not work for, the Chamber of Commerce’s
reasoning for not being a working model should be explained. It is interesting that the Chamber
of Commerce has two high variables but one low variable which results in a low Success Level.
The model does not work here, because two high level variables that carry a high level of
significance should result in a Success Level that is also significant. It is interesting that the
model did not work in this case, but perhaps this could be because of the lack of Presidential
Alignment, which appears to be important in a case like this where the President wins.
United Health Group’s low level of success cannot be explained by this model. The
group has two moderate level variables and a low level of Presidential Alignment. With two
variables that are significant, it would be expected that there would be a significant outcome for
the group. However, there was not, so the behavior was not explained by this model.
For the groups that the model does not work there could be other factors that the chart
does not explain influencing interest group behavior and outcomes. The main problem with the
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model in this case is that Presidential Alignment and Success Level overlap. However, despite
this, the model still works to explain the Success Level of most of the groups in this case.
The most successful interest groups in this reform were the AARP, the American College
of Radiology, Pfizer Inc., and PhRMA. Of these four groups, three have high levels of
Presidential Alignment. The American College of Radiology is the only exception and this may
be because their goal was so small and specific. All groups had mixed levels of Ideological
Alignment with Congress and generally, their newspaper mentions were moderate-to-high.
The least successful interest groups in this reform were groups that were mixed across all
of the variables or had consistently low levels of alignment or activity. Mixed organizations are
groups who have no clear patterns across all variables. This suggests that groups who have
multiple mixed variables, or consistently low alignment or activity, will have a low level of
success, while those who have consistently high alignment or moderate-high variables will have
high levels of success. Also, in general, groups who had a low Presidential Alignment had low
levels of success. It is important to note that determining the impact of activity/Newspaper
Mentions versus the impact of Congressional Alignment is difficult. Five groups have complete
opposite relationships between Congressional Alignment and their Success Level. There are also
eight cases where the relationship deviates by one level. The five one-level deviations for
Presidential to Congressional Alignment seems to be less alignment between Congress and an
interest group’s success than Presidential Alignment and an interest group’s success. In terms of
Newspaper mentions, five groups have opposite relationships between Newspaper Mentions and
Success Level and five groups have a one-level deviation. That leaves eight groups who have the
same Newspaper Mentions Level as Success Level. Distinguishing the impact of the two is
problematic, especially in this case where the President wins. However, because it looks like
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there are slightly more equivalent Newspaper Mention Levels and Success Levels than there are
Congressional Alignment Levels and Success Levels, in the case where the President wins, it
looks like Newspaper Mentions may have more of an impact. Although, it is important to note
that both Newspaper Mentions and Congressional Alignment have the same number of opposite
relationships, making a relationship hard to observe.
In sum, the model partially worked for this case. Groups who were highly aligned with
President Obama had a high level of success while groups who were inconsistent and/or against
the reform did not have high levels of success. This could be because groups who had low levels
of success tended to have low levels of Presidential Alignment and to be in favor of preserving
the status quo. In this case the status quo was not preserved and change occurred. The model was
able to determine the Success Level for the majority of interest groups, but the overlapping of the
Presidential Alignment variable and an interest group’s Success Level makes it more difficult to
interpret the model.

Chapter 6: Conclusion
The model was applied to three separate cases, Clinton’s, Obama’s, and Bush’s health
care reform attempts. In observing the effectiveness of the model, it is clear that the model was
not very successful in Clinton’s reform, was moderately successful in Obama’s reform, and was
successful in Bush’s reform. The model was successful if it was able to explain an interest
group’s significant Success Level (moderate or high) through the group having a significant
(moderate or high) level in two or more variables. It was also successful if it was able to explain
an interest group’s non-significant Success Level (low) through the group having a nonsignificant level in two ore more variables. In the Clinton case, there was a strong opposition
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movement that hindered the model, in the Bush case, the model worked because the variables
were relatively independent and the model explained what it set out to explain, finally in the
Obama case Presidential Alignment and Success were not wholly independent, yet the model
worked partially for some cases because there was alignment between variables and Success
Level. When looking at the success of the model in each case, it is clear that there could have
been more factors at play than this model alone could measure. Despite this, this model does
have relative success in explaining the Success Level of some interest groups depending on their
Newspaper Mentions, Ideological Alignment with Congress, and Presidential Alignment.
Below are some of the differences and similarities of the cases that could have affected
the model. Also discussed will be an overall success analysis of the model and how it could be
improved for future use.
In the Bush and Obama case, the both presidents made their goal known to Congress and
the public and then the House and Senate delegated between themselves and produced a plan that
eventually became law. However there were some key differences. In Obama’s reform, there was
no give and take between Republicans and Democrats. The plan was a predominately
Democratic plan and was passed with minimal Republican support. For the most part, provisions
were not put into the legislation in order to appease the Republicans or to gain their support.
Compared to the other two plans, it was clear that Republicans and Democrats were not willing
to bargain. However, in Bush’s attempt at Medicare reform, there was, at least initially, some
compromise and give-and-take between the two sides. Republicans mostly controlled the plan,
but there were concessions provisions in the plan that Democrats supported. This is evident in
the Senate in which some Democrats supported and voted on the bill. However, after the bill
went to conference, these provisions were weakened and fewer Democrats supported the bill
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because of fears that the bill was too focused on helping industries rather than seniors. After
conference every vote mattered and Republican loyalty was necessary. There was little Democrat
support for the legislation because of the rising estimated costs and the lack of strong provisions
to protect seniors and to control the costs of prescription drugs.
Bush and Obama had key differences in their reform plans. Bush’s Medicare reform was
a smaller, specialized plan compared to an overhaul of the United State’s health care delivery
system. By having a targeted plan on a specific issue within health care, different actors and
players come to the table. Also, industries have different goals than they would if the reform was
comprehensive. By having a targeted approach on a specific issue, interest groups had specific
preferences and the debate could also be targeted. Because of this structure, it could have been
easier for both the president and interest groups in favor of reform to change the status quo. In
Obama’s health care reform attempt, the reform was comprehensive and a larger reform has the
potential to invite more players and a longer debate. This is seen in how, compared to Bush’s
reform, there were many alternative bills and proposals offered in the House and Senate during
Obama’s health care reform attempt, but during Bush’s attempt, there was always just leading
Committee or House and Senate plans. This is another difference, during Obama’s reform there
were many more competing plans and less of a structured approach from within Congress, while
during Bush’s reform, Committees and Congress as a whole attempted to manage and streamline
plans. There were not plans that competed with the Committee and main House and Senate
plans.
Other differences between the presidents’ attempts are that while they both tried to
delegate the responsibility of forming a plan to Congress, Bush did outline what he would like to
see in a plan more clearly and he did publically say what he would like to see in a plan. His
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statements were not recommendations for Congress as he was outlining his own ideal plan for
Medicare reform. Obama, however, told Congress what key provisions he wanted in a plan and
said it was up to Congress to figure out a way to develop and pass legislation that would try to
meet those provisions. While Bush was outlining a plan for Congress, Obama gave
recommendations.
Each case had to handle different coalitions in Congress. In the case of Obama’s reform,
the Blue Dog Democrats heavily resisted voting to pass the reform. At the time, one-fifth of all
Democrats were in the coalition and they wanted to make sure that provisions in the bill would
not hurt small businesses and they wanted to keep government costs down (Bendavid 2009). The
Blue Dog Coalition had 52 votes in the House, which means that if they coordinated with
Republican votes, they could defeat the legislation. In order to appease this coalition, provisions
were written into the bill to distribute more funds to rural doctors (which are in the Blue Dogs’
districts) (Bendavid 2009). Bush did not face rebellion from internal coalitions within his own
party, he just had to fight for every last Republican vote to ensure that the bill would pass the
House and the Senate. In Bush’s case, leaders of the party had to lobby hard the day of voting to
try and sway votes against Medicare reform to votes for the reform. Deals were made with
Members of Congress and the process by which lobbying was done and the vote was held
resulted in a review by the Ethics Committee. Both presidents had to fight for alignment within
their own party, but during Obama’s reform concessions were made to appeal to the Blue Dog
Democrats while during Bush’s reform intense lobbying practices the day of the vote were
employed.
Between Bush and Obama’s reform attempt there were also similarities. Although they
delegated differently, as mentioned above, both presidents at least tried to delegate legislative
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responsibility to Congress. Bush did have more of an involved approach when stating his plan
and ideals for Medicare reform than Obama in stating his goals for comprehensive health care
reform, but importantly, both let Congress develop their own plans instead of giving Congress a
bill to try and pass.
Another similarity between Bush and Obama was that they both made initial, or
“sweetheart” deals with interest groups to gain their support from the beginning. Both presidents
targeted the pharmaceutical industry as well as other major players. Also, both groups were able
to garner support from some key groups such as the AMA, AHA, and AARP. Having the major
industries—hospital, medical, seniors, and pharmaceutical—on your side is certainly a way to
secure increased support for the plan and to help increase the strength of the plan in Congress.
Having key players in favor of the plan is better than having them opposed to the plan. Both
presidents set out to try and make deals with the interest groups to try and get them on board
with reform early on. This plays into the idea of Presidential Alignment for an interest group. If
the president himself is seeking out alignment, that will greatly increase the likelihood that an
interest group will have a higher level of Presidential Alignment than if an interest group was left
without a relationship. Having the president seek out a relationship with a group will increase the
chance that the group will be in favor of the reform because the group has had the chance to tell
the administration what they want and what concessions they would specifically like in order to
be in favor of the reform. Without the administration working with the interest groups, the
chance that the president’s preferences and plans will align with that of interests are not as high.
Both Bush and Obama saw the utility of seeking out relationships with interest groups and
making deals early on before interest groups had a chance to lobby hard against the reform. Also,
both made initial and substantial deals with the pharmaceutical industry to gain their support.
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In addition to having similar deal-making methods, both Bush and Obama had a majority

in Congress at the time they were pushing for a health care reform. Having control over both the
House and the Senate and the ability to pass legislation through without votes from the
opposition is an advantage in a situation of reform. At the time of Bush’s reform, there were 48
Democratic Senators, 49 Republican Senators and one Independent Senator. In the House there
were 222 Republican Senators, with one Independent who caucused with the Republicans. There
were 210 Democrats and one Independent who caucused with the Democrats. For Obama’s
reform, the Senate was composed of 55 Democrats, 41 Republicans, and two Independents who
caucused with the Democrats. Towards the end of 2009, the Democrats had a supermajority in
the Senate and controlled over 60 votes. The House of Representatives was composed of 256
Democrats, and 178 Republicans, with one vacant seat.
Both presidents also were not met with a strong opposition movement. Unlike Clinton,
Bush and Obama were not met with a large coalition of interest groups who did not support their
plans for reform. While interest groups were not always fully on board and were not supportive
of all the provisions in reform, Bush and Obama did have support from interest groups and their
bills were publically endorsed by multiple groups. In these instances, interest groups were not
wholly opposed to reform. They saw that the potential for reform was on the horizon and were
willing to compromise and make concessions rather than try to block the plan altogether. This
difference affects Presidential Alignment. When an interest group choses to participate in
supporting a reform, its Presidential Alignment will be affected.
The model works well for Bush because it provided an explanation for why an interest
group would have a high level of success for the majority of interest groups in an attempt of
health care reform. In Bush’s case, Presidential Alignment and Success Level were not

	
  

141

necessarily related and interest groups who had a significant (moderate or high) level in two or
more variables were likely to have a significant Success Level (moderate or high). For the
majority of interest groups, 13 out of 17, the model was able to accurately explain an interest
group’s Success Level based on the significance of the groups Newspaper Mentions,
Congressional Alignment, and Presidential Alignment.
For Obama’s reform, the model is able to explain the Success Level for 14 out of the 18
groups observed, but Presidential Alignment was not completely independent of an interest
group’s Success Level. This is because Obama’s plan was the plan that passed through Congress.
Although he delegated his preferences, he was able to get most of them in the legislation,
therefore his ideal plan as outlined through his preferences resembled the policy outcome. This
makes it difficult to separate Presidential Alignment from Success Level because, in a way, a
group succeeds if the president succeeds with a reform. If, the president has a high level of
success, so will the interest group because, essentially the policy outcome is the president’s
policy plan. This is avoided in Bush’s case because the final plan was not the plan that he would
have ultimately implemented. Congress acted more independently in Bush’s case.
In Clinton’s case, the model does not work very well. It failed to explain the Success
Level for a majority of the interest groups observed. Out of 12 interest groups, it was able to
explain the Success Level for five groups. This is likely because of the strong opposition
movement present in Clinton’s reform. It is easier for interests to block change than for change
to occur. The status quo is easily protected. Also, Presidential alignment is needed when a group
wants reform to occur, but when an interest group is trying to obstruct policy change and protect
the status quo, Presidential Alignment it is not essential. When a group wants to stop change
from occurring there is no reason for that group to align themselves with the president, that is
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why the model does not work well in the instance of Clinton’s health care reform attempt.
Interest groups bandwagoned and attempted to block policy change. In order to do that they did
not need the support of Clinton and there was no reason for them to try and align with him. Thus,
the variable of Presidential Alignment was not at play as much as it was in other cases. Also, by
default, when the president lost, interest groups likely had a significant level of success because
they wanted the status quo to remain the same.
This model works best when there are interest groups both in favor of and opposed to the
reform who have the potential to align with the president. The president’s success must also not
be the overall success level of the policy in order for the model to work well. If all groups are
against the reform, as in Clinton’s case, the data will present itself in a way that the table has a
hard time interpreting because without Presidential Alignment working well, the table by itself
cannot explain factors such as a strong opposition movement or bandwagoning effects.
As stated previously in the analysis after Clinton’s case study, the model works when an
organization has two or more significant variables that lead to a significant outcome. The model
also works when an organization as two or more low significance variables that lead to a nonsignificant outcome. A high variable can be thought of as being very significant, a moderate
variable can be thought of as significant, and a low variable can be thought of as not significant.
If an interest group has a combination of high and moderate variables and has a high or moderate
Success Level the model is successful. This is because the average of the two would be
significant—either high or moderate. Therefore, the expected outcome of success would be
significant, or moderate. If the expected outcome is produced, then the outcome worked. The
model works if it follows this pattern:
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Table 2. Instances of Model Success
Variable 1
Significant (Moderate or
High)

Variable 2
Significant (Moderate or
High)

Not Significant (Low)

Not Significant (Low)

Variable 3
Significant or Not
Significant (Low or
Moderate or High)
Significant or Not
Significant (Low or
Moderate or High)

Success Level
Significant (Moderate or
High)
Not Significant (Low)

Variable 1, 2, and 3 are not assigned to any particular variable. Any variable can have the
assigned significance value that would meet the criteria for the model to be successful. For
instance, Variable 1 is not restricted to Newspaper Mentions. Any two variables out of
Newspaper Mentions, Ideological Alignment with Congress, and Presidential Alignment can
fulfill the two out of three minimum requirement for matching significance or non-significance
for the model to be successful in that case.3
Out of the 47 total interest groups observed, the model was able to explain the Success
Level for 32 of the groups. This means that the model explained approximately 68.1 percent of
Success Levels. If Clinton’s case is removed, it is able to explain the Success Level for 27 out of
35 groups observed. Without the Clinton case, the model explained approximately 74.1 percent
of Success Levels.
The model worked as expected in Theory Section, it just did not work as well as
expected. However, when the model worked, it worked as predicted. This is expressed in the
following contingency table. This can be observed by the following contingency table:
Table 1. Contingency Table of Variables
Low Policy Success
(Non-Significant)
Interest Group Strategy:
Activity Level
Ideological Alignment
with Congress
Presidential Alignment
-
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From page 77

Moderate Policy Success
(Significant)
+

High Policy Success
(Very Significant)
++

+

++

+

++
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Interest groups who had higher policy success had more significant variables than those

with lower policy success. The more significant variables an interest group had, the more
significant the Success Level. The reasons the model did not work as expected were discussed
above. These reasons include a tautology between Success Level and Presidential Alignment,
bandwagoning, and a strong opposition movement.
Initially, it was expected that interest groups’ Activity Levels and Congressional
Alignment would have more of an impact on a group’s success level. I would have expected to
see more groups who had uniform patterns of variables across the case. However, the prevalence
of this was minimal and more often interest groups had a non-uniform level of activity and
alignment. This is what made hard to initially observe clear patterns in the data and significance
of variables.
Important factors for interest group’s Success Level appeared to be their Presidential
Alignment, but only when the president was able to successfully pass their favored reform. Also,
it is difficult to distinguish the importance of Newspaper Mentions versus the importance of
Congressional Alignment. Each variable does aligns with the Success Level in cases, but most
often they are aligning with Presidential Alignment, which suggests that Presidential Alignment
is the most important variable.
In hindsight there are certain things that could have been done differently. One main
thing that could have been done differently would be to try and limit the tautology, or the
potential of a tautology, between Presidential Alignment and Success Level. A way to combat
the problem of this tautology would have been to potentially look at the deals that interest groups
made before the reform with a Presidential Administration and see how that benefited their
policy outcome after the reform attempt had concluded. Another aspect of this research that

	
  

145

could have been done different would have been to look at Congressional Alignment in a
different way. Measuring Ideological Alignment with Congress is difficult and the way it was
done here was through interest group spending. Another, maybe more reliable, measure of
alignment could make the data more accurate and could help determine the significance of
Congressional Alignment.
A methodological approach that could have been done differently is a different wording
of search terms. For this project, the search terms for a specific interest group were
((“healthcare” OR “health care”) AND (“reform” OR “plan” OR “proposal”) AND (“president’s
name”) AND (“interest group name” OR “interest group abbreviation”)) for a specific year.
However, if the search criteria were amended to not include the president’s name, different
results could have occurred. By including the name of the president involved in the reform
movement, the data could have been limited. However, that is the search criteria and parameters
that were set. Proportionally, the data is likely the same, but there is a chance that it could have
an effect.
It is important to mention that DW-Nominate scores, which are used to determine a
Congress’ ideological alignment really only states how legislators are rank-ordered compared to
each other. Because of this, in some ways, it is not a true measure of ideology. Also, it weighs all
votes the same. This means that roll call votes on the naming of a Post Office is weighed the
same as a vote on comprehensive health care reform. By including all votes and weighing them
the same, there is the potential to make less polar Members of Congress look more polarized
(Trende 2012). A better measure for this study would look at Members’ votes on key issues that
have a similar weight as comprehensive health care reform. This would be a slightly better
measure of ideology.
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The model had difficulty explaining bandwagoning by interest groups. This could slightly

be observed when groups had a high level of success and had other significant variables, but a
low level of activity. Likely, a group that was not very active, but was able to have a significant
level of success was successful because it was able to benefit from the efforts of larger interest
groups who shared the same preferences. Also, coalition formation by interest groups could have
occurred, but the table does not account for that behavior. It only looks at the individual behavior
of a single interest group. Thus, a way to measure or observe bandwagoning effects would
strengthen the model and help explain the Success Level of groups who had lower activity and
Congressional Alignment levels, but still had a significant level of success. As Peterson said,
there is a free-rider problem (Peterson 1993b). Groups can benefit from the efforts of other,
larger groups whether or not they are actively participating in a reform. This can make it so
groups are less likely to have a high activity level or to align with the President themselves.
Other groups with more strength can lobby on their behalf and they will still win.
When trying to observe interest group spending, the data was not as complete as one
would have wanted or expected. This made it so looking at interest group spending as a measure
of activity could only be done as an industry-wide approach, but not on the individual level like
this study required. Repeating this study with a better measure of interest group spending and
better spending data would greatly assist in measures of interest group activity and
Congressional Alignment.
In the future, another change that could be made would be to look at different legislation.
One of the problems that this model encountered was that there was not flexibility in the process.
There was little room in the process for amendments to be made that would appease interest
groups. A bill and legislative process where there is the potential for interest groups to oppose
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the president, but get an amendment that they wanted, would have an interesting impact on the
model. Observing a case where there is an outcome that is not exactly what the president wants
or what the president does not want. There needs to be more than a binary outcome. This is
possible through amendments and more of a general debate around a less-controversial bill.
Overall, the model worked well in one case, worked moderately-well in a second, and did
not work well in a third. It is reasonable to say that the model has the potential to work, but in
comprehensive health care reform there are many factors that play into the Success Level of an
interest group’s policy outcome. Due to this, it is hard to narrow down what exactly in the model
leads to an interest group’s success. Such factors include bandwagoning, opposition movements,
and coalitions. The model showed in Clinton’s case, in line with interest group theory, that it is
easier to protect the status quo than for change to occur. However when an overhaul of Medicaid
and the U.S. health care system was imminent, interest groups decided to make deals with the
president and utilize Presidential Alignment. While other factors out of the scope of this study
were certainly at play here, the model was able to successfully explain the Success Level for the
majority of interest groups when interest groups were at the table.
When looking at the three initial hypotheses of: 1) With all other things being equal,
interest groups who are more active with the reform movement are more likely to be successful
in their goals than those who are less active, 2) With all other things being equal, interest groups
who are aligned with presidential health care reform initiatives are more likely to be successful
in their goals than those who are not aligned, and 3) With all other things being equal, interest
groups who are aligned with the ideological majority in Congress are more likely to be
successful in their goals than those who are not aligned with the ideological majority in
Congress, it is seems that there was less support for the first and third hypothesis, but when the
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president was a winner in the health care reform movement and there was not a strong opposition
movement, the third hypothesis was supported by the data.
In sum, interest group behavior has always been known to be difficult to predict. This
model shows that it is hard to narrow down a specific reason why interest groups succeed, but
when they have a significant Activity Level (newspaper mentions), Congressional Alignment,
and Presidential Alignment, they are more likely than not to have a significant policy outcome.
Changes can be implemented to the model and case study approach to refine it and collect better
data, but with the current data, it is reasonable to state that the more significance an interest
group has at each variable, the more significant the interest group’s policy outcome. This
research resembled the dominant interest group theories, when interest groups are seeking to
protect the status quo, the status quo typically prevails because it is easier to block change than to
initiate change. Also White House liaison theory and presidential leadership was at play. It was
clear that presidential leadership did matter in order for an interest group to succeed if the
president’s reform efforts were successful. Also, in accordance with Peterson’s White House
liaison theory, the White House sought out relationships with key interest groups in order to
support the legislation in the eyes of the public and Congress (Peterson 1992). This model was
able to explain the Success Level for the majority of interest groups at play. Congressional
Alignment and Presidential Alignment appeared to be the most important variables for an
interest group to have a significant Success Level. This topic can certainly be explored further
and expanded to see the depth of the relationships between interest groups’ behavior and policy
success.
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